In November 2018, an ad hoc planning committee at the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine planned two sister workshops held in Washington, DC, to examine the lessons from influenza pandemics and other major outbreaks, understand the extent to which the lessons have been learned, and discuss how they could be applied further to ensure that countries are sufficiently ready for future pandemics. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from both workshops.
In response to the call of the 48th World Health Assembly for a substantial revision of the International Health Regulations, this new edition of the Regulations will enter into force on June 15, 2007. The purpose and scope of the Regulations are "to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade." The Regulations also cover certificates applicable to international travel and transport, and requirements for international ports, airports and ground crossings.
Section 6.14.3 of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework established an annual Partnership Contribution (PC) to be paid by influenza vaccine, diagnostic and pharmaceutical manufacturers using the WHO global influenza surveillance and response system (GISRS). Resources contributed are to be used to strengthen pandemic influenza preparedness and response. For 2018-2023, the second High-Level Implementation Plan (HLIP II) guides the use of PC Preparedness Funds. In 2021, as planned under Section 6.2.3.3 of the HLIP II, an external Mid-Term Review was conducted to assess progress, consider changes in the landscape for global pandemic influenza preparedness and discuss potential ‘mid-course adjustments’ needed for future HLIP II implementation. This revision to the HLIP II responds to recommendation #1 of the 2021 HLIP II Mid-Term Review. It includes amendments to the Monitoring & Evaluation framework of the plan (Annex 3) to consider HLIP II implementation and progress on the results hierarchy between 2018 and 2020.
In the past half century, deadly disease outbreaks caused by novel viruses of animal origin - Nipah virus in Malaysia, Hendra virus in Australia, Hantavirus in the United States, Ebola virus in Africa, along with HIV (human immunodeficiency virus), several influenza subtypes, and the SARS (sudden acute respiratory syndrome) and MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) coronaviruses - have underscored the urgency of understanding factors influencing viral disease emergence and spread. Emerging Viral Diseases is the summary of a public workshop hosted in March 2014 to examine factors driving the appearance, establishment, and spread of emerging, re-emerging and novel viral diseases; the global health and economic impacts of recently emerging and novel viral diseases in humans; and the scientific and policy approaches to improving domestic and international capacity to detect and respond to global outbreaks of infectious disease. This report is a record of the presentations and discussion of the event.
The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIP Framework) was unanimously adopted by the Sixty-fourth World Health Assembly in May 2011. This second edition reflects an amendment made to the Framework by the 72nd World Health Assembly in May 2019. The objective of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework is to improve pandemic influenza preparedness and response, and strengthen the protection against the pandemic influenza by improving and strengthening the WHO global influenza surveillance and response system (“WHO GISRS”), with the objective of a fair, transparent, equitable, efficient, effective system for, on an equal footing: the sharing of H5N1 and other influenza viruses with human pandemic potential; and access to vaccines and sharing of other benefits.
The PIP Framework is a broad-based partnership to improve global pandemic influenza preparedness and response. The Framework, which grew out of the re-emergence of A(H5N1) influenza in 2004, was adopted by WHO’s 194 Member States at the World Health Assembly on 24 May 2011. Section 6.14.3 of the Framework establishes an annual Partnership Contribution (“PC”) to be paid by influenza vaccine, diagnostic and pharmaceutical manufacturers using the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS). Resources contributed are to be used to strengthen pandemic influenza preparedness and response. WHO has published two prior high-level implementation plans to outline the use of the PC preparedness funds. In order to continue the strategic use of the PC funds, this document will build upon the gains made in the implementation of the previous two plans, take into account lessons from COVID-19 and take into consideration the evolving global landscape for pandemic and epidemic preparedness. The document will enable stakeholders to see at a high level, the approach for use of PC funds and priority areas for capacity-building for the period 2024-2030. The document will describe the current context, layout a results hierarchy and define the project management processes that are key for successful implementation.
The 2018 FAO-OIE-WHO (Tripartite) zoonoses guide, “Taking A Multisectoral, One Health Approach: A Tripartite Guide to Addressing Zoonotic Diseases in Countries” (2018 TZG) is being jointly developed to provide member countries with practical guidance on OH approaches to build national mechanisms for multisectoral coordination, communication, and collaboration to address zoonotic disease threats at the animal-human-environment interface. The 2018 TZG updates and expands on the guidance in the one previous jointly-developed, zoonoses-specific guidance document: the 2008 Tripartite “Zoonotic Diseases: A Guide to Establishing Collaboration between Animal and Human Health Sectors at the Country Level”, developed in WHO South-East Asia Region and Western Pacific Region. The 2018 TZG supports building by countries of the resilience and capacity to address emerging and endemic zoonotic diseases such as avian influenza, rabies, Ebola, and Rift Valley fever, as well as food-borne diseases and antimicrobial resistance, and to minimize their impacts on health, livelihoods, and economies. It additionally supports country efforts to implement WHO International Health Regulations (2005) and OIE international standards, to address gaps identified through external and internal health system evaluations, and to achieve targets of the Sustainable Development Goals. The 2018 TZG provides relevant country ministries and agencies with lessons learned and good practices identified from country-level experiences in taking OH approaches for preparedness, prevention, detection and response to zoonotic disease threats, and provides guidance on multisectoral communication, coordination, and collaboration. It informs on regional and country-level OH activities and relevant unisectoral and multisectoral tools available for countries to use.
When, in late 2011, it became public knowledge that two research groups had submitted for publication manuscripts that reported on their work on mammalian transmissibility of a lethal H5N1 avian influenza strain, the information caused an international debate about the appropriateness and communication of the researchers' work, the risks associated with the work, partial or complete censorship of scientific publications, and dual-use research of concern in general. Recognizing that the H5N1 research is only the most recent scientific activity subject to widespread attention due to safety and security concerns, on May 1, 2012, the National Research Council's Committee on Science, Technology and Law, in conjunction with the Board on Life Sciences and the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Microbial Threats, convened a one-day public workshop for the purposes of 1) discussing the H5N1 controversy; 2) considering responses by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), which had funded this research, the World Health Organization, the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), scientific publishers, and members of the international research community; and 3) providing a forum wherein the concerns and interests of the broader community of stakeholders, including policy makers, biosafety and biosecurity experts, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the general public might be articulated. Perspectives on Research with H5N1 Avian Influenza: Scientific Enquiry, Communication, Controversy summarizes the proceedings of the workshop.
