"In 1953, a coup d'etat in Iran was carefully organised by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States together with the British Secret Intelligence Service. The CIA Director 'approved a budget of $1 million which could be used by the Tehran Station in any way that would bring about the fall' of Premier Mossadeq. Once the deed had been accomplished, the CIA commissioned a history of its successful operation to change the Iranian regime. It is published here in full." "This document is crucial to an understanding of Iranian history: but it also has some considerable relevance to the constitutional history of the United Kingdom. Here we have a short guide through the labyrinths of the world where things are not what they seem to be. Yet, the parallels with the current confrontation with Iran are all too clear."--BOOK JACKET.
“By a wide margin, this book is the most sophisticated treatment of the internal dynamics and paradoxes of Iranian politics that I know of.” —Nader Hashemi, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies This volume provides an unparalleled and timely look at political, social, economic, and ideological dynamics in contemporary Iran. Through chapters on social welfare and privatization, university education, the role and authority of the Supreme Leader, the rule of law, the evolving electoral system, and the intense debate over human rights within and outside the regime, the contributors offer a comprehensive overview of Iranian politics. Their case studies reveal a society whose multiple vectors of contestation, negotiation, and competition are creating possibilities for transformation that are yet to be realized but whose outcome will affect the Islamic Republic, the region, and relations with the United States. “Offers a realistic, nuanced, and perceptive analysis of Iran’s complex and evolving political system . . . This book would be appropriate as required or recommended reading for any courses dealing with the Islamic Republic of Iran or with the politics of the Middle East, both at the undergraduate and graduate levels.” —Mohsen Milani, author of The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution
An award-winning author tells the stories of the audacious American politicians, military commanders, and business executives who took it upon themselves to depose monarchs, presidents, and prime ministers of other countries with disastrous long-term consequences.
Foreign Affairs Best of Books of 2021 "Book of the Week" on Fareed Zakaria GPS Financial Times Best Books of 2020 The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades—and why it always seems to go wrong. "It's a first-rate work, intelligently analyzing a complex issue, and learning the right lessons from history." —Fareed Zakaria Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of once per decade—in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have likewise been highly varied, ranging from diplomatic pressure alone to outright military invasion and occupation. What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before. Philip H. Gordon's Losing the Long Game is a thorough and riveting look at the U.S. experience with regime change over the past seventy years, and an insider’s view on U.S. policymaking in the region at the highest levels. It is the story of repeated U.S. interventions in the region that always started out with high hopes and often the best of intentions, but never turned out well. No future discussion of U.S. policy in the Middle East will be complete without taking into account the lessons of the past, especially at a time of intense domestic polarization and reckoning with America's standing in world.
This book offers Ritter's "national intelligence assessment" of the Iranian imbroglio. He examines the Bush administration's regime-change policy and the potential of Iran to threaten U.S. national security interests. The author also considers how the country is seen by other interested parties.
This report analyzes four key aspects of US and Iranian strategic competition--sanctions, energy, arms control, and regime change. Its primary focus is on the ways in which the sanctions applied to Iran have changed US and Iranian competition since the fall of 2011. This escalation has been spurred by the creation of a series of far stronger US unilateral sanctions and the European Union’s imposition of equally strong sanctions, both of which affect Iran’s ability to export, its financial system, and its overall economy.
The paper evaluates the situation in Iran in light of the recent protests due to the growing satisfaction among its people. The foreseeable future for Iran is that due to these protests and rebellions by the people, in addition to other factors of instability, there is a huge chance of regime change happening in Iran. The status quo of Iran is presented from many angles, relevant past, general status quo, political and diplomatic, economic, media, military and cooperation with the UAE. Iran's past has not been any better than the present. It had a past rich of the public dissatisfaction and continuous let downs to the international community, Iran's present actions are not only maintaining their unfavored view of the rest of the world, it actually is worsening it. The continuation of actions such as the nuclear program it has, meddling with other countries affairs and breach of treaties is making the world have a worse view of Iran. Iran has not been very open to diplomatic negotiations with others as often as they should and does not practice proper politics much. Calling media coverage in Iran as controlled would be an understatement. Iran doe not give direct public statement in regard to its defense assets. The UAE and Iranian business cooperation is very significant regardless of their issues. This paper takes all these points into consideration as a starting point, a status quo, from which the analysis takes off. For the sake of unity, all changes even if just of the way a country is governed without changing the governing body is considered a regime change. Accordingly, between 1899 and 1997, 42 countries have shown regime change and a pattern similar to an infectious disease. In other words, regime change spreads around to neighboring countries as a disease does. Furthermore, like the disease, the more time that passes and the future one is from the source the less probable the infection, regime change, is to happen. Analysis of these data support this hypothesis. Furthermore, subjective analysis shows that Iran and Nazi Germany are very similar. If the world is to prevent a new Nazi regime, Iranian regime need to be changed by force or reason. The paper suggests that the best time to do so between 2042 and 2048.
The son of the deposed Shah of Iran reflects on Iran's political situation (without mentioning his father) and argues for a campaign of civil disobedience to the current Iranian regime that would hopefully lead to a constitutional monarchy restoring a Pahlavi to the throne of Iran. He discusses energy policy, foreign policy, and the Iranian Diaspora suggesting that the policies of the current clerical leaders of Iran have led to disastrous results for the Iranian people. He counters this with some rather bland bromides about international cooperation, secularization, self-determination, and cultural preservation. If brought back to the throne, he claims he will consult all of the Iranian people in governing the nation. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.
The Green Movement protests that erupted in Iran in 2009 amid allegations of election fraud shook the Islamic Republic to its core. For the first time in decades, the adoption of serious liberal reforms seemed possible. But the opportunity proved short-lived, leaving Iranian activists and intellectuals to debate whether any path to democracy remained open. Offering a new framework for understanding democratization in developing countries governed by authoritarian regimes, Democracy in Iran is a penetrating, historically informed analysis of Iran’s current and future prospects for reform. Beginning with the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Misagh Parsa traces the evolution of Iran’s theocratic regime, examining the challenges the Islamic Republic has overcome as well as those that remain: inequalities in wealth and income, corruption and cronyism, and a “brain drain” of highly educated professionals eager to escape Iran’s repressive confines. The political fortunes of Iranian reformers seeking to address these problems have been uneven over a period that has seen hopes raised during a reformist administration, setbacks under Ahmadinejad, and the birth of the Green Movement. Although pro-democracy activists have made progress by fits and starts, they have few tangible reforms to show for their efforts. In Parsa’s view, the outlook for Iranian democracy is stark. Gradual institutional reforms will not be sufficient for real change, nor can the government be reformed without fundamentally rethinking its commitment to the role of religion in politics and civic life. For Iran to democratize, the options are narrowing to a single path: another revolution.
