Prudential Supervision

Prudential Supervision

Author: Frederic S. Mishkin

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Published: 2009-02-15

Total Pages: 379

ISBN-13: 0226531937

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Since banking systems play a crucial role in maintaining the overall health of the economy, the adverse effects of poorly supervised systems may be quite severe. Without some form of vigilant external oversight, banking systems could fall prey to excessive risk taking, moral hazard, and corruption. Prudential supervision provides that oversight, using government regulation and monitoring to ensure the soundness of the banking system and, by extension, the economy at large. The contributors to this thoughtful volume examine the current state of prudential supervision, focusing on fundamental issues and key pragmatic concerns. Why is prudential supervision so important? What kinds of excess must it guard against? What particular forms does it take? Which of these are the most effective deterrents against mismanagement and system overload in today's rapidly shifting financial climate? The contributors foresee a continued movement beyond simple regulatory rules in banking and toward a more active evaluation and supervision of a bank's risk management practices.


The Prudential Regulation of Banks

The Prudential Regulation of Banks

Author: Mathias Dewatripont

Publisher:

Published: 1994-12

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9780262513869

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

The Prudential Regulation of Banks applies modern economic theory to prudential regulation of financial intermediaries. Dewatripont and Tirole tackle the key problem of providing the right incentives to management in banks by looking at how external intervention by claimholders (holders of equity or debt) affects managerial incentives and how that intervention might ideally be implemented. Their primary focus is the regulation of commercial banks and S&Ls, but many of the implications of their theory are also valid for other intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension funds, and securities funds. Observing that the main concern of the regulation of intermediaries is solvency (the relation between equity, debt, and asset riskiness), the authors provide institutional background and develop a case for regulation as performing the monitoring functions (screening, auditing, convenant writing, and intervention) that dispersed depositors are unable or unwilling to perform. They also illustrate the dangers of regulatory failure in a summary of the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Following a survey of banking theory, Dewatripont and Tirole develop their model of the capital structure of banks and show how optimal regulation can be achieved using capital adequacy requirements and external intervention when banks are violated. They explain how regulation can be designed to minimize risks of accounting manipulations and to insulate bank managers from macroeconomic shocks, which are beyond their control. Finally, they provide a detailed evaluation of the existing regulation and of potential alternatives, such as rating agencies, private deposit insurance, and large private depositors. They show that these reforms are, at best, a complement, rather than a substitute, to the existing regulation which combines capital ratios with external intervention in case of insolvency. The Prudential Regulation of Banks is part of the Walras Pareto Lectures, from the Universiy of Lausanne.


Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision

Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision

Author: Mr.Thierry Tressel

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2014-05-28

Total Pages: 61

ISBN-13: 1498338550

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. We show that the optimal capital ratio depends on the macro-financial cycle, and that, in presence of production externalities, it should be complemented by a constraint on asset allocation. We show that the political process tends to exacerbate excessive risk taking and credit cycles.


Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision

Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision

Author: Mr.Thierry Tressel

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2014-05-28

Total Pages: 61

ISBN-13: 1498389481

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. We show that the optimal capital ratio depends on the macro-financial cycle, and that, in presence of production externalities, it should be complemented by a constraint on asset allocation. We show that the political process tends to exacerbate excessive risk taking and credit cycles.


Aligning Financial Supervisory Structures with Country Needs

Aligning Financial Supervisory Structures with Country Needs

Author: Jeffrey Carmichael

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2004

Total Pages: 290

ISBN-13: 9780821360026

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This publication contains the proceedings of an international conference on the regulation of financial institutions and supervisory structural reforms, held in Washington D.C., United States in December 2003 and involving participants from 52 countries. It considers case studies of experiences of regulatory reform approaches adopted in a number of countries including Australia, South Africa, Ireland, Sweden, Hungary and Estonia.


Regulatory Cycles: Revisiting the Political Economy of Financial Crises

Regulatory Cycles: Revisiting the Political Economy of Financial Crises

Author: Jihad Dagher

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2018-01-15

Total Pages: 89

ISBN-13: 1484337743

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.


