The world is not always truly reflected in what we see. The brain creates images, fills in gaps and even at times constructs fictions. This book brings together experts from several diverse fields to present state of the art accounts of how the visual world enters two small holes in our heads and is reconstructed to give us the rich impressions of color, movement, and shape.
Historical introduction to the constancies; Visuomotor coordination in visual direction and position constancies; The constancies in object orientation: an algorithm processing approach; Stereoscopic depth constancy; The metric of visual space; Analysis of causal relations in the perceptual constancies; Instruction and perceptual constancy judgments; Illusion and constancies; Constancies in the perceptual world of the infant; In defense of unconscious inference; Spatial constancy and motion in visual perception; Lessons in constancy from neurophysiology; Observations concerning the contemporary analysis of constancies.
A proposal for a new way to do cognitive science argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than computation and representation. While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach (which he terms radical embodied cognitive science), puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and John Dewey, and follows them in viewing perception and cognition to be understandable only in terms of action in the environment. Chemero argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in terms of computation and representation. After outlining this orientation to cognition, Chemero proposes a methodology: dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation. He also advances a background theory: Gibsonian ecological psychology, “shored up” and clarified. Chemero then looks at some traditional philosophical problems (reductionism, epistemological skepticism, metaphysical realism, consciousness) through the lens of radical embodied cognitive science and concludes that the comparative ease with which it resolves these problems, combined with its empirical promise, makes this approach to cognitive science a rewarding one. “Jerry Fodor is my favorite philosopher,” Chemero writes in his preface, adding, “I think that Jerry Fodor is wrong about nearly everything.” With this book, Chemero explains nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological cognitive science as clearly and as rigorously as Jerry Fodor explained computational cognitive science in his classic work The Language of Thought.
"In Perception: First Form of Mind, Tyler Burge develops an understanding of the most primitive type of representational mind: perception. Focusing on its form, function, and underlying capacities, as indicated in the sciences of perception, Burge provides an account of the representational content and formal representational structure of perceptual states, and develops a formal semantics for them. The account is elaborated by an explanation of how the representational form is embedded in an iconic format. These structures are then situated in current theoretical accounts of the processing of perceptual representations, with an emphasis on the formation of perceptual categorizations. An exploration of the relationship between perception and other primitive capacities-conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, and imagining-clarifies the distinction between perceiving, with its associated capacities, and thinking, with its associated capacities. Drawing on a broad range of historical and contemporary research, rather than relying on introspection or ordinary talk about perception, Perception: First Form of Mind is a scientifically rigorous and agenda-setting work in the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of science"--
Principles of Psychology offers students a complete introduction to psychology. It balances contemporary approaches with classic perspectives, weaves stimulating conceptual issues throughout the text, and encourages students to think critically, creatively, and practically about the subject and how it applies to the real-world.
In attempting to understand and explain various behaviour, events, and phenomena in their field, psychologists have developed and enunciated an enormous number of ‘best guesses’ or theories concerning the phenomenon in question. Such theories involve speculations and statements that range on a potency continuum from ‘strong’ to ‘weak’. The term theory, itself, has been conceived of in various ways in the psychological literature. In the present dictionary, the strategy of lumping together all the various traditional descriptive labels regarding psychologists ‘best guesses’ under the single descriptive term theory has been adopted. The descriptive labels of principle, law, theory, model, paradigm, effect, hypothesis and doctrine are attached to many of the entries, and all such descriptive labels are subsumed under the umbrella term theory. The title of this dictionary emphasizes the term theory (implying both strong and weak best guesses) and is a way of indication, overall, the contents of this comprehensive dictionary in a parsimonious and felicitous fashion. The dictionary will contain approximately 2,000 terms covering the origination, development, and evolution of various psychological concepts, as well as the historical definition, analysis, and criticisms of psychological concepts. Terms and definitions are in English. *Contains over 2,000 terms covering the origination, development and evolution of various psychological concepts *Covers a wide span of theories, from auditory, cognitive tactile and visual to humor and imagery *An essential resource for psychologists needing a single-source quick reference
A renewed interest in the study of vision has attracted scholars from such diverse fields as neuroscience, computer science, mathematics, physics and philosophy. At the same time, the development of imaging devices and popularization of stereoscopic effects has increased student interest in vision. This primer provides an overview of the principles of space perception in a handbook format that should appeal to researchers as well as students. Topics covered include geometrical and distal-proximal relationships, spatial localization, stereopsis, cyclopean perception, stimulus inadequacy, pictorial cues, perceived size and shape, Gibsonian psychophysics, lateral motion, motion in depth, perceived object motion, and motion detection.
The two volume set LNCS 4351 and LNCS 4352 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 13th International Multimedia Modeling Conference, MMM 2007, held in Singapore in January 2007. Based on rigorous reviewing, the program committee selected 123 carefully revised full papers of the main technical sessions and 33 revised full papers of four special sessions from a total of 392 submissions for presentation in two volumes.
According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how cognitive states can influence perception. All sixteen chapters were written especially for the book. The first chapters provide methodological and conceptual clarification of the topic and give an account of the relations between penetrability, encapsulation, modularity, and cross-modal interactions in perception. Assessments of psychological and neuroscientific evidence for cognitive penetration are given by several chapters. Most of the contributions analyse the impact of cognitive penetrability and impenetrability on specific philosophical topics: high-level perceptual contents, the epistemological consequences of penetration, nonconceptual content, the phenomenology of late perception, metacognitive feelings, and action. The book includes a comprehensive introduction which explains the history of the debate, its key technical concepts (informational encapsulation, early and late vision, the perception-cognition distinction, hard-wired perceptual processing, perceptual learning, theory-ladenness), and the debate's relevance to current topics in the philosophy of mind and perception, epistemology, and philosophy of psychology.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception is a survey by leading philosophical thinkers of contemporary issues and new thinking in philosophy of perception. It includes sections on the history of the subject, introductions to contemporary issues in the epistemology, ontology and aesthetics of perception, treatments of the individual sense modalities and of the things we perceive by means of them, and a consideration of how perceptual information is integrated and consolidated. New analytic tools and applications to other areas of philosophy are discussed in depth. Each of the forty-five entries is written by a leading expert, some collaborating with younger figures; each seeks to introduce the reader to a broad range of issues. All contain new ideas on the topics covered; together they demonstrate the vigour and innovative zeal of a young field. The book is accessible to anybody who has an intellectual interest in issues concerning perception.
