This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. A fundamental objective of congressional oversight (CO) is to hold exec. officials accountable for the implementation of delegated authority. This objective is especially important given the huge expansion of executive influence in the modern era. Clearly, given the role and scope of the fed. establishment, the importance of Congress¿s review function looms large in checking and monitoring the delegated authority that it grants to fed. departments and agencies. This report: (1) highlights several reasons for the expansion of the fed. gov¿t.; (2) discusses a few definitions of CO; (3) spotlights 3 purposes of oversight; (4) comments upon CO laws and rules; (5) reviews CO techniques; and (6) identifies incentives and disincentives to CO. Illus.
This book examines the legal and policy issues surrounding congressional investigations through a series of case studies, with an emphasis on the second half of the twentieth century to date. The new and updated second edition covers significant developments from the Obama and Trump administrations, including the two Trump impeachments, the January 6 Committee investigation of the 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, and recent Supreme Court decisions on congressional investigative powers. The book is organized by case study topic, with each chapter using two or three case studies to introduce and analyze a discrete area of legal authorities and policy issues. The central thesis and organizing principle of the book is the importance of effective congressional oversight and investigative activities in our American democratic system of government, especially in the aftermath of the disputed 2020 presidential election. In addition to collecting legal authorities, the book includes relevant historical information and structural analysis of government functions, with an emphasis on separation of powers issues. The use of a case study format, rather than a traditional law school casebook format, is intended to present the subject matter in a way that can be used to teach undergraduate and graduate school courses as well as law school courses. The authors combine original congressional and judicial source materials with book excerpts and explanatory text, as well as notes and questions for each case study, to make the subject matter accessible to graduate and upper-level undergraduate students in government and political science courses, as well as to law students.
An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. In this in-depth look at formal oversight hearings by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, Linda Fowler evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs performed from the mid-twentieth century to the present. She finds a noticeable reduction in public and secret hearings since the mid-1990s and establishes that American foreign policy frequently violated basic conditions for democratic accountability. Committee scrutiny of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, she notes, fell below levels of oversight in prior major conflicts. Fowler attributes the drop in watchdog activity to growing disinterest among senators in committee work, biases among members who join the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and motives that shield presidents, particularly Republicans, from public inquiry. Her detailed case studies of the Truman Doctrine, Vietnam War, Panama Canal Treaty, humanitarian mission in Somalia, and Iraq War illustrate the importance of oversight in generating the information citizens need to judge the president’s national security policies. She argues for a reassessment of congressional war powers and proposes reforms to encourage Senate watchdogs to improve public deliberation about decisions of war and peace. Watchdogs on the Hill investigates America’s national security oversight and its critical place in the review of congressional and presidential powers in foreign policy.