Provides a philosophical and historical critique of contemporary conceptions of physicalism, especially non-reductive, levels-based approaches to physicalist metaphysics. Challenging assumptions about the mind-body problem, this accessible book will interest scholars working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.
This book assesses the existentially relevant consequences of physicalism. It argues that accepting physicalism is the healthiest stance we can take in the face of an account of the self and world which offers no metaphysical assurances. Why should we care about physicalism? On one hand, the view seems to be inconsistent with things that many people find valuable, such as the existence of free will, God, the immortal soul, ultimate purpose, and natural laws like karma. On the other hand, physicalism seems to have positive existential implications such as supporting the unlimited potential of scientific understanding or the attitude that we need not fear supernatural powers or forces because they don’t exist. This book argues that physicalism has several consequences that are of existential import. It begins by outlining the history of physicalism and explaining two popular ways of understanding it: the via negativa approach and the theory-based approach. The rest of Part 1 explores the existential consequences of these two versions of physicalism. Part 2 draws on Nietzsche to construct an argument about what attitude we ought to adopt toward physicalism. It argues that we ought to avoid nihilism and despair even when being confronted with a picture of the universe which offers no metaphysical assurances. Finally, Part 3 is dedicated to how well physicalism deals with the hard problem of consciousness, mental causation, and multiple realization. The Hope and Horror of Physicalism will appeal to anyone interested in a contemporary approach to existential philosophy, as well as scholars and advanced students working in the fields of philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
Jaegwon Kim (1934-019) was one of the most influential metaphysicians and philosophers of mind in the last third of the Twentieth Century and early Twenty-First Century. In metaphysics, he did pioneering work on events, supervenience, emergence, higher-level causation, properties, and the metaphysics of the special sciences. His highly influential work in the philosophy of mind centered around the mind-body problem. This special issue of Protosciology is in his honor.
This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions in the philosophy of mind. There is the question: Are mental properties identical with physical properties? An affirmative answer would seem to secure the truth of physicalism regarding the mind, i.e., the belief that all mental phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. If the answer is negative, then the question arises: Can this solely in virtue of relation be understood as some kind of dependence short of identity? And answering this requires answering two further questions. Exactly what sort of dependence on the physical does physicalism require, and what is needed for a property or phenomenon to qualify as physical? It is argued that multiple realizability still provides irresistible proof (especially with the possibility of immaterial realizers) that mental properties are not identical with any properties of physics, chemistry, or biology. After refuting various attempts to formulate nonreductive physicalism with the notion of realization, a new definition of physicalism is offered. This definition shows how it could be that the mental depends solely on the physical even if mental properties are not identical with those of the natural sciences. Yet, it is also argued that the sort of psychophysical dependence described is robust enough that if it were to obtain, then in a plausible and robust sense of ‘physical’, mental properties would still qualify as physical properties.
Torin Alter presents a compelling defence of the 'knowledge argument' against physicalism, pioneered by Frank Jackson. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. Alter argues that the knowledge argument succeeds in refuting all standard versions of physicalism: versions on which consciousness is grounded by what objective science reveals. Alter also argues that given further, plausible assumptions, the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism, according to which there are intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics, such as mass and charge. Alter explains how the knowledge argument establishes those two conclusions and defend it against numerous objections.
Both the special sciences and ordinary experience present us with a world of macro-entities - trees, birds, lakes, mountains, humans, houses, and sculptures, to name a few - which materially depend on lower-level configurations, but which are also distinct from and distinctively efficacious ascompared to those configurations. This give rise to two key questions. First, what is metaphysical emergence, more precisely? Second, is there actually any metaphysical emergence? Metaphysical Emergence provides clear, compelling, and systematic answers to these questions. Wilson argues that thereare two and only two forms of metaphysical emergence that make sense of the target cases: 'Weak' emergence, whereby a macro-entity or feature has a proper subset of the powers of its base-level configuration, and 'Strong' emergence, whereby a macro-entity or feature has a new power as compared toits base-level configuration. Given that the lower-level configurations are physical, Weak emergence unifies and accommodates diverse accounts of realization associated with varieties of non-reductive physicalism, whereas Strong emergence unifies and accommodates anti-physicalist views according towhich there may be fundamentally novel features, forces, interactions, or laws at higher levels of compositional complexity. After defending each form of emergence from various objections, Wilson considers whether complex systems, ordinary objects, consciousness, and free will are actually eitherWeakly or Strongly metaphysically emergent. She argues that Weak emergence is quite common, and that Strong emergence, while in most cases at best a live empirical possibility, is instantiated for the important case of free will.
Metaphysics: An Introduction, Second Edition combines comprehensive coverage of the core elements of metaphysics with contemporary and lively debates within the subject. It provides a rigorous and yet accessible overview of a rich array of topics, connecting the abstract nature of metaphysics with the real world. Topics covered include: basic logic for metaphysics an introduction to ontology abstract objects material objects critiques of metaphysics natural and social kinds the metaphysics of race and gender grounding and fundamentality free will time modality persistence causation. This outstanding book not only equips the reader with a thorough knowledge of the fundamentals of metaphysics, but provides a valuable guide to contemporary metaphysics and metaphysicians. New for this second edition are updated sections on metaphysical indeterminacy; new sections on manipulation arguments and free will and neuroscience; and new chapters on the important topics of social ontology, fundamentality, and grounding. Additional features such as exercises, annotated further reading, a glossary, and a companion website https://routledgetextbooks.com/textbooks/9780815350491 have also been updated and will help students find their way around this subject and assist teachers in the classroom.
Software is everywhere. Yet software doesn’t exist. At least not in the way we typically think about things existing. Starting from this simple truth, The Software Revelation takes you on a highly entertaining and thought-provoking journey through the questions people have been asking since the beginning of time about the world and about themselves. Expertly drawing on insights from computer science, philosophy, linguistics, physics, religion, and the arts, The Software Revelation helps readers of all backgrounds, education levels, and viewpoints clarify the ideas that form the foundation of their belief-systems. The Software Revelation is also a great text to use as a teaching tool or for book discussion groups for those who want to delve into deeper waters without having to slog through the works of Kant, Derrida, and other key thinkers whose writing can be almost impossible for the average reader to get through.
Physicalism—the thesis that everything there is in the world, including our minds, is constituted by basic physical entities—has dominated the philosophy of mind during the last few decades. But although the conceptual foundations of the physicalist agenda—including a proper explication of notions such as ‘causation', ‘determination', ‘realization’ or even ‘physicalism’ itself—must be settled before more specific problems (e.g. the problems of mental causation and human agency) can be satisfactorily addressed, a comprehensive philosophical reflection on the relationships between the various key concepts of the debate on physicalism is yet missing. This book presents a range of essays on the conceptual foundations of physicalism, mental causation and human agency, written by established and leading authors in the field.
In a world where science faces challenges from creationists and climate change deniers, and where social media is awash with wild conspiracy theories, it is no longer enough for scientists, pundits, and activists to simply ask the public to trust science. Rather, all must better understand how science works, and why science is essential. By exploring many of the odd beliefs embraced by large sections of the public that are rejected by the scientific mainstream, Weirdness! makes a case for science that goes beyond popular slogans. It takes seriously claims that paranormal phenomena, such as psychic abilities and mythical creatures, might be real, but demonstrates how such phenomena would extend beyond the laws of nature. It rejects a sharp boundary between science and religion, while explaining how to negotiate their real differences. Denials of science cause no end of trouble, but so too does placing blind trust in science. As Weirdness! reminds readers, science should not be seen as a mechanism that takes in data and spits out truth—indeed, what we get wrong about how the world works is often as interesting as what we get right.