July 2019 Printed in BLACK AND WHITE The Army's Weapon Systems Handbook was updated in July 2019, but is still titled "Weapon Systems Handbook 2018." We are printing this in black and white to keep the price low. It presents many of the acquisition programs currently fielded or in development. The U.S. Army Acquisition Corps, with its 36,000 professionals, bears a unique responsibility for the oversight and systems management of the Army's acquisition lifecycle. With responsibility for hundreds of acquisition programs, civilian and military professionals collectively oversee research, development and acquisition activities totaling more than $20 billion in Fiscal Year 2016 alone. Why buy a book you can download for free? We print this so you don't have to. We at 4th Watch Publishing are former government employees, so we know how government employees actually use the standards. When a new standard is released, somebody has to print it, punch holes and put it in a 3-ring binder. While this is not a big deal for a 5 or 10-page document, many DoD documents are over 400 pages and printing a large document is a time- consuming effort. So, a person that's paid $25 an hour is spending hours simply printing out the tools needed to do the job. That's time that could be better spent doing mission. We publish these documents so you can focus on what you are there for. It's much more cost-effective to just order the latest version from Amazon.com. SDVOSB If there is a standard you would like published, let us know. Our web site is usgovpub.com
Jerry Thigpen's study on the history of the Combat Talon is the first effort to tell the story of this wonderfully capable machine. This weapons system has performed virtually every imaginable tactical event in the spectrum of conflict and by any measure is the most versatile C-130 derivative ever produced. First modified and sent to Southeast Asia (SEA) in 1966 to replace theater unconventional warfare (UW) assets that were limited in both lift capability and speed the Talon I quickly adapted to theater UW tasking including infiltration and resupply and psychological warfare operations into North Vietnam. After spending four years in SEA and maturing into a highly respected UW weapons system the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) chose the Combat Talon to lead the night low-level raid on the North Vietnamese prison camp at Son Tay. Despite the outcome of the operation the Talon I cemented its reputation as the weapons system of choice for long-range clandestine operations. In the period following the Vietnam War United States Air Force (USAF) special operations gradually lost its political and financial support which was graphically demonstrated in the failed Desert One mission into Iran. Thanks to congressional supporters like Earl Hutto of Florida and Dan Daniel of Virginia funds for aircraft upgrades and military construction projects materialized to meet the ever-increasing threat to our nation. Under the leadership of such committed hard-driven officers as Brenci Uttaro Ferkes Meller and Thigpen the crew force became the most disciplined in our Air Force. It was capable of penetrating hostile airspace at night in a low-level mountainous environment covertly to execute any number of unconventional warfare missions.
The U.S. Navy is ready to execute the Nation's tasks at sea, from prompt and sustained combat operations to every-day forward-presence, diplomacy and relief efforts. We operate worldwide, in space, cyberspace, and throughout the maritime domain. The United States is and will remain a maritime nation, and our security and prosperity are inextricably linked to our ability to operate naval forces on, under and above the seas and oceans of the world. To that end, the Navy executes programs that enable our Sailors, Marines, civilians, and forces to meet existing and emerging challenges at sea with confidence. Six priorities guide today's planning, programming, and budgeting decisions: (1) maintain a credible, modern, and survivable sea based strategic deterrent; (2) sustain forward presence, distributed globally in places that matter; (3) develop the capability and capacity to win decisively; (4) focus on critical afloat and ashore readiness to ensure the Navy is adequately funded and ready; (5) enhance the Navy's asymmetric capabilities in the physical domains as well as in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum; and (6) sustain a relevant industrial base, particularly in shipbuilding.
Naval Air War: The Rolling Thunder Campaign is the sixth monograph in the series The U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War. It covers aircraft carrier activity during one of the longest sustained aerial bombing campaigns in history. And it would be a failure. The U.S. Navy proved essential to the conduct of Rolling Thunder and by capitalizing on the inherent flexibility and mobility of naval forces, the Seventh Fleet operated with impunity for three years off the coast of North Vietnam. The success with which the Navy executed the later Operation Linebacker campaign against North Vietnam in 1972 revealed how much the service had learned from and exploited the Rolling Thunder experience of 1965-1968.
Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and unity of effort. Rather than establishing a set of hard and fast rules, the objective of doctrine is to foster initiative and creative thinking. To this end, FM 3-06 discusses major Army operations in an urban environment. This environment, consisting of complex terrain, a concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems, is an operational environment in which Army forces will operate. In the future, it may be the predominant operational environment. Each urban operation is unique and will differ because of the multitude of combinations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation of which it may be part (or the focus), and the fluidity of societal and geopolitical considerations. Therefore, there will always exist an innate tension between Army doctrine, the actual context of the urban operation, and future realities. Commanders must strike the proper balance between maintaining the capability to respond to current threats and preparing for future challenges.
After Southeast Asia, analysts and force planners came to the realization that there was a fundamental difference between search and rescue (SAR) in a permissive area and in an area that was not permissive (i.e., under enemy control). This second condition is now called combat search and rescue or CSAR. At the time of Desert Storm, the two forms of rescue were defined thusly: Search and Rescue (SAR): Use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, personnel, and equipment to locate and recover personnel in distress on land or at sea. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR): A specialized SAR task performed by rescue-capable forces to effect recovery of distressed personnel from hostile territory during contingency operations or wartime.2 The development of this rescue capability has been well established. Dr. Robert Futrell documented our efforts in Korea in The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. His work was followed by Dr. Earl Tilford's Search and Rescue in South east Asia, which eloquently chronicled the heroic efforts of the rescue crews in that conflict who brought back literally thousands of airmen. It extensively documented what is now considered the "golden age" of rescue. This work is meant to follow in those traditions and will focus on our CSAR efforts in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, or more specifically, the period of Operation Desert Storm, 17 January to 28 February 1991. Overall, CSAR in Desert Storm appears to have been a mixed bag. Because of advances in precision weaponry, Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, countermeasures, and training, relatively few coalition aircraft were shot down. Forty-three coalition aircraft were lost in combat, most over high-threat areas. Eighty-seven coalition airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines were isolated in enemy or neutral territory. Of that total, 48 were killed, one is still listed as missing, 24 were immediately captured, and 14 were exposed in enemy territory. Of those who survived, most landed in areas controlled by enemy troops. Of the few actually rescueable, six were not rescued for a variety of reasons, but primarily because of limitations in CENTAF's ability to locate them accurately and in a timely manner.