An official in the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and both Bush administrations, Peter W. Rodman draws on his firsthand knowledge of the Oval Office to explore the foreign-policy leadership of every president from Nixon to George W. Bush. This riveting and informative book about the inner workings of our government is rich with anecdotes and fly-on-the-wall portraits of presidents and their closest advisors. It is essential reading for historians, political junkies, and for anyone in charge of managing a large organization.
“An excellent, vividly written” (The Washington Post) account of leadership in wartime that explores how four great democratic statesmen—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion—worked with the military leaders who served them during warfare. The relationship between military leaders and political leaders has always been a complicated one, especially in times of war. When the chips are down, who should run the show—the politicians or the generals? In Supreme Command, Eliot A. Cohen expertly argues that great statesmen do not turn their wars over to their generals, and then stay out of their way. Great statesmen make better generals of their generals. They question and drive their military men, and at key times they overrule their advice. The generals may think they know how to win, but the statesmen are the ones who see the big picture. Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion led four very different kinds of democracy, under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They came from four very different backgrounds—backwoods lawyer, dueling French doctor, rogue aristocrat, and impoverished Jewish socialist. Yet they faced similar challenges. Each exhibited mastery of detail and fascination with technology. All four were great learners, who studied war as if it were their own profession, and in many ways mastered it as well as did their generals. All found themselves locked in conflict with military men. All four triumphed. The powerful lessons of this “brilliant” (National Review) book will touch and inspire anyone who faces intense adversity and is the perfect gift for history buffs of all backgrounds.
From the only national security advisor to have served under Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump, a riveting diplomat's memoir of America at war, and an exclusive insider's look at the way presidents make decisions under pressure. Since the attacks of 9/11, American presidents have exercised raw and unchecked executive power to make critical, fateful decisions for our nation. From Afghanistan to Iraq and Syria, enemies have been declared and Americans have fought and died based on presidential orders issued outside public view--and therefore with little scrutiny or accountability. But McGurk deploys his insight as a vital player in the executive decision-making process to pull back the curtain on these crucial moments in modern American history. From the Green Zone to the Situation Room, McGurk delivers an inside look at the last three presidents as they grapple with incomplete information and conflicting advice to make life-and-death decisions. Bush transformed his presidency over its last two years, becoming the most hands-on commander-in-chief since FDR. Obama demanded a rigorous process some saw as micromanagement, but others recognized as a key feature of what led to his election. Trump threw out the playbook. In page-turning prose, McGurk delivers hair-raising stories from his time as an American diplomat in Iraq and as a national security advisor in the White House, revealing how the vast differences in leadership and strategy among each president play out on the ground. McGurk uses his close-up view of three presidents' successes and failures to extract an urgent set of lessons about the best way to make the biggest decisions--the means, ways, and ends of policymaking. With implications from the White House to the Pentagon to boardrooms and organizations around the globe, Command lifts the mystique of wartime decision-making, illuminating the high-stakes choices made by a chosen few that profoundly affect us all.
Moten traces a sweeping history of the evolving roles of civilian and military leaders in conducting war. In doing so he demonstrates how war strategy and national security policy shifted as political and military institutions developed, and how they were shaped by leader's personalities.
An American President faces war and finds himself hamstrung by a Congress that will not act. To protect national security, he invokes his powers as Commander-in-Chief and orders actions that seem to violate laws enacted by Congress. He is excoriated for usurping dictatorial powers, placing himself above the law, and threatening to “breakdown constitutional safeguards.” One could be forgiven for thinking that the above describes former President George W. Bush. Yet these particular attacks on presidential power were leveled against Franklin D. Roosevelt. They could just as well describe similar attacks leveled against George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln and a number of other presidents challenged with leading the nation through times of national crisis. However bitter, complex, and urgent today’s controversies over executive power may be, John Yoo reminds us they are nothing new. In Crisis and Command, he explores a factor too little consulted in current debates: the past. Through shrewd and lucid analysis, he shows how the bold decisions made by Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and FDR changed more than just history; they also transformed the role of the American president. The link between the vigorous exercise of executive power and presidential greatness, Yoo argues, is both significant and misunderstood. He makes the case that the founding fathers deliberately left the Constitution vague on the limits of presidential authority, drawing on history to demonstrate the benefi ts to the nation of a strong executive office.
From the American Revolution to the War in Afghanistan, the United States has had no shortage of conflicts on both domestic and world stages. All provide insight into the values of the presidents who led the nation through them. U.S. Presidents during Wartime: A History of Leadership takes readers through chronological entries of presidents who participated in key wars throughout U.S. history. An overview essay first considers the social, economic, and political factors that affected presidents during war. Entries beginning with the presidency of George Washington and ending with that of George W. Bush comprehensively cover each war therein, as well as the responses of the relevant presidents. Primary documents in each entry depict the perspectives of the presidents and offer opportunities for comparing and contrasting the presidents' engagements in wartime strategies. Ending each entry are chronologies of the various events and conflicts that marked the president's time in office. Moreover, entries build upon each other to help readers toward a broader understanding of the sum impact of the wars that the presidents led. While the book emphasizes the historical record, it also explores ongoing conflicts through the lens of contemporary U.S. presidents to provide readers with a complete picture of the changing nature of war over time.
Since World War II, the United States has been engaged in near-constant military conflict abroad, often with ill-defined objectives, ineffectual strategy, and uncertain benefits. In this era of limited congressional oversight and “wars of choice,” the executive and the armed services have shared the primary responsibility for making war. The negotiations between presidents and their generals thus grow ever more significant, and understanding them becomes essential. Matthew Moten traces a sweeping history of the evolving roles of civilian and military leaders in conducting war, demonstrating how war strategy and national security policy shifted as political and military institutions developed, and how they were shaped by leaders’ personalities. Early presidents established the principle of military subordination to civil government, and from the Civil War to World War II the president’s role as commander-in-chief solidified, with an increasingly professionalized military offering its counsel. But General Douglas MacArthur’s insubordination to President Harry Truman during the Korean War put political-military tensions on public view. Subsequent presidents selected generals who would ally themselves with administration priorities. Military commanders in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan did just that—and the results were poorly conceived policy and badly executed strategy. The most effective historical collaborations between presidents and their generals were built on mutual respect for military expertise and civilian authority, and a willingness to negotiate with candor and competence. Upon these foundations, future soldiers and statesmen can ensure effective decision-making in the event of war and bring us closer to the possibility of peace.
