Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9

Author: Russ Shafer-Landau

Publisher: OUP Oxford

Published: 2014-07-31

Total Pages: 273

ISBN-13: 0191019372

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Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics

Author: Russ Shafer-Landau

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2014-07-31

Total Pages: 273

ISBN-13: 0198709293

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Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9

Author: Mark Timmons

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2019-10-24

Total Pages: 314

ISBN-13: 0192585215

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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16

Author: Russ Shafer-Landau

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2021-06-24

Total Pages: 304

ISBN-13: 0192651862

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Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here. Topics explored in Volume 16 include moral worth, moral testimony, moral evaluation, expressivism, reasons, and normativity.

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10

Author: Mark Timmons

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2020-10-15

Total Pages: 304

ISBN-13: 0192638203

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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

Moral Skepticism
Moral Skepticism

Author: Diego E. Machuca

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2017-10-20

Total Pages: 238

ISBN-13: 131723930X

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Moral skepticism is at present a vibrant topic of philosophical inquiry. Particularly since the turn of the millennium, the debates between moral skeptics of various stripes and their opponents have gained renewed force not only by taking account of innovative ideas in moral philosophy, but also by drawing on novel positions in epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language as well as on recent findings in empirical sciences. As a result, new arguments for and against moral skepticism have been devised, while the traditional ones have been reexamined. This collection of original essays will advance the ongoing debates about various forms of moral skepticism by discussing such topics as error theory, disagreement, constructivism, non-naturalism, expressivism, fictionalism, and evolutionary debunking arguments. It will be a valuable resource for academics and advanced students working in metaethics and moral philosophy more generally.

The Origin of Oughtness
The Origin of Oughtness

Author: Stefan Fischer

Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG

Published: 2018-08-06

Total Pages: 298

ISBN-13: 3110599783

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How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory – metaethical conativism – and defend it against some historically influential objections.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13

Author: Russ Shafer-Landau

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2018-07-12

Total Pages: 322

ISBN-13: 0192557165

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Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

Moral Psychology with Nietzsche
Moral Psychology with Nietzsche

Author: Brian Leiter

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

Published: 2019

Total Pages: 211

ISBN-13: 0199696500

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Brian Leiter draws on empirical psychology to defend a set of radical ideas from Nietzsche: there is no objectively true morality, there is no free will, no one is ever morally responsible, and our conscious thoughts play almost no significant role in our actions. Nietzsche emerges as not just a great philosopher but a prescient psychologist.

The Importance of Being Rational
The Importance of Being Rational

Author: Errol Lord

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2018-05-30

Total Pages: 278

ISBN-13: 0192546759

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The Importance of Being Rational systematically defends a novel reasons-based account of rationality. The book's central thesis is that what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. Errol Lord defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons. He shows that these views not only help to support the book's main thesis, they also help to resolve several important problems that are independent of rationality. The account of possession provides novel contributions to debates about what determines what we ought to do, and the account of correctly responding to reasons provides novel contributions to debates about causal theories of reacting for reasons. After defending views about possession and correctly responding, Lord shows that the account of rationality can solve two difficult problems about rationality. The first is the New Evil Demon problem. The book argues that the account has the resources to show that internal duplicates necessarily have the same rational status. The second problem concerns the deontic significance of rationality. Recently it has been doubted whether we ought to be rational. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that the requirements of rationality are the requirements that we ultimately ought to comply with. If this is right, then rationality is of fundamental importance to our deliberative lives.