Author: John W. Parker

Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Published: 2017-07-22

Total Pages: 108

ISBN-13: 9781973839026

Due largely to Russia's military intervention, Syrian president Asad's fortunes have recovered since June 2015. Russia, together with Hizballah and Iran, averted Asad's military defeat. What Russian president Putin accomplished in Syria is important for American security interests and policy in the region because it frames hard choices Washington must now make. Russia has profited from a hard core of Alawite and Christian support for Asad inside Syria. At the same time, U.S. reluctance to become militarily involved in Syria facilitated Russian military intervention. Russia also benefited from the disunity among the diverse opposition to Asad and their external patrons. While Saudi Arabia and Turkey were both early proponents of ousting Asad, Saudi Arabia is now more focused on defeating Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Turkey on fighting Kurdish separatist forces in northern Syria. In return for help from Putin in resolving its Kurdish problem, Turkey in 2016 helped Putin resolve Russia's Aleppo problem. As President Trump considers and implements a way forward on working with Russia in the fight against ISIS and toward peace in Syria, recent events underscore fundamental constraints under which Putin will be operating and some challenges that have been overstated. First, Russia will find it hard to deliver Asad's agreement to any political arrangement that requires him to step aside. Asad plays Russia off against Iran and Hizballah, extending no preference to Putin for Russia's contribution to his survival. Second, Tehran will not be keen to see its leverage in Damascus diminish and that of Moscow grow. Tehran will support Asad in his resistance to any Russian pressure that would impact Syria's role as Iran's land bridge to Lebanon. Third, while working with Iran militarily in Syria, Russia also engaged with major Sunni powers in the Middle East, most interestingly Saudi Arabia, as well as with Israel. Fourth, Putin does not want Syria to be a "negative" issue in Russian presidential elections in 2018. Cooperation with the Trump administration and renewed American treatment of Russia as a "respected equal" would make Syria a more manageable electoral issue for Putin. As Washington continues to formulate and fine-tune a new approach to fighting ISIS and terrorism under the Trump administration, this study makes the following policy recommendations. First, the United States must cast aside sentiment and strictly prioritize its objectives and preferred or acceptable outcomes. Second, the United States should work toward a Syria that remains unified even as the American fight against ISIS benefits from Syrian Kurdish military prowess. The Kurds should be part of the mix in political negotiations going forward but only in the context of a unified Syria at the end of the process. Third, the United States should explore the military pros and cons of more robust cooperation with Russia in Syria, without conceding anything in advance on Asad's future or Iran's place in the region. The U.S. needs to be prepared selectively and judiciously to strike Syrian regime forces from time to time to inhibit their attacks on nonterrorist opposition fighters and civilian populations. Fourth, Washington should work quietly with Moscow toward diminishing Iranian leverage in Syria and the region. That said, while Moscow probably hopes that its weight in Syria will increase over time at Iran's expense, Russia has little interest in sharing influence there with the U.S. Finally, with or without Russia, the United States should engage militarily in Syria more robustly. Besides being necessary to fight ISIS more effectively, this will also help reverse the view that began to take hold in the region during the Barack Obama administration that the United States is a declining power, and encourage regional capitals to rebalance their relations with Moscow.