Aircraft and the three-dimensional environment in which they operate are not user-friendly for human beings. As a result, developing and maintaining the proficiencies necessary to safely and efficiently fly an airplane or helicopter are difficult, time-consuming, and costly. Flight training has barely progressed beyond the basics, perhaps because of a typical pilot's limited time and money. Training remains a sort of crash course in not crashing, with almost exclusive concentration on physically coordinating, maneuvering, and manually handling-not manhandling-an aircraft.
The Limits of Expertise reports a study of the 19 major U.S. airline accidents from 1991-2000 in which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found crew error to be a causal factor. Each accident is reported in a separate chapter that examines events and crew actions and explores the cognitive processes in play at each step.
Offers you protection against the causes of up to 80 per cent of aviation accidents - pilot mistakes. This guide provides: related case studies; save yourself techniques and safety tips; and clear and concise analysis of error sets.
CHECKLISTS & COMPLIANCE Do it or don't fly. Read and learn: *Why highly skilled, highly proficient pilots make tragic errors *Reasons that pilots too often take off without fuel *How to avoid a myriad of mishaps and accidents resulting from inadequate attention to protocols and details *Why gear-up landings are a recurring pattern, despite safeguards *How to beat the most common causes of takeoff and landing misconfigurations *Ways to build good piloting habits and keep them strong *Real-life pilot near-miss stories you won't forget FAST & FOCUSED RX FOR PILOT ERROR The most effective aviation safety tools available, CONTROLLING PILOT ERROR guides offer you expert protection against the causes of up to 80% of aviation accidents--pilot mistakes. Each title provides: *Related case studies *Valuable "save yourself" techniques *Clear and concise analysis of error sets BEST FOR PILOTS--BUILD YOUR KNOWLEDGE BASE--INCREASE YOUR CONFIDENCE--SHARPEN YOUR SKILLS--LEARN LIFESAVING TIPS
Veteran crash investigator Nick Phillips has discovered evidence of fatal pilot error often enough to expect it. But when a private jet slams into a ridgeline, a far more disturbing possibility emerges. Nick's career-obsessed boss tries to remove him as head of the investigation team. His replacement? The boss's clone, a quintessential minion who will do anything to climb the bureaucratic ladder. It's an unusual move, and Nick's personal radar takes notice. The owner-pilot faced indictment for war crimes as the leader of an anti-terror assassination squad. What if he signed his own death warrant with his well-publicized threats to implicate the high-level government officials who sanctioned his targets? Nick suspects a cover-up in the making. The victim's legendary reputation as a mediocre aviator is a perfect smokescreen to conceal airborne murder behind an expeditious finding of pilot error. But it's not going to happen on Nick's watch. They have no idea who they're dealing with. And neither does Nick . . .
Human error is implicated in nearly all aviation accidents, yet most investigation and prevention programs are not designed around any theoretical framework of human error. Appropriate for all levels of expertise, the book provides the knowledge and tools required to conduct a human error analysis of accidents, regardless of operational setting (i.e. military, commercial, or general aviation). The book contains a complete description of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which incorporates James Reason's model of latent and active failures as a foundation. Widely disseminated among military and civilian organizations, HFACS encompasses all aspects of human error, including the conditions of operators and elements of supervisory and organizational failure. It attracts a very broad readership. Specifically, the book serves as the main textbook for a course in aviation accident investigation taught by one of the authors at the University of Illinois. This book will also be used in courses designed for military safety officers and flight surgeons in the U.S. Navy, Army and the Canadian Defense Force, who currently utilize the HFACS system during aviation accident investigations. Additionally, the book has been incorporated into the popular workshop on accident analysis and prevention provided by the authors at several professional conferences world-wide. The book is also targeted for students attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University which has satellite campuses throughout the world and offers a course in human factors accident investigation for many of its majors. In addition, the book will be incorporated into courses offered by Transportation Safety International and the Southern California Safety Institute. Finally, this book serves as an excellent reference guide for many safety professionals and investigators already in the field.
With up to 80% of accidents attributed to pilot error, this new series is critically important. It identifies and examines the ten top areas of concern to pilot safety. Each book contains real-life pilot stories drawn from FAA/NASA databases, valuable "save-yourself" techniques and an action agenda of preventive techniques pilots can implement to avoid risks.
Why would highly skilled, well-trained pilots make errors that lead to accidents when they had safely completed many thousands of previous flights? The majority of all aviation accidents are attributed primarily to human error, but this is often misinterpreted as evidence of lack of skill, vigilance, or conscientiousness of the pilots. The Limits of Expertise is a fresh look at the causes of pilot error and aviation accidents, arguing that accidents can be understood only in the context of how the overall aviation system operates. The authors analyzed in great depth the 19 major U.S. airline accidents from 1991-2000 in which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found crew error to be a causal factor. Each accident is reviewed in a separate chapter that examines events and crew actions and explores the cognitive processes in play at each step. The approach is guided by extensive evidence from cognitive psychology that human skill and error are opposite sides of the same coin. The book examines the ways in which competing task demands, ambiguity and organizational pressures interact with cognitive processes to make all experts vulnerable to characteristic forms of error. The final chapter identifies themes cutting across the accidents, discusses the role of chance, criticizes simplistic concepts of causality of accidents, and suggests ways to reduce vulnerability to these catastrophes. The authors' complementary experience allowed a unique approach to the study: accident investigation with the NTSB, cognitive psychology research both in the lab and in the field, enormous first-hand experience of piloting, and application of aviation psychology in both civil and military operations. This combination allowed the authors to examine and explain the domain-specific aspects of aviation operations and to extend advances in basic research in cognition to complex issues of human performance in the real world. Although The Limits of Expertise is directed to aviation operations, the implications are clear for understanding the decision processes, skilled performance and errors of professionals in many domains, including medicine.
On 25 January 2010, at 00:41:30 UTC, Ethiopian Airlines flight ET 409, a Boeing 737-800, on its way from Beirut to Addis Abeba, crashed just after take-off from Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut, Lebanon, into the Mediterranean Sea about 5 NM South West of Beirut International Airport. All 90 persons on board were killed in the accident. The investigation concluded that the probable causes of the accident were pilot errors due to loss of situational awareness. Ethiopian Airlines refutes this conclusion. Other factors that could have lead to probable causes are the increased workload and stress levels that have most likely led to the captain reaching a situation of loss of situational awareness similar to a subtle incapacitation and the F/O failure to recognize it or to intervene accordingly. Ethiopian Airlines refutes the investigation. According to the airline the final report was biased, lacking evidence, incomplete and did not present the full account of the accident.
