Pension reform is a key policy challenge in Russia. This paper examines how pension spending could increase in Russia in the absence of reforms, quantifies the impact of some recent proposals, and suggests some alternatives that would ensure public pension benefits - relative to wages - not fall from current levels while containing spending.
Despite their increasing fiscal burden, the public pension systems of BRO countries are failing to provide adequate social protection. Although there is a broad consensus about the need for pension reforms, BRO countries are debating whether to embark on systemic reforms or whether to correct the distortions in their pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. The paper reviews the measures taken by BRO countries during the transition period to address their pension problems and examines the options for further reform. It makes a strong case for a gradual reform approach aimed at establishing a multi-pillar system over the long run, but initially focused on implementation of “high-quality” reforms of the PAYG system.
Are the current account fluctuations in oil-exporting countries "excessive"? How should their real exchange rate respond to the evolution of external (and domestic) fundamentals? This paper proposes methodologies tailored to the specific features of oil-exporting countries that help address these questions. Price-based methodologies (based on the time series of real effective exchange rates) identify a strong link between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade, but have relatively limited explanatory power. On the other hand, an empirical model of the current account, which fits oil exporting countries' data well, and an intertemporal model that takes into account the stock of oil reserves provide useful benchmarks for oil exporters' external balances.
"The gains from the transition in post-communist Russia were captured by the new managerial class, which won rents from the state in the form of privatized enterprises, state subsidies, credits, and opportunities for tax evasion. Those rents reduced state revenues that could have supported social policy-- including pension reform, which in turn could have fueled industrial restructuring. With neither pension reform nor industrial restructuring, Russia's economy has continued to shrink"--Cover.
This report provides a critical review of reform initiatives undertaken by the Russian government to overhaul retirement provision in Russia and documents recent evolution occurring in the Russian private pension market.
The gains from the transition in post-communist Russia were captured by the new managerial class, which won rents from the state in the form of privatized enterprises, state subsidies, credits, and opportunities for tax evasion. Those rents reduced state revenues that could have supported social policy - including pension reform, which in turn could have fueled industrial restructuring. With neither pension reform nor industrial restructuring, Russia's economy has continued to shrink. Kapstein and Milanovic present a political economy model in which policy is the outcome of an interaction between three actors: government (G), managers and workers (W), and transfer recipients (P). The government's objective is to stay in power, for which it needs the support of either P or W. It can choose slow privatization with little asset stripping and significant taxation, thus protecting the fiscal base out of which it pays pensioners relatively well (as in Poland). Or it can give away assets and tax exemptions to managers and workers, who then bankroll it and deliver the vote, but it thereby loses taxes and pays little to pensioners (as in Russia). The authors apply this model to Russia for the period 1992-96. An empirical analysis of electoral behavior in the 1996 presidential election shows that the likelihood of someone voting for Yeltsin did not depend on that person's socioeconomic group per se. Those who tended to vote for Yeltsin were richer, younger, and better educated and had more favorable expectations of the future. Entrepreneurs, who had more of these characteristics, tended to vote for Yeltsin as a result, while pensioners, who had almost none, tended to vote against Yeltsin. Unlike Poland, Russia failed to create pluralist politics in the early years of the transition, so no effective counterbalance emerged to offset managerial rent-seeking and the state was easily captured by well-organized industrial interests. The political elite were reelected because industrial interests bankrolled their campaign in return for promises that government largesse would continue to flow. Russia shows vividly how political economy affects policymaking, because of how openly and flagrantly government granted favors in return for electoral support. But special interests, venal bureaucrats, and the exchange of favors tend to be the rule, not the exception, elsewhere as well. This paper - a product of Poverty and Human Resources, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the political economy of reform in transition countries. This study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy in Transition Countries (RPO 682-52).
The Russian Federation has undergone a major reform of the pension system which has resulted in a shift from a single, publicly managed system to one supplemented by a mandatory, privately managed occupational funded component and voluntary pension arrangements. The reform aimed to tackle a set of problems of demographic, social and economic order inherent to retirement income provision and was viewed as a way to improve old-age security of retirees in Russia by ensuring long-term financial and fiscal stability of the pension system and adequacy of pension benefits. This book examines these reforms and new challenges related to the reforms. Most prominent among the challenges is the need to further strengthen the pension system regulatory capacity and enforcement powers of the authorities in charge of the oversight of private pension institutions
Examining the reform process of the old age pension system in Russia, from its Soviet origins to the Putin era, Shocking Mother Russia adds significantly to the growing body of literature on comparative social policy and the political challenges of pension reform. Andrea Chandler explains why Russia's old-age pension system went into decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, even though it was a prominent issue in the political arena at the outset of the post-communist transition. While tracing the roots of the system's difficulties to the Soviet Union's first efforts to establish a national social welfare system after 1917, Chandler nonetheless devotes the bulk of her study to the period from 1990 to 2001. While political factors impeded reform for much of this eleven-year period, ultimately Russia's striking policy reversals provide a case study for developing nations. In 1990, a new Russian pension law was adopted during the Soviet reform process of perestroika. The system was again significantly altered in 2001 when a market-reform-oriented package of pension legislation was passed. Shocking Mother Russia places the Russian experience in comparative perspective, and suggests lessons for pension reform derived from analysis of the Russian case.
Despite their increasing fiscal burden, the public pension systems of BRO countries are failing to provide adequate social protection. Although there is a broad consensus about the need for pension reforms, BRO countries are debating whether to embark on systemic reforms or whether to correct the distortions in their pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. The paper reviews the measures taken by BRO countries during the transition period to address their pension problems and examines the options for further reform. It makes a strong case for a gradual reform approach aimed at establishing a multi-pillar system over the long run, but initially focused on implementation of quot;high-qualityquot; reforms of the PAYG system.
