The twelve essays in this volume underscore the similarities between Chinese and American approaches to bilateral diplomacy and between their perceptions of each other’s policy-making motivations. Much of the literature on U.S.–China relations posits that each side was motivated either by ideologically informed interests or by ideological assumptions about its counterpart. But as these contributors emphasize, newly accessible archives suggest rather that both Beijing and Washington developed a responsive and tactically adaptable foreign policy. Each then adjusted this policy in response to changing international circumstances and changing assessments of its counterpart’s policies. Motivated less by ideology than by pragmatic national security concerns, each assumed that the other faced similar considerations.
Revisiting the Roots of the Cold War is a history of the emergence of the Cold War from 1944–1948, emphasizing the recently available Soviet scholarship and information from other archives. Prior scholarship on the origins of the Cold War served as the basis for the final works of James Gaddis, George Kennan and Ernest May in the 1980s, and with no access to Soviet materials, these works ignored the effects of American demobilization and the major restructuring of the State and Defense Departments. This study represents a more realistic appraisal of the formulation of U.S. policy.
This book examines the Vogeler/Sanders espionage case that ruptured ties between the US and UK and Hungary in 1949, and analyses this as an example of Western covert operations in the early Cold War. The work focuses on the 1949 case of ITT in Hungary, where two of its executives, the American Robert A. Vogeler and the Briton Edgar Sanders, were arrested by the secret police, tortured, forced to confess, put on a public show trial, and found guilty of espionage. This happened at a time that the US and the UK were cooperating in numerous operations to undermine the credibility of the communist regime and to encourage local resistance by “all means short of war.” Using the case as a lens to examine the dynamics of the early Cold War, the book integrates business history, diplomatic history and intelligence history, and thereby traces the impact of the case on Anglo-Hungarian, American-Hungarian, and Anglo-American relations during the critical period of 1949-1956. Vogeler’s case had a strong impact on the growing criticism of the Truman Administration’s containment policies and contributed to the demand for a more activist policy of ‘liberation of captive peoples’. His experiences also rallied the business community, especially trade associations such as the National Foreign Trade Council, the US Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers, to support the anti-communist crusade both abroad and at home. Vogeler’s wife also waged a personal campaign to secure her husband’s release and exemplifies the activism of conservative and Catholic women who waged their own anti-communist crusade. The book thus tells the “rest of the story” often omitted in traditional works. This book will be of much interest to students of Cold War history, intelligence studies and European political history.
As more and more people are questioning the assumptions of present U.S. foreign policy they are reexamining the roots of these policies in the diplomacy of the Cold War. This scrutiny has made the origins of the Cold War the most controversial issue in American diplomatic history. Now a complete new dimension has been added to the debate by the charges leveled by Robert James Maddox in The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War. How did the Cold War begin? Who or what was responsible? Could it have been avoided? Was it a temporary condition created by a combination of individual personalities and historical factors, or did it represent the clash of fundamentally irreconcilable political systems? The orthodox explanation of the Cold War is that it was "the brave and essential response of free men to Communist aggression." A number of scholars more or less identified with the New Left have challenged the conventional explanation by asserting that the U.S. bears the major responsibility for its onset. One group of revisionists sees this as the result of a failure of statesmanship on the part of Truman and the advisors around him, the other that the Cold War was the inevitable result of the American system as it developed over the years. Their conclusions have often been challenged in matters of interpretation. Robert Maddox, however, believes that an examination of the manner in which new interpretations are reached should precede dialogues over the ideas themselves. Consequently he has examined seven of the most prominent New Left works: The Tragedy of American Diplomacy by William Appleman Williams; The Cold War and Its Origins by D. F. Fleming; Atomic Diplomacy by Gar Alperovitz; The Free World Colossus by David Horowitz; The Politics of War by Gabriel Kolko; Yalta by Diane Shaver Clemens; and Architects of Illusion by Lloyd C. Gardner. After detailed comparisons of the evidence they present with the sources from which it was taken, he concludes that these books are based on pervasive misuse of the source materials and fail to measure up to the most elementary standards of good scholarship. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
One of America's leading historians offers the first major history of the Cold War. Packed with new information drawn from previously unavailable sources, the book offers major reassessments of Stalin, Mao, Khrushchev, Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Truman.
Abstract: This thesis examines how select newspaper editorial sections covered certain American Cold War foreign policy decisions between 1976 and 1980.
“Here’s a book that would've split the sides of Thucydides. Wiener’s magical mystery tour of Cold War museums is simultaneously hilarious and the best thing ever written on public history and its contestation.“ —Mike Davis, author of City of Quartz “Jon Wiener, an astute observer of how history is perceived by the general public, shows us how official efforts to shape popular memory of the Cold War have failed. His journey across America to visit exhibits, monuments, and other historical sites, demonstrates how quickly the Cold War has faded from popular consciousness. A fascinating and entertaining book.” —Eric Foner, author of Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877 "In How We Forgot the Cold War, Jon Wiener shows how conservatives tried—and failed—to commemorate the Cold War as a noble victory over the global forces of tyranny, a 'good war' akin to World War II. Displaying splendid skills as a reporter in addition to his discerning eye as a scholar, this historian's travelogue convincingly shows how the right sought to extend its preferred policy of 'rollback' to the arena of public memory. In a country where historical memory has become an obsession, Wiener’s ability to document the ambiguities and absences in these commemorations is an unusual accomplishment.” —Rick Perlstein, author of Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America “In this terrific piece of scholarly journalism, Jon Wiener imaginatively combines scholarship on the Cold War, contemporary journalism, and his own observations of various sites commemorating the era to describe both what they contain and, just as importantly, what they do not. By interrogating the standard conservative brand of American triumphalism, Wiener offers an interpretation of the Cold War that emphasizes just how unnecessary the conflict was and how deleterious its aftereffects have really been.”—Ellen Schrecker, author of Many Are The Crimes: McCarthyism in America
