This new study of senates in small powers across the North Atlantic shows that the establishment and the reform of these upper legislative houses have followed remarkably parallel trajectories. Senate reforms emerged in the wake of deep political crises within the North Atlantic world and were influenced by the comparatively weak positions of small powers. Reformers responded to crises and constantly looked beyond borders and oceans for inspiration to keep their senates relevant. The Open Access version of this book, available at http://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780429323119, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
In this lively analysis, Daniel Wirls examines the Senate in relation to our other institutions of government and the constitutional system as a whole, exposing the role of the "world’s greatest deliberative body" in undermining effective government and maintaining white supremacy in America. As Wirls argues, from the founding era onward, the Senate constructed for itself an exceptional role in the American system of government that has no firm basis in the Constitution. This self-proclaimed exceptional status is part and parcel of the Senate’s problematic role in the governmental process over the past two centuries, a role shaped primarily by the combination of equal representation among states and the filibuster, which set up the Senate’s clash with modern democracy and effective government and has contributed to the contemporary underrepresentation of minority members. As he explains, the Senate’s architecture, self-conception, and resulting behavior distort rather than complement democratic governance and explain the current gridlock in Washington, D.C. If constitutional changes to our institutions are necessary for better governance, then how should the Senate be altered to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem? This book provides one answer.
Examines the upper houses of the world's parliaments within their own political systems, capturing their development over time and characterizing their relations with the lower house, the government of the day, and extraparliamentary political parties. Begins with the US Senate, then analyzes the German, Australian, and Canadian federal senates. Remaining chapters look at senatorial segments of parliamentary life in the unitary systems of France, Britain, Italy, Spain, and Poland. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Recent legislative battles over healthcare reform, the federal budget, and other prominent issues have given rise to widespread demands for the abolition or reform of the filibuster in the US Senate. Critics argue that members’ traditional rights of unlimited debate and amendment have led to paralyzing requirements for supermajorities and destructive parliamentary tactics such as "secret holds." In Defending the Filibuster, a veteran Senate aide and a former Senate Parliamentarian maintain that the filibuster is fundamental to the character of the Senate. They contend that the filibuster protects the rights of the minority in American politics, assures stability and deliberation in government, and helps to preserve constitutional principles of checks and balances and separation of powers. Richard A. Arenberg and Robert B. Dove provide an instructive historical overview of the development of Senate rules, define and describe related procedures and tactics, examine cases related to specific pieces of legislation, and consider current proposals to end the filibuster or enact other reforms. Arguing passionately in favor of retaining the filibuster, they offer a stimulating assessment of the issues surrounding current debates on this contentious issue.
The Canadian Senate has long been considered an institutional pariah, viewed as an undemocratic, outmoded warehouse for patronage appointments and mired in spending and workload scandals. In 2014, the federal government was compelled to refer constitutional questions to the Supreme Court relating to its attempts to enact senatorial elections and term limits. Constitutional Pariah explores the aftermath of Reference re Senate Reform, which barred major unilateral alteration of the Senate by Parliament. Ironically, the decision resulted in one of the most sweeping parliamentary reforms in Canadian history, creating a pathway to informal changes in the appointments process that have curbed patronage and partisanship. Despite reinvigorating the Senate, Reference re Senate Reform has far-reaching implications for constitutional reform in other contexts. Macfarlane’s sharp critique suggests that the Court’s nebulous approach to the amending formula raises the spectre of a frozen constitution, unable to evolve with the country.
The American people are disgusted with the U.S. Congress. In 2014, public approval of the first branch of government reached a forty-year low. Congress is producing legislation at a historically anemic rate, while many of the nations immediate problems fester. Those are the facts. The fiction? The notion that we cant do anything about it. The U.S. Constitution assigned obligations to our legislative branchcalling on our elected representatives to promote the general welfare. Congress is in breach of contract. In Unlock Congress, veteran journalist and former political strategist Michael Golden examines the ways in which congressional failure generates a harmful PRODUCT. Rather than affixing blame to individual politicians, Golden diagnoses the causes behind the breakdown. He then identifies the PROBLEMobsolete rules that lead to major defects within the system. Finally, Unlock Congress lays out a PLATFORM of solutions designed to reinvigorate both the process and its players.
On its Surface, this book is aimed at the topical issue of regulatory reform. But underneath it strives to go beyond the topical, seeking to analyze regulation as a distinct discipline and to help teach it as a separate subject.
How U.S. senators were chosen prior to the Seventeenth Amendment—and the consequences of Constitutional reform From 1789 to 1913, U.S. senators were not directly elected by the people—instead the Constitution mandated that they be chosen by state legislators. This radically changed in 1913, when the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, giving the public a direct vote. Electing the Senate investigates the electoral connections among constituents, state legislators, political parties, and U.S. senators during the age of indirect elections. Wendy Schiller and Charles Stewart find that even though parties controlled the partisan affiliation of the winning candidate for Senate, they had much less control over the universe of candidates who competed for votes in Senate elections and the parties did not always succeed in resolving internal conflict among their rank and file. Party politics, money, and personal ambition dominated the election process, in a system originally designed to insulate the Senate from public pressure. Electing the Senate uses an original data set of all the roll call votes cast by state legislators for U.S. senators from 1871 to 1913 and all state legislators who served during this time. Newspaper and biographical accounts uncover vivid stories of the political maneuvering, corruption, and partisanship—played out by elite political actors, from elected officials, to party machine bosses, to wealthy business owners—that dominated the indirect Senate elections process. Electing the Senate raises important questions about the effectiveness of Constitutional reforms, such as the Seventeenth Amendment, that promised to produce a more responsive and accountable government.
"The reader can't help but hold out hope that maybe someday, some of these sweeping changes could actually bring the nation's government out of its intellectual quagmire...his lively, conversational tone and compelling examples make the reader a more than willing student for this updated civics lesson." --The Hill The political book of the year, from the acclaimed founder and director of the Center for politics at the University of Virginia. A More Perfect Constitution presents creative and dynamic proposals from one of the most visionary and fertile political minds of our time to reinvigorate our Constitution and American governance at a time when such change is urgently needed, given the growing dysfunction and unfairness of our political system . Combining idealism and pragmatism, and with full respect for the original document, Larry Sabato's thought-provoking ideas range from the length of the president's term in office and the number and terms of Supreme Court justices to the vagaries of the antiquated Electoral College, and a compelling call for universal national service-all laced through with the history behind each proposal and the potential impact on the lives of ordinary people. Aware that such changes won't happen easily, but that the original Framers fully expected the Constitution to be regularly revised, Sabato urges us to engage in the debate and discussion his ideas will surely engender. During an election year, no book is more relevant or significant than this.
