The prerogative powers of ministers include some of the most important functions of government, such as decisions on armed conflict and the conclusion of international treaties. This report describes how such powers have come to be delegated. It also concludes that they should be more closely regulated. It proposes that the government should prepare a list of all prerogative powers, which would be considered by a parliamentary committee. Appropriate legislation, with any required statutory safeguards, would then be put into place. A draft Bill is appended to the report.
The Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) has concluded a year-long inquiry into the future of the Civil Service with only one recommendation: that Parliament should establish a Joint Committee of both Houses to sit as a Commission on the future of the Civil Service. It should be constituted within the next few months and report before the end of the Parliament with a comprehensive change programme for Whitehall with a timetable to be implemented over the lifetime of the next Parliament. The Report considers the increased tensions between ministers and officials which have become widely reported, and places the problems in Whitehall in a wider context of a Civil Service built on the Northcote-Trevelyan settlement established in 1853 and the Haldane principles of ministerial accountability set out in 1919. The government's Civil Service Reform Plan lacks strategic coherence and clear leadership from a united team of ministers and officials. The Northcote-Trevelyan Civil Service remains the most effective way of supporting the democratically elected Government and future administrations in the UK. Divided leadership and confused accountabilities in Whitehall have led to problems: a low level of engagement amongst civil servants in some departments and agencies, and a general lack of trust and openness; the Civil Service exhibits the key characteristics of a failing organisation with the leadership are in denial about the scale of the challenge they face. There is a persistent lack of key skills and capabilities across Whitehall and an unacceptably high level of churn of lead officials, which is incompatible with good government.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
The Committee for Standards in Public Life felt that the time was right to undertake a review of the key lessons that have been learnt since the Nolan Committee's first report (ISBN 9780101285025) was published in 1995 about how to improve ethical standards in public life - to stand back and reflect on what has been achieved and what still needs to be done. The report argues that much of the basic infrastructure to improve standards is now in place. Statements of key principles and codes of conduct have been adopted by most public bodies, new regulators have been created or had their existing remits clarified, and awareness of principles such as integrity, accountability and openness has increased considerably. The Committee believes standards of behaviour in many areas of public life have improved. But the Committee finds it disturbing that concerns continue to be raised about the integrity of so many of the country's key institutions or those within them; and the evidence of the last few years and months suggests that there is still much to do before the high standards in public life to which we all aspire are fully internalised in the cultures of all our public institutions. The report concludes that the need now is not for more principles, codes or regulators but rather for the existing arrangements to be more consistently and actively implemented.
This reference book is primarily a procedural work which examines the many forms, customs, and practices which have been developed and established for the House of Commons since Confederation in 1867. It provides a distinctive Canadian perspective in describing procedure in the House up to the end of the first session of the 36th Parliament in Sept. 1999. The material is presented with full commentary on the historical circumstances which have shaped the current approach to parliamentary business. Key Speaker's rulings and statements are also documented and the considerable body of practice, interpretation, and precedents unique to the Canadian House of Commons is amply illustrated. Chapters of the book cover the following: parliamentary institutions; parliaments and ministries; privileges and immunities; the House and its Members; parliamentary procedure; the physical & administrative setting; the Speaker & other presiding officers; the parliamentary cycle; sittings of the House; the daily program; oral & written questions; the process of debate; rules of order & decorum; the curtailment of debate; special debates; the legislative process; delegated legislation; financial procedures; committees of the whole House; committees; private Members' business; public petitions; private bills practice; and the parliamentary record. Includes index.
This White Paper contains a three volume set of documents (Cm. 7342-I/II/III, ISBN 9780101734226) and is part of the Governance of Britain series examining constitutional renewal. In July 2007, the Governance of Britain Green Paper was published (ISBN 9780101717021) which set out the Government's vision and proposals for constitutional renewal, calling on the public, Parliament and other organisations to submit views. The result of the consultation is the publication of this White Paper. Volume 1 covers the substantive issues of constitutional renewal, including: the Government's policy proposals; the Attorney General; judicial appointments; treaties; the civil service; war powers; flag flying and other policies, such as the reform of the Intelligence and Security Committee; a wider review of the Royal Perogative; passports; the National Audit Office; public appointments and Church of England appointments. Volume 2, presents the draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, with Volume 3, setting out an analysis of the consultations. For specific publications on a number of the issues examined here, see Cm. 7239, War Powers & Treaties - ISBN 9780101723923; Cm. 7210, Judicial Appointments, ISBN 9780101721028; Cm. 7192, Role of the Attorney General, ISBN 9780101719223.
All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britainthe legal advice for the invasionintelligence about weapons of mass destruction andplanning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events REVIEWS The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.
The role of the special adviser is currently one of the most controversial issues in British politics. This study of special advisers brings an historical as well as analytical perspective to a hot topic.
The post of Prime Minister's Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests was created in March 2006, and extended by the incoming Prime Minister in July 2007. Part of the new Independent Adviser's role is to investigate allegations that the Ministerial Code has been breached. This Report considers the suitability of the new mechanism for investigating alleged breaches of the Code. The creation of an investigatory capacity is welcomed as an important step. However, the Committee identifies limitations on the Independent Adviser's powers which cast doubt over the effective ability of any holder of the post to secure public confidence. The Independent Adviser should be free to instigate investigations rather than, as at present, being dependent on being invited to do so by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister should also undertake that findings of investigations into the conduct of ministers will routinely be published. Constitutional watchdogs such as this new investigator need to be demonstrably independent of those they regulate. The post of Independent Adviser meets none of the criteria associated with independence. The holder of the post, Sir Philip Mawer, has been appointed by the Prime Minister on a non-specific term of office which can be terminated by the Prime Minister at any time and on any grounds. He has no staff of his own, no office and no budget, but relies on the Cabinet Office for all these things. There has been no open advertisement process and no parliamentary involvement in the appointment. Until these defects are remedied, the Committee has difficulty accepting the suggestion that the new investigator can meaningfully be considered to be independent.
