Proprietary Costs and Determinants of Voluntary Segment Disclosure
Proprietary Costs and Determinants of Voluntary Segment Disclosure

Author: Annalisa Prencipe

Publisher:

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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This paper aims to identify new determinants of the extent of voluntary segment disclosure by using the theoretical framework of the Proprietary Costs Theory, which states that companies limit voluntary disclosure because of proprietary costs, such as preparation and competitive costs. On the basis of the existing literature on this theory and on segment reporting, three hypotheses are theoretically derived, each correlating the level of segment disclosure to a new determinant, specifically the correspondence between the segments and legally identifiable subgroups of companies, the growth rate and the listing status age. The paper also provides further evidence to test the impact of some "traditional" determinants, introduced in the study as control variables. The hypotheses formulated are empirically verified. The analysis is carried out with reference to Italy, because of its limited legal and professional provisions on the topic. For the empirical test, a sample of 64 Italian listed companies is selected and a multiple regression model is used. Results show that, except for the growth rate, the two other new determinants are significantly related to the extent of segment disclosure. These findings confirm that proprietary costs are particularly relevant and limit the incentive for companies to provide segment information to the market.

Proprietary Costs and Voluntary Segment Disclosure
Proprietary Costs and Voluntary Segment Disclosure

Author: Annalisa Prencipe

Publisher:

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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This paper aims to identify some new determinants of the quality of voluntary segment disclosure by using the theoretical framework of Proprietary Costs Theory. The identified new determinants are correspondence between segments and legally identifiable subgroups of companies, level of detail in segment definition, listing status age and growth rate. The paper also provides further evidence to test the impact of some traditional determinants, which are introduced in the model as control variables. The study is carried out in Italy, which proves to be a particularly suitable setting for the analysis because of its limited legal and professional requirements on the topic. To test the hypotheses, a sample of 67 Italian listed companies was selected and a multiple regression model was used. Except for growth rate, all the other new determinants proved to be significantly related to segment reporting quality, consistently to what hypothesized. These results confirm that proprietary costs are particularly relevant for segment reporting, thus limiting the incentive for the companies to provide this information to the market.

An Analysis of the Proprietary Costs of Segment Disclosure
An Analysis of the Proprietary Costs of Segment Disclosure

Author: Cristi Anne Gleason

Publisher:

Published: 1998

Total Pages: 94

ISBN-13: 9780591969993

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This paper examines the proprietary costs of line-of-business (LOB) reporting. Despite research documenting many benefits of LOB reporting, no research has directly examined the proprietary costs resulting from mandatory segment reporting. My empirical examination of proprietary costs supports the theoretical expectation that the expected proprietary costs of LOB reporting exceeded expected related benefits for manufacturing firms that reported segment information only when required to do so by the SEC. Firms that elected not to report segment information voluntarily had higher levels of market power. Hence these firms faced greater expected costs from competitor entry, pressure from labor groups, suppliers and customers, and government regulation. These firms also obtained less additional financing in the years prior to the SEC requirement, consistent with lower expected benefits. However, my results do not provide any evidence that these involuntary reporters subsequently incurred the expected proprietary costs. In contrast, my results show that voluntary reporters were more likely to obtain financing during the voluntary reporting period, suggesting that differing benefits rather than proprietary costs distinguish voluntary and mandated reporters. This result is consistent with the position of the FASB and with statements made by other supporters of segment reporting, dismissing concerns over substantial competitive harm.

The Expected Costs of Increased Disclosure. Firm- and Industry-specific Forces
The Expected Costs of Increased Disclosure. Firm- and Industry-specific Forces

Author: Simon Kröger

Publisher: GRIN Verlag

Published: 2020-08-05

Total Pages: 26

ISBN-13: 3346219763

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Seminar paper from the year 2020 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: 1.0, Mannheim University of Applied Sciences, language: English, abstract: A series of financial crises and corporate scandals gave rise to increasing concerns about prevailing models of corporate governance and disclosure and stimulated financial disclosure and reporting regulation. As a result, there has been considerably more interest in documenting the benefits of increased disclosure than its costs. Accordingly, numerous papers purport to provide evidence of capital market benefits through incremental disclosure. At the same time, firms refrain from voluntarily committing to increased disclosure, implying that there must be a trade-off between associated benefits and costs. Consequently, critics contend that the capital market benefits are inconclusive. Instead, increased disclosure may result in adverse capital market effects through increasing information asymmetry. Moreover, critics predict that increased disclosure imposes further costs on the firm. The purpose of this seminar thesis is to review existing literature on these expected costs of increased disclosure. Thereby, I focus on controversies regarding the heavily debated capital market effects as well as on specific forces that determine proprietary and litigation costs associated with increased disclosure. While a firm’s disclosure choices likely are a joint outcome of market forces and incentives provided by regulation, the seminar thesis is limited to voluntary disclosure choices as a starting point for possible disclosure regulation. The remainder of the seminar thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the capital market effects of voluntary disclosure through its impact on information asymmetry. Section 3 discusses the ambiguous impact of voluntary disclosure on litigation and proprietary costs. Section 4 concludes the seminar thesis.

