The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
"The Most Important Treatise on Criminal Law Produced by American Legal Scholarship" First published to great acclaim in 1947, Hall's General Principles of Criminal Law is one of the undisputed classics in its field. It provides more than a broad overview. Drawing on his expertise in jurisprudence and the work of the legal realists, it analyzes the principles that comprise criminal activity with an emphasis on its creation and definition by officials. This process is explored in the chapters on criminology, criminal theory and penal theory and, in more specific terms, the chapters on legality, mens rea, harm, causation, punishment, strict liability, ignorance and mistake, necessity and coercion, mental disease, intoxication and criminal attempt. "For many years, our standard work on criminal law has been Bishop's. First published in 1856, Bishop's is the only American book in the field that has conspicuously influenced our criminal law. (...) When Jerome Hall's, General Principles of Criminal Law (1947) appeared, it represented the first significant effort to articulate the principles of criminal law since Bishop's era. Hall's work may, in fact, represent the most important treatise on criminal law produced by American legal scholarship." --Fred Cohen, Journal of Legal Education 16 (1963-64) 260.
In this volume, the Study Group and the Acquis Group present the first academic Draft of a Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). The Draft is based in part on a revised version of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and contains Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law in an interim outline edition. It covers the books on contracts and other juridical acts, obligations and corresponding rights, certain specific contracts, and non-contractual obligations. One purpose of the text is to provide material for a possible "political" Common Frame of Reference (CFR) which was called for by the European Commission's Action Plan on a More Coherent European Contract Law of January 2003.
"With keen insight into the common law mind, Edlin argues that there are rich resources within the law for judges to ground their opposition to morally outrageous laws, and a legal obligation on them to overturn it, consequent on the general common law obligation to develop the law. Thus, seriously unjust laws pose for common law judges a dilemma within the law, not just a moral challenge to the law, a conflict of obligations, not just a crisis of conscience. While rooted firmly in the history of common law jurisprudence, Edlin offers an entirely fresh perspective on an age-old jurisprudential conundrum. Edlin's case for his thesis is compelling." ---Gerald J. Postema, Cary C. Boshamer Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and author of Bentham and the Common Law Tradition "Douglas Edlin builds a powerful historical, conceptual, and moral case for the proposition that judges on common law grounds should refuse to enforce unjust legislation. This is sure to be controversial in an age in which critics already excoriate judges for excessive activism when conducting constitutional judicial review. Edlin's challenge to conventional views is bold and compelling." ---Brian Z. Tamanaha, Chief Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo Professor of Law, St. John's University, and author of Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law "Professor Edlin's fascinating and well-researched distinction between constitutional review and common law review should influence substantially both scholarship on the history of judicial power in the United States and contemporary jurisprudential debates on the appropriate use of that power." ---Mark Graber, Professor of Law and Government, University of Maryland, and author of Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil Is a judge legally obligated to enforce an unjust law? In Judges and Unjust Laws, Douglas E. Edlin uses case law analysis, legal theory, constitutional history, and political philosophy to examine the power of judicial review in the common law tradition. He finds that common law tradition gives judges a dual mandate: to apply the law and to develop it. There is no conflict between their official duty and their moral responsibility. Consequently, judges have the authority---perhaps even the obligation---to refuse to enforce laws that they determine unjust. As Edlin demonstrates, exploring the problems posed by unjust laws helps to illuminate the institutional role and responsibilities of common law judges. Douglas E. Edlin is Associate Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College.
A broad history of the western European legal tradition. Bellomo discusses the great jurists who gave common law its intellectual vigor as well as the humanist jurists of the period.
The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and plays a central role in both the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the development of international law. This comprehensive Commentary on the Statute of the International Court of Justice, now in its second edition, analyses in detail not only the Statute of the Court itself but also the related provisions of the United Nations Charter as well as the relevant provisions of the Court's Rules of Procedure. Five years after the first edition was published, the second edition of the Commentary embraces current events before the International Court of Justice as well as before other courts and tribunals relevant for the interpretation and application of its Statute. The Commentary provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of all legal questions and issues the Court has had to address in the past and will have to address in the future. It illuminates the central issues of procedure and substance that the Court and counsel appearing before it face in their day-to-day work. In addition to commentary covering all of the articles of the Statute of the ICJ, plus the relevant articles of the Charter of the United Nations, the book includes three scene-setting chapters: Historical Introduction, General Principles of Procedural Law, and Discontinuation and Withdrawal. The second edition of the Commentary adds two important and instructive chapters on Counter-Claims and Evidentiary Issues. The combination of expert editors and commentators, and their assessment of new developments in the important work of the ICJ, make this a landmark publication in the field of international law.
The theory of natural law grounds human laws in the universal truths of God’s creation. Until very recently, lawyers in the Western tradition studied natural law as part of their training, and the task of the judicial system was to put its tenets into concrete form, building an edifice of positive law on natural law’s foundations. Although much has been written about natural law in theory, surprisingly little has been said about how it has shaped legal practice. Natural Law in Court asks how lawyers and judges made and interpreted natural law arguments in England, Europe, and the United States, from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the American Civil War. R. H. Helmholz sees a remarkable consistency in how English, Continental, and early American jurisprudence understood and applied natural law in cases ranging from family law and inheritance to criminal and commercial law. Despite differences in their judicial systems, natural law was treated across the board as the source of positive law, not its rival. The idea that no person should be condemned without a day in court, or that penalties should be proportional to the crime committed, or that self-preservation confers the right to protect oneself against attacks are valuable legal rules that originate in natural law. From a historical perspective, Helmholz concludes, natural law has advanced the cause of justice.
