This paper presents recent trends in bank ownership across countries and summarizes the evidence regarding the implications of bank ownership structure for bank performance and competition, financial stability, and access to finance. The evidence reviewed suggests that foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic banks in developing countries, promote competition in host banking sectors, and help stabilize credit when host countries face idiosyncratic shocks. But there are tradeoffs, since foreign-owned banks can transmit external shocks and might not always expand access to credit. The record on the impact of government bank ownership suggests few benefits, especially for developing countries.
"Which public policies and ownership structures enhance the governance of banks? This paper constructs a new database on the ownership of banks internationally and then assesses the ramifications of ownership, shareholder protection laws, and supervisory/regulatory policies on bank valuations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held, but rather families or the State tend to control banks. We find that (i) larger cash flow rights by the controlling owner boosts valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on bank valuations. These results are consistent with the views that expropriation of minority shareholders is important internationally, that laws can restrain this expropriation, and concentrated cash flow rights represent an important mechanism for governing banks. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that empowering official supervisory and regulatory agencies will increase the market valuation of banks"--NBER website
Abstract: "The authors jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance. They argue that it is important to include indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model. "Nonrobustness" checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument. Using data from Argentina in the 1990s, their strongest and most robust results concern state ownership. State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect. However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks."--World Bank web site.
This book explores the status quo of corporate governance in banking and investor protection from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Bringing together original conclusions with a regional and international focus, it provides a timely and comprehensive overview of the effectiveness of corporate governance in the financial sector and an assessment of investor protection. It also includes a number of examples and case studies to illustrate the findings. The book compares corporate governance in the banking and financial industries before and after the financial crisis, and helps to evaluate the effect of the recommendations and regulations that have been developed in the interim.
March 1998 Differences in interest margins reflect differences in bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, existing financial structure and taxation, regulation, and other institutional factors. Using bank data for 80 countries for 1988-95, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga show that differences in interest margins and bank profitability reflect various determinants: * Bank characteristics. * Macroeconomic conditions. * Explicit and implicit bank taxes. * Regulation of deposit insurance. * General financial structure. * Several underlying legal and institutional indicators. Controlling for differences in bank activity, leverage, and the macroeconomic environment, they find (among other things) that: * Banks in countries with a more competitive banking sector-where banking assets constitute a larger share of GDP-have smaller margins and are less profitable. The bank concentration ratio also affects bank profitability; larger banks tend to have higher margins. * Well-capitalized banks have higher net interest margins and are more profitable. This is consistent with the fact that banks with higher capital ratios have a lower cost of funding because of lower prospective bankruptcy costs. * Differences in a bank's activity mix affect spread and profitability. Banks with relatively high noninterest-earning assets are less profitable. Also, banks that rely largely on deposits for their funding are less profitable, as deposits require more branching and other expenses. Similarly, variations in overhead and other operating costs are reflected in variations in bank interest margins, as banks pass their operating costs (including the corporate tax burden) on to their depositors and lenders. * In developing countries foreign banks have greater margins and profits than domestic banks. In industrial countries, the opposite is true. * Macroeconomic factors also explain variation in interest margins. Inflation is associated with higher realized interest margins and greater profitability. Inflation brings higher costs-more transactions and generally more extensive branch networks-and also more income from bank float. Bank income increases more with inflation than bank costs do. * There is evidence that the corporate tax burden is fully passed on to bank customers in poor and rich countries alike. * Legal and institutional differences matter. Indicators of better contract enforcement, efficiency in the legal system, and lack of corruption are associated with lower realized interest margins and lower profitability. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to study bank efficiency.
The presence of sound corporate governance in a financial institution is important in maintaining the confidence of both the market and the public. The power that corporate governance holds over the success of some of the largest financial institutions in the world is not to be downplayed. This book methodically assesses the quality of corporate governance and mechanisms of accountability disclosures to various stakeholders. It is further intended to provide fresh insights into some specific corporate governance recommendations to help improve good governance in financial institutions, particularly in the United Kingdom and the EU but will also be applicable to other major economies. It explores what, when and how corporate governance has changed the financial institution functions and corporate executive behaviour by critically reviewing the pre- and post-financial crisis theoretical and empirical literature. Increasingly driven by the nature of complications, complexities and opacity in the operations of financial systems, corporate governance reporting plays an important role in the financial sector. It will provide insights into corporate governance disclosures over a long-term basis. This book should be a valuable asset to support the research of practitioners, students and all academics due to its stimulating and reflective insights into this fascinating topic.
Routledge Handbook of Social and Sustainable Finance brings together an international cast of leading authorities to map out and display the disparate voices, traditions and professional communities engaged in social finance activity. With a clear societal or environmental mission, foundations, individual and group investors, as well as public bodies around the world have become increasingly eager to finance and support innovative forms of doing business. Together, founders and established businesses alike are embracing new sustainable business models with a distinct stakeholder approach to tackle social or environmental problems in what they see as a failed economic system in crisis. As a result, the topic of social and sustainable finance is at the forefront of financial economic thought. This Handbook is divided up into three parts. The first, "The Landscape of Social and Sustainable Finance and Investments", comprises of chapters from a multitude of perspectives in an effort to grasp the entirety of the landscape. The second, "Challenges, Suggestions, Critiques and Debates", focuses on areas ranging from sociological underpinnings to critical takes on markets, and the identification of specialized business models. Amongst ethical considerations, topics include the scaling of impact, an analysis of sustainability as risk prevention and comparative analyses of various methods of justification and measurement. In the third and final section, "Markets and Institutions", contributions range from various perspectives on sustainable banking to environmental marketplaces, and finally on to practical cases and country specific observations. This volume is essential reading for both academics and students in economics and finance. It is also of interest to those who study environmental economics, microeconomics and banking.
This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001?09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.
This paper highlights the distinct challenges and suggests practical solutions to the effective regulation, supervision, and crisis management for public banks. It acknowledges that public banks exist for variety of reasons (legacy, ideology, public policy) and will likely remain a feature of financial systems in a number of countries. On this basis, it provides advice on how to best incorporate public banks in the regulatory paradigm commensurate with their risk profiles.