Proprietary Costs & Governance on the Segment Disclosure Decision
Proprietary Costs & Governance on the Segment Disclosure Decision

Author: Ana Gisbert

Publisher:

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 51

ISBN-13:

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Focusing on the Spanish setting, traditionally characterized by high ownership concentration and a regulatory framework which has traditionally given more priority to the avoidance of proprietary and competition costs related to segment disclosures than promoting transparency, this paper aims to identify the main factors influencing the segment reporting decision. In particular, we aim to test whether the strength of the concentrated ownership structures together with the remaining pre-IAS reporting philosophy offsets the role of independent directors. If this is the case, it would be in spite of the new IAS/IFRS reporting standards based on relevance and transparency, and would also run counter to the improvements in the Spanish governance framework which strengthens the presence of independent non-executive directors. The empirical evidence suggests that under the new IAS/IFRS reporting philosophy, proprietary costs may have lost relevance due to the introduction of mandatory segment information requirements. In addition, within an institutional context of high ownership concentration independent directors play a significant role in raising the level of reported information. The context of the new IFRS 8 offers new opportunities to observe how governance and proprietary costs affect the new “management approach” for segment reporting classification.

Proprietary Costs and Disclosure Substitution
Proprietary Costs and Disclosure Substitution

Author: Mirko Stanislav Heinle

Publisher:

Published: 2020

Total Pages: 72

ISBN-13:

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This study develops and tests a simple model of voluntary disclosure where managers can choose to withhold (i.e., redact) information from mandatory disclosure. We consider a setting where mandatory disclosure is a disaggregated disclosure (e.g., a financial statement), voluntary disclosure is an aggregate disclosure (e.g., an earnings forecast), and the costs of each type of disclosure are distinct. In this setting, we show that concerns about the proprietary cost of mandatory disclosure motivate managers to withhold information from mandatory disclosure and substitute voluntary disclosure. We test our predictions using a comprehensive sample of mandatory disclosures where the SEC allows the firm to redact information that would otherwise jeopardize its competitive position. Consistent with our predictions, we find strong evidence that redacted mandatory disclosure is associated with greater voluntary disclosure.

Segment Profitability and the Proprietary and Agency Costs of Disclosure
Segment Profitability and the Proprietary and Agency Costs of Disclosure

Author: Philip G. Berger

Publisher:

Published: 2007

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

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We exploit the change in U.S. segment reporting rules (from SFAS 14 to SFAS 131) to examine two motives for managers to conceal segment profits: proprietary costs and agency costs. Managers face proprietary costs of segment disclosure if the revelation of a segment that earns high abnormal profits attracts more competition and hence reduces the abnormal profits. Managers face agency costs of segment disclosure if the revelation of a segment that earns low abnormal profits reveals unresolved agency problems and hence leads to heightened external monitoring. By comparing a hand-collected sample of restated SFAS 131 segments with historical SFAS 14 segments, we examine at the segment level whether managers' disclosure decisions are influenced by their proprietary and agency cost motives to conceal segment profits. Specifically, we test two hypotheses: (1) when the proprietary cost motive dominates, managers tend to withhold the segments with relatively high abnormal profits (hereafter, the proprietary cost motive hypothesis), and (2) when the agency cost motive dominates, managers tend to withhold the segments with relatively low abnormal profits (hereafter, the agency cost motive hypothesis). Our results are consistent with the agency cost motive hypothesis, whereas we find mixed evidence with regard to the proprietary cost motive hypothesis.

Segment Disclosures, Proprietary Costs, and the Market for Corporate Control
Segment Disclosures, Proprietary Costs, and the Market for Corporate Control

Author: Philip G. Berger

Publisher:

Published: 2003

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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Recent studies provide evidence that the new segment reporting rule, SFAS 131, induced companies to provide more disaggregated segment information. We use adoption of the new standard to identify firms that aggregated segment information under the old standard, SFAS 14, and examine two motives for managers to aggregate segment information. First, withholding proprietary information and, second, avoiding external scrutiny from the market for corporate control. We find firms that increased their segment disclosure on adoption of SFAS 131 (i.e., firms that aggregated segment data under SFAS 14) had higher abnormal profitability and operations with more divergent performance. We do not, however, find a significant decline in abnormal profits for these firms after SFAS 131, suggesting their concerns that more disaggregated reporting would result in competitive harm were unwarranted. We also document a negative association between aggregating segment information and the probability of takeover activities in the pre-SFAS 131 period. Firms that are forced to provide more disaggregated information under the new standard face a higher takeover likelihood in the post-SFAS 131 period. These results suggest that the more disaggregated disclosure generated by the new standard facilitates the market for corporate control.