"In the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2008, offers a systematic overview of recent developments in regulatory frameworks in advanced and emerging-market countries, outlining challenges to improving regulation, markets, and access in developing economies"--Provided by publisher.
Jomo Kwame Sundaram is assistant secretary general for economic development at the United Nations and research coordinator for the G24 Intergovernmental Group on International Monetary Affairs and Development. In 2007 he was awarded the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought. --Book Jacket.
Two top economists outline distinctive approaches to post-crisis financial reform. Over the last few years, the financial sector has experienced its worst crisis since the 1930s. The collapse of major firms, the decline in asset values, the interruption of credit flows, the loss of confidence in firms and credit market instruments, the intervention by governments and central banks: all were extraordinary in scale and scope. In this book, leading economists Randall Kroszner and Robert Shiller discuss what the United States should do to prevent another such financial meltdown. Their discussion goes beyond the nuts and bolts of legislative and regulatory fixes to consider fundamental changes in our financial arrangements. Kroszner and Shiller offer two distinctive approaches to financial reform, with Kroszner providing a systematic analysis of regulatory gaps and Shiller addressing the broader concerns of democratizing and humanizing finance. After brief discussions by four commentators (Benjamin M. Friedman, George G. Kaufman, Robert C. Pozen, and Hal S. Scott), Kroszner and Shiller each offer a response to the other's proposals, creating a fruitful dialogue between two major figures in the field.
This volume focuses on constructing a safer and more efficient financial system based on the lessons learned from the financial debacles of the 1980s. The first essay discusses the economic and political forces both propelling and opposing widespread banking reform. The next two essays describe the intellectual history of the deposit insurance reform provisions of FDICIA, arguably the most important banking legislation since the Banking Act of 1933, discuss the weaknesses and strengths of these provisions and make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the reforms. Theoretical and empirical evidence is then summarized and evaluated with respect to the costs and benefits of regulators granting forbearance to economically insolvent institutions. An analysis is given of the whys and hows of privatizing federal deposit insurance in case the reforms in FDICIA prove ineffective. An examination follows of the causes and consequences of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) debacle of the early 1990s and the implications for the supervision of foreign banks in the United States and elsewhere. Next the broader issue is discussed of whether U.S. financial markets affect the behavior of U.S. corporate managers, particularly whether they encourage managerial myopia. Without concluding whether such myopia exists, policy options are examined that would make financial markets more conducive to longer-term planning, including permitting banks to invest in corporate equity and thus monitor firms as owners as well as creditors.
The papers included in this book cover different aspects of the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions. They explore different options for reform and show that enhancing the participation of developing and emerging market countries in resolving the major monetary and financial problems confronting the world economy, would improve global economic performance and contribute to the elimination of world poverty.
The Independent Commission on Banking's final recommendations aim to create a more stable and competitive basis for UK banking for the long term. The result would be a banking system that is much less likely to cause, or succumb to, financial crises and the huge costs they bring; is self-reliant, so that the taxpayer does not have to bear the losses that banks make; and is effective and efficient at providing the basic banking services of safeguarding retail deposits, operating secure payments systems, and efficiently channelling savings to productive investments in the economy. Stability is crucial and UK banks should have more equity capital and loss-absorbing debt - beyond what has so far been internationally agreed - and their retail banking activities should be structurally separated, by a ring-fence, from wholesale and investment banking activities. The Commission also address competition, which has not been properly effective in UK retail banking. They recommend a seamless switching system based on redirection for personal and small business current accounts, free of cost and risk, complemented by measures to enhance transparency. The new Financial Conduct Authority should have a clear duty to promote effective competition. Structural reform should be complete by the Basel implementation date of 2019 at the latest. These reforms would result in better-capitalised, less leveraged banking more focused on the needs of savers and borrowers in the domestic economy. At the same time UK banks would be free to flourish in global markets, but without UK taxpayer support.
In 1978, China embarked on a gradual but far-reaching reform of its economic system. This paper focuses on the achievements so far in reforming the financial sector, the legal framework for financial transactions, the payments system, and the monetary policy and foreign exchange system. It also analyzes the tasks ahead to achieve the goals set in these areas for the year 2000.
This paper seeks to draw lessons for financial sector regulation and supervision and central bank liquidity management from the ongoing crisis, focusing principally on implications for the future rather than on immediate crisis management policies. Inadequacies in macroeconomic policies and the design of the international financial architecture exposed in the crisis will also have to be addressed to make the suggested changes in the regulatory framework effective.
An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.