Military coups have plagued many countries around the world, but Russia, despite its tumultuous history, has not experienced a successful military coup in over two centuries. In a series of detailed case studies, Brian Taylor explains the political role of the Russian military. Drawing on a wealth of new material, including archives and interviews, Taylor discusses every case of actual or potential military intervention in Russian politics from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin. Taylor analyzes in particular detail the army's behavior during the political revolutions that marked the beginning and end of the twentieth century, two periods when the military was, uncharacteristically, heavily involved in domestic politics. He argues that a common thread unites the late-Imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet Russian army: an organizational culture that believes that intervention against the country's political leadership - whether tsar, general secretary, or president - is fundamentally illegitimate.
This study of the Russian army and how it has fared in the uncertain transitional period since independence in December 1991 provides the basis for understanding its present and potential future role in the new political developments within Russia. Following an historical overview of Russia′s security agenda and an examination of the Russian/Soviet army′s tradition of involvement in politics, the book then examines Russia′s current security interests and the role of the army in protecting them. Geopolitical perspectives are linked to the security issues of the `Near Abroad′, and to the nuclear dimension of security. Pavel K Baev then considers the question of the feasibility of political control over the Russian army. The problem of the politicization of the army is followed through the interlinked issues of stalled military reform and a drastically reduced military budget. Baev examines the current military role of the army with case studies on conflict management in the Caucasus and the army′s performance in the role of peace-keeper in the Chechen War. Finally, the place of the army in Russia′s peace-keeping activities within a broader European context is examined.
One of the most crucial challenges that democratizing states face is that of redefining civil-mil'y. relations and transforming the mil'y. into a force loyal to the new democratic system. Contents: the Military's (Mil.) response to the USSR's Center-Periphery Crisis; the Mil. and the Union Treaty; the Mil. and the Aug. 1991 Coup; the Mil. and the demise of the USSR; the Mil. and Russia's Center-Periphery Problem; the Mil. and Russia's Legislative-Exec. struggle; the Mil. and the Fall 1993 Crisis; how can the Mil's. role be explained? the Mil's. role in Russia's future.
This book analyzes the evolution of Russian military thought and how Russia's current thinking about war is reflected in recent crises. While other books describe current Russian practice, Oscar Jonsson provides the long view to show how Russian military strategic thinking has developed from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. He closely examines Russian primary sources including security doctrines and the writings and statements of Russian military theorists and political elites. What Jonsson reveals is that Russia's conception of the very nature of war is now changing, as Russian elites see information warfare and political subversion as the most important ways to conduct contemporary war. Since information warfare and political subversion are below the traditional threshold of armed violence, this has blurred the boundaries between war and peace. Jonsson also finds that Russian leaders have, particularly since 2011/12, considered themselves to be at war with the United States and its allies, albeit with non-violent means. This book provides much needed context and analysis to be able to understand recent Russian interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, how to deter Russia on the eastern borders of NATO, and how the West must also learn to avoid inadvertent escalation.
A rare, behind-the-scenes look at Russian military politics Why have Russian generals acquired an important political position since the Soviet Union's collapse while at the same time the effectiveness of their forces has deteriorated? Why have there been no radical defense reforms in Russia since the end of the cold war, even though they were high on the agenda of the country's new president in 2000? Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military explains these puzzles as it paints a comprehensive portrait of Russian military politics. Zoltan Barany identifies three formative moments that gave rise to the Russian dilemma. The first was Gorbachev's decision to invite military participation in Soviet politics. The second was when Yeltsin acquiesced to a new political system that gave generals a legitimate political presence. The third was when Putin not only failed to press for needed military reforms but elevated numerous high-ranking officers to prominent positions in the federal administration. Included here are Barany's insightful analysis of crisis management following the sinking of the Kursk submarine, a systematic comparison of the Soviet/Russian armed forces in 1985 and the present, and compelling accounts of the army's political role, the elusive defense reform, and the relationship between politicians and generals. Barany offers a rare look at the world of contemporary military politics in an increasingly authoritarian state. Destined to become a classic in post-Soviet studies, this book reminds us of the importance of the separation of powers as a means to safeguard democracy.
