In recent years uniform tariffs have become increasingly popular but economists have not formulated a rationale that demonstrates their superiority to alternative tariff structures. Do strong political economy arguments exist that favor uniform tariffs?
Uniform tariffs have become increasingly popular in recent years, yet their economic rationale is not strong. We identify and evaluate three sets of reasons as to why governments may prefer tariff uniformity as a means of alleviating political motives for excessive protection. First, a free-rider effect may be conducive to less lobbying under a uniform tariff regime than under a regime in which tariffs are allowed to differ. Second, an input-price effect may dampen the enthusiasm of final-goods producers for import protection. Third, a precommitment effect may increase the cost to a future government of protecting favored sectors. None of these arguments provides an unambiguous, airtight case for tariff uniformity. The decision on uniformity has to be made on a case-by-case basis.
This collection of papers by former students and colleagues celebrates the profound impact that Jagdish Bhagwati has had on the field of international economics over the past three decades. Bhagwati, who is the Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics at Columbia University, has made pathbreaking contributions to the theory of international trade and commercial policy, including immiserizing growth, domestic distortions, economic development, and political economy. His success and influence as a teacher and mentor is widely recognized among students at both MIT and Columbia, and as founder of the Journal of International Economics, he has encouraged research on many questions of theoretical and policy relevance. The political economy of trade policy, Bhagwati's most recent area of interest, is the theme of this collection which addresses salient topics including market distortions, income distribution, and the political process of policy-making. Sections and Contributors Market Distortions, T. N. Srinivasan. Paul A. Samuelson. Paul R. Krugman * Trade and Income Distribution, Douglas A. Irwin. Richard A. Brecher and Ehsan U. Choudri. Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson. Earl L. Grinols * Perspectives on Political Economy, Robert E. Baldwin. Peter Diamond * Models of Political Economy and Trade, Gene M. Grossman and Elhana Helpman. John Douglas Wilson. B. Peter Rosendorff. Arvind Panagariya and Ronald Findlay
Malthus has prepared in this work the general rules of political economy. He calls into question some of the reasonings of Ricardo and attempts to defend Adam Smith.
This book provides trade negotiators with an indispensable tool that will help them formulate their negotiating objectives and strategies in the area of tariffs; it also provides policy analysts with key data that are necessary to define negotiating scenarios and to impute the impacts.