Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System brings together the research of economists at New York University and the University of Maryland, along with those from the private sector, government bodies, and other universities. The first section of the volume focuses on the historical origins of the credit rating business and its present day industrial organization structure. The second section presents several empirical studies crafted largely around individual firm-level or bank-level data. These studies examine (a) the relationship between ratings and the default and recovery experience of corporate borrowers, (b) the comparability of credit ratings made by domestic and foreign rating agencies, and (c) the usefulness of financial market indicators for rating banks, among other topics. In the third section, the record of sovereign credit ratings in predicting financial crises and the reaction of financial markets to changes in credit ratings is examined. The final section of the volume emphasizes policy issues now facing regulators and credit rating agencies.
The business of credit ratings began in the United States in the early 1900s. Over time, credit ratings have gradually taken on an expanding role, both in the United States and abroad and in official financial market regulation as well as in private capital market decisions. However, in 1999 the Bank for International Settlements (through its Committee on Banking Supervision) proposed rule changes that would provide an explicit role for credit ratings in determining a bank's required regulatory risk capital. Once implemented, this BIS proposal (often referred to as Basel 2) would vastly elevate the importance of credit ratings by linking the required measure of bank capital to the credit rating of the bank's obligors. With these regulatory changes under active discussion, research into the role for ratings and rating agencies in the global financial system is particularly apropos. Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System brings together the research of economists at New York University and the University of Maryland, along with those from the private sector, government bodies, and other universities. The first section of the volume focuses on the historical origins of the credit rating business and its present day industrial organization structure. The second section presents several empirical studies crafted largely around individual firm-level or bank-level data. These studies examine (a) the relationship between ratings and the default and recovery experience of corporate borrowers, (b) the comparability of credit ratings made by domestic and foreign rating agencies, and (c) the usefulness of financial market indicators for rating banks, among other topics. In the third section, the record of sovereign credit ratings in predicting financial crises and the reaction of financial markets to changes in credit ratings is examined. The final section of the volume emphasizes policy issues now facing regulators and credit rating agencies.
Seminar paper from the year 2019 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, , language: English, abstract: The objective of this seminar paper is to illuminate the work and role of credit rating agencies in the global financial system and to explain and understand the general criticism directed at them. In addition, their special part in the subprime crisis of 2008 will be analysed and an estimation will be made of how much responsibility they bear in the crisis.
Seminar paper from the year 2011 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: 1.3, Berlin School of Economics and Law, language: English, abstract: After the Asian crisis during the 1990s and the startling insolvencies of Enron and Parmalat, the recent financial crisis is one the most important trigger to raise doubt concerning the proper work of rating agencies. They are criticized because of their various conflicts of interest and obvious deficits in practicing their rating methods. The rating agencies should be jointly responsible for the emergence of the so-called bubble markets during the last couple of years. Because of these bubbles and their boom and burst effect, private as well as institutional investors lost enormous sums of assets and single countries were thrown into financial turmoil. Because of these facts, the discontent concerning the rating agencies grew. People took additional notice of their market power, which they only obtained because of their influence on the global capital flows and the use of ratings to regulate the financial markets. To particularize the issues, it is helpful to bring up the year 2007, when the delayed payments among the subprime loans became more frequent. This was due to the slower increase of the housing prices and the rising short-termed interest. Consequently, the rating agencies depreciated a lot of these structured financial products, many of which had received the highest seal of quality before (AAA). Those actions both led to a massive loss of confidence on the investors' side and a remarkable decline of liquidity. The former market of securitization products no longer existed. Influenced by this development and because they were considerable involved in this securitization business, a lot of banks also got into this downstream. In the first part of this term paper I will present some general facts about the rating agencies including their history of origins. Afterwards I will mention the process of rating and th
Credit rating agencies play a powerful and contentious role in the governance of global financial markets. Introducing an original framework for delegating political authority to private actors, this book explains common trends in the regulatory use of private ratings for public purposes and analyzes regulatory changes after the Financial Crisis.
This title is a guide to ratings, the ratings industry, and the mechanics and economics of obtaining a rating. It sheds light on the role that the agencies play in the international financial markets.
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, there have been many criticisms weighed against private credit rating agencies. Many claim they only exacerbate financial market volatility by issuing faulty public statements, ratings warnings, and downgrades. This instability increases the uncertainty in business environments and weakens the pace of business investment. Their rating changes also prompt national governments to reduce their spending at a time when fiscal expenditures are crucial for economic recovery. Public Credit Rating Agencies argues for the creation of national public credit rating agencies, offering the first in-depth discussion of their implied role and function operating alongside private agencies. Schroeder provides an up-to-date overview of the ratings industry and the government bodies that monitor its activities. She suggests that the proper implementation of public credit rating agencies will promote the stability of lending, further development and adaptation of new technology, and increase labor productivity and the profitability of new investment in businesses. Finally, this book clarifies the inconsistencies that have surfaced between public budgeting and a rating agency's evaluation of national budgets.
We find that Credit Rating Agencies (CRA)'s opinions have an impact in the cost of funding of sovereign issuers and consequently ratings are a concern for financial stability. While ratings produced by the major CRAs perform reasonably well when it comes to rank ordering default risk among sovereigns, there is evidence of rating stability failure during the recent global financial crisis. These failures suggest that ratings should incorporate the obligor's resilience to stress scenarios. The empirical evidence also supports: (i) reform initiatives to reduce the impact of CRAs' certification services; (ii) more stringent validation requirements for ratings if they are to be used in capital regulations; and (iii) more transparency with regard to the quantitative parameters used in the rating process.
The global financial system has proven increasingly unstable and crisis-prone since the early 1980s. The system has failed to serve either creditors or debtors well. This has been reinforced by the global financial crisis of 2008, where we have seen systemic weaknesses bring rich countries to the brink of bankruptcy and visit appalling suffering on the poorest citizens of poor countries. Yet the regulatory responses to this crisis have involved little thinking from outside the box in which the crisis was delivered to the world. This book presents a powerful indictment of this regulatory failure and calls for greatly increased attention to international financial law and analyses new regulatory measures with the potential to make a new recognition of the principles that ought to underlie it. Using a historical approach that compares the various financial crises of the past three decades, the authors clearly show how misconceived economic policy responses have paved the way for each next 'crash'. Among the numerous topics that arise in the course of this revealing analysis are the following: overvalued exchange rates; excess liquidity in rich countries; premature liberalisation of local financial markets; capital controls; derivatives markets; accounting standards; credit ratings and the conflicts in the role of credit rating agencies; investor protection arrangements; insurance companies; and payment, clearing and settlement activities. The authors offer detailed commentary on: the role of multilateral development banks, the IMF and the WTO in responding to crises; the role of the Basel Accords, the Financial Stability Forum and Board, and the responses of the European Commission, the US, and the G20 to the most recent crisis. The book concludes by exploring systemic game-changing reforms such as bank levies, financial activities taxes and financial transaction taxes, and a global sovereign bankruptcy regime; as well as measures to remove the currency mismatches from the balance sheets of developing countries. Apart from its great usefulness as a detailed introduction to the international financial system and its regulation, the book is enormously valuable for its clear identification of the areas of regulatory failure, and its analysis of new regulatory approaches that offer the potential for a genuinely more stable system. Banking and investment policymakers at every level, the lawyers that serve these markets and the regulators that seek to regulate them, cannot afford to neglect this book.