Seminar paper from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: Russia, grade: A-, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna - School of International Studies, course: Seminar: Russia, Ukraine and the CEEC, language: English, abstract: The internal state of the army reveals that far-reaching and profound military reform cannot be achieved by pure arms build-up. It becomes clear that a new military strategy and a meaningful military reform plan are needed in order to improve its state. Sustainable change can only be achieved through numerous multi-facetted reforms that reach the military at its core. It is therefore advisable for these reform plans to not only come from the outside (namely the political administration) but additionally be co-developed within the army itself. Only in such way will it be possible to implement them fully and to minimize inefficiency, corruption, vagueness and violence, archaic structures of hierarchy and an attitude that reminds of vested rights. Finally, it has to be mentioned that the picture painted in the course of this paper is a rather negative one as its purpose is to outline weaknesses. Of course, the debated flaws and deficits are problematic and need to be addressed. Nevertheless, experts are divided when it comes to the measurement of the strength of Russia's military.
The evolution of elite personal protection units—also known as close protection units—within the former Soviet Union is one of the least examined, yet crucial political developments in this region. Due to the often-violent environment in which the political leaders of this region now operate, the need for these special military units is obvious. This study examines the similarities between these the current units and those of the Soviet past and finds that, in spite of the highly unstable nature of politics in post-communist Russia, these elite units have not intervened to the degree that many might have expected. They have, however, played a significant political role throughout the region. These close protection forces may very well determine the success or failure of the democratization process now underway. On the other hand, establishing a Praetorian Guard within the very walls of the Kremlin may in itself portend an end to democracy. Ultimately, a complete understanding of future politics in the former Soviet Union is impossible without acknowledging the role that these modern Praetorians play in the civil-military balance.
This book is a memoir of Russian history at the beginning of the 20th century. As a personal witness, the author's content involves a number of major issues such as the military, politics, society, and economy. The Russian people gain strength and wisdom from blood, terror and poverty, moral and physical death.
Throughout its existence, the Red Army was viewed as a formidable threat. By the end of the Cold War, however, it had become the weakest link in the Soviet Union's power structure. Always subordinate to the Communist Party, the military in 1991 suddenly found itself answering instead to the president of a democratic state. Dale Herspring closely examines how that relationship influenced the military's viability in the new Russian Federation. Herspring's book is the first to assess the relationship between the Russian military and the political leadership under Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin. He depicts an outmoded and demoralized military force still struggling to free itself from Cold War paradigms, while failing to confront not only debacles in Afghanistan and Chechnya but also a rise in crime and corruption within the ranks. He reveals how Gorbachev neglected the military to save Russia from internal collapse and Yeltsin reneged on continuing promises of support. And, while Putin claims a better understanding of the armed forces, he has severely tightened his control over the military while monitoring its struggle toward modernization. Herspring argues that presidential leadership-or a significant lack thereof-has been the key variable determining the kind of military Russia puts in the field. It has been up to the president to ensure that the high command makes a successful transition to the new polity-otherwise combat readiness will decline and generals and admirals could become politicized. By focusing on how the high command has reacted to each president's decisions and leadership style, Herspring shows that, in spite of the continued importance of the military's bureaucratic structure, personality factors have assumed a much more important role than in the past. The Kremlin and the High Command provides the most complete analysis to date of the Russian president's influence on the Russian officer corps, the soldiers they lead, and their army's combat readiness. Shedding light on the chaos that has plagued the USSR and Russia over the past 25 years, it also suggests how the often fraught relationship between the president and the high command must evolve if the Russian Federation is to evolve into a truly democratic nation.
Although the role of the military in Russia has changed significantly since Soviet times, it continues to exert great influence on Russian politics, economy and society. This book presents a comprehensive overview of current developments related to Russia’s military sector. It considers recent military reforms, personnel issues, the defence industry and procurement, the defence economy, changes in civil-military relations, and the continuing huge economic significance of Russia’s military-industrial complex. It explores difficulties currently faced by the Russian military, including problems of recruitment and leadership; analyses Russian security policy - including in relation to Europe and more widely; and discusses the lessons learned by the Russian military as a result of the recent war in Georgia. The book argues that reform attempts have often been thwarted by bureaucracy, economy, strategy, manpower, weapon systems and leadership. The book concludes by assessing likely future developments.
