øŠAline Darbellay analyzes the obvious system relevance of credit rating agencies in depth and assesses the possible options for regulatory responses to this systemic issue. Thereby, the book is based on a fruitful comparative legal approach and formul
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) shares concerns about the role credit rating agencies played in the dislocation of the credit markets. Poor performance by highly rated securities resulted in substantial investor loss and market turmoil which severely damaged the financial markets. Further steps are necessary to improve the integrity and transparency of the ratings process, promote competition among rating agencies, and give investors the appropriate context for evaluating ratings. This testimony discusses the new rules and rule proposals the SEC has adopted with respect to credit rating agencies registered as nationally recognized statistical rating org. (NRSROs).
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.
Studies credit ratings on subprime and Alt-A mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) deals issued between 2001 and 2007, the period leading up to the subprime crisis. The fraction of highly rated securities in each deal is decreasing in mortgage credit risk; ratings contain useful info. for investors. There was also evidence of significant time variation in risk-adjusted credit ratings, incl. a progressive decline in standards around the MBS market peak between 2005 and mid-2007. Conditional on initial ratings, they observe underperformance (high mortgage defaults and losses and large rating downgrades) among deals with observably higher risk mortgages based on a simple ex ante model and deals with a high fraction of opaque low-documentation loans.
Taking position from the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis, Credit Ratings and Market Over-reliance: An International Legal Analysis by Francesco De Pascalis provides an in depth legal and regulatory analysis of the concept of over-reliance in the use of ratings and how regulation facilitates over-reliance is different from mere reliance on credit ratings. Not only does the book provide an incisive doctrinal analysis of the concept of over-reliance, it also considers over-reliance from a comparative and international perspective by reviewing legal and regulatory developments under European Union and US law and how over-reliance has been addressed in international financial regulation.
The global crisis revealed that credit rating agencies (CRAs) are capable of bringing about potential distortions in the financial sector, thereby resulting in a reduction in market confidence which, in turn, influences negotiations and expectations. CRAs need to be held accountable for lack of transparency and inaccurate ratings, however the existing regulatory framework does not secure adequate investor protection. This book provides a new and important contribution to research in the area, at a crucial time in the debate around financial regulation and investment regimes.
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of credit rating economics and draws conclusions on the nature of regulation. It starts with an overview of the credit rating industry and introduces a framework that structures multiple rating agency functions. At the heart of the credit rating business model lies the reputation mechanism, which is analyzed in detail. After analyzing the reputation mechanism, the study takes a wider look at the industry and identifies the forces behind credit rating supply and demand. From an industrial organization perspective competition in the credit rating industry is limited. A comprehensive review of potential reasons for regulating the credit rating industry, however, reveals that there are only few compelling arguments. The regulatory approaches of the EU under the Capital Requirements Directive of 2005 and the USA under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 are contrasted against an optimal regulatory regime.