The Optimality of Nominal Contracts

The Optimality of Nominal Contracts

Author: Scott Freeman

Publisher:

Published: 1991

Total Pages: 44

ISBN-13:

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Why do we see nominal contracts in the presence of price level risk? To answer this question, this paper studies an overlapping generations model in which the equilibrium contract form is optimal, given the contracts elsewhere in the economy. Nominal contracts turn out to be optimal in the presence of aggregate price level risk under two circumstances. First, if individuals have the same constant degree of relative risk aversion. The reason is that in this case nominal contracts (eventually coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk sharing. Second, nominal contracts can be optimal, even if the first condition is not met, if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash in advance constraint. The reason is that a contingent contract, while reducing purchasing power risk, also increases the cash flow risk. Under a binding cash in advance constraint on the repayment of contracts, this second risk is costly, and it is minimized by a nominal contract. Finally