E-Money: Prudential Supervision, Oversight, and User Protection

E-Money: Prudential Supervision, Oversight, and User Protection

Author: Mr. Marc C Dobler

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2021-12-14

Total Pages: 34

ISBN-13: 1513593404

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This departmental paper discusses the evolving prudential frameworks for nonbank issuers of electronic money. Some jurisdictions take a relatively light-touch approach to regulating electronic money issuers (EMIs). Others have sought to apply more stringent requirements to protect electronic money (e-money) users, as the sector has grown in importance. The paper aims to build on previous IMF staff contributions to the literature and to draw policy conclusions for strengthening e-money regulatory regimes; in particular in jurisdictions where issuers, individually or collectively, have grown to a size to which they are of macro-financial importance (see below). Chapter 2 provides background on the development of e-money, its economic benefits, and potential risks. Chapter 3 discusses prudential supervision of EMIs, followed in Chapter 4 by their oversight from a payments system perspective. Chapter 5 discusses potential additional measures for user protection and contingency arrangements for EMI failure. The last chapter presents policy recommendations for policymakers, especially in those emerging market economies and developing countries wherein EMIs have reached a scale at which they could have a significant economic impact if they were to fail.


The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to Say "No"

The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to Say

Author: Jennifer A. Elliott

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Published: 2010-05-18

Total Pages: 22

ISBN-13: 9781462310180

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

The quality of financial sector supervision has emerged as a key issue from the financial crisis. While most countries operated broadly under the same regulatory standards, differences emerged in supervisory approaches. The international response to this crisis has focused on the need for more and better regulations (e.g., in areas such as bank capital, liquidity and provisioning) and on developing a framework to address systemic risks, but there has been less discussion of how supervision itself could be strengthened. The IMF's work in assessing compliance with financial sector standards over the past decade in member countries suggests that while progress is being made in putting regulation in place, work remains to be done in many countries to strengthen supervision. How can this enhanced supervision be achieved? Based on an examination of lessons from the crisis and the findings of these assessments of countries' compliance with financial standards, the paper identifies the following key elements of good supervision-that it is intrusive, skeptical, proactive, comprehensive, adaptive, and conclusive. To achieve these elements, the "ability" to supervise, which requires appropriate resources, authority, organization and constructive working relationships with other agencies must be complemented by the "will" to act. Supervisors must be willing and empowered to take timely and effective action, to intrude on decision-making, to question common wisdom, and to take unpopular decisions. Developing this "will to act" is a more difficult task and requires that supervisors have a clear and unambiguous mandate, operational independence coupled with accountability, skilled staff, and a relationship with industry that avoids "regulatory capture." These essential elements of good supervision need to be given as much attention as the regulatory reforms that are being contemplated at both national and international levels. Indeed, only if supervision is strengthened can we hope to effectively deliver on the challenging-but crucial-regulatory reform agenda. For this to happen, society must stand with supervisors as they play their role as naysayers in times of exuberance.


Systemic Risk, Crises, and Macroprudential Regulation

Systemic Risk, Crises, and Macroprudential Regulation

Author: Xavier Freixas

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2015-06-19

Total Pages: 487

ISBN-13: 0262028697

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

A framework for macroprudential regulation that defines systemic risk and macroprudential policy, describes macroprudential tools, and surveys the effectiveness of existing macroprudential regulation. The recent financial crisis has shattered all standard approaches to banking regulation. Regulators now recognize that banking regulation cannot be simply based on individual financial institutions' risks. Instead, systemic risk and macroprudential regulation have come to the forefront of the new regulatory paradigm. Yet our knowledge of these two core aspects of regulation is still limited and fragmented. This book offers a framework for understanding the reasons for the regulatory shift from a microprudential to a macroprudential approach to financial regulation. It defines systemic risk and macroprudential policy, cutting through the generalized confusion as to their meaning; contrasts macroprudential to microprudential approaches; discusses the interaction of macroprudential policy with macroeconomic policy (monetary policy in particular); and describes macroprudential tools and experiences with macroprudential regulation around the world. The book also considers the remaining challenges for establishing effective macroprudential policy and broader issues in regulatory reform. These include the optimal size and structure of the financial system, the multiplicity of regulatory bodies in the United States, the supervision of cross-border financial institutions, and the need for international cooperation on macroprudential policies.