Price Leadership and Conscious Parallelism
Author: Louis Phlips
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 48
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKPosts
The Antitrust Laws
Author: John H. Shenefield
Publisher: American Enterprise Institute
Published: 2001
Total Pages: 216
ISBN-13: 9780844741543
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA former top antitrust officer at the U.S. Department of Justice and a noted economist guide readers through the increasingly complex antitrust laws.
New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure
Author: International Economic Association
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 1986
Total Pages: 588
ISBN-13: 9780262690935
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThese contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of market structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors which determine the effective degree of competition in the market; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordination under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies.ContributorsJoseph E. Stiglitz, G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, R. G. Lipsey, David Enaoua, Paul Geroski, Alexis Jacquemin, Richard J. Gilbert, Reinhard Selten, Oliver E. Williamson, Jerry R. Green, G. Frank Mathewson, R. A. Winter, C. d'Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Steven Salop, Branko Horvat, Z. Roman, W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Nelson, Michael Scence, and Partha Dasgupta
Competition Policy
Author: Louis Phlips
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 1995-10-19
Total Pages: 292
ISBN-13: 9780521498715
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book uses game theory to analyse anti-competitive behaviour among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Part I focuses on 'explicit collusion': the author proves that 'four are few and six are many', and shows how cartels can be enforced under imperfect and incomplete information. Part II on 'tacit collusion' discusses the informational requirements of collusion detection in noncooperative repeated games. In Part III on 'semicollusion', excess capacity is shown to reinforce collusion. Part IV is devoted to the detection of predatory pricing. In this book, Louis Phlips applies the latest economic theory to a discussion of several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies. The presentation of case studies, combined with a clear exposition of the theory, will make this book invaluable to teachers and students of competition policy.
The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy
Author: Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2017-11-16
Total Pages: 145
ISBN-13: 0262036932
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.
Antitrust Law
Author: Keith N. Hylton
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2003-03-27
Total Pages: 436
ISBN-13: 9780521793780
DOWNLOAD EBOOKPreface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.
Antitrust Analysis
Author: Phillip Areeda
Publisher: Aspen Publishers
Published: 1997
Total Pages: 100
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKReorganized for increased accessibility, The 1997 edition of ANTITRUST ANALYSIS presents coverage of current issues with the same incisive -- and effective -- approach that has earned the book its premier reputation in the field. The distinctive emphasis on textual explanations that has always characterized Antitrust Analysis continues in the Fifth Edition. These strong textual discussions convey essential background information and necessary economic principles. Further, less significant cases have been trimmed. The authors' vast expertise in antitrust and economics is shown in a casebook of truly unrivaled quality. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, Fifth Edition, opens with a clear introduction To The history of antitrust law and a cogent presentation of important economics material. The authors then explore: horizontal agreements monopolization vertical agreements mergers price discrimination Reflecting ongoing movement in the antitrust arena, Areeda and Kaplow now address new developments in: intellectual property health care international aspects of antitrust law
Competition Policy
Author: Massimo Motta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2004-01-12
Total Pages: 650
ISBN-13: 9780521016919
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal with such important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices, and price discrimination, and to formulate policy implications on these issues. The interaction between theory and practice is one of the main features of the book, which contains frequent references to competition policy cases and a few fully developed case studies. The treatment is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and some solved problems are provided.
Study of Monopoly Power
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power
Publisher:
Published: 1949
Total Pages: 1222
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKCommittee Serial No. 14. Reviews effectiveness of antitrust laws, and suggested revisions to the laws from representatives of educational institutions, business and government; pt. 2A-B, Reviews economic concentration and monopolistic practices relation to procurement practices, small businesses, patent right restrictions, Federal transportation rate-making regulations, and special antitrust exemptions. Includes summary and digest of testimony for parts 2-A and 2-B (p. 1-160); pt.4A, Includes digest of testimony (p. 1-65); pt.5, Considers legislation to make fines for certain antitrust violations triple the amount of damages; pt.6A, Reviews newsprint shortages and industry economic concentration. Focuses on Canadian and Newfoundland newsprint export and production practices' impact on domestic industry. Includes digest of testimony (p. 1-85).
Competition Policy and Price Fixing
Author: Louis Kaplow
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2013-06-30
Total Pages: 508
ISBN-13: 0691158622
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThroughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior--and is also easier to apply.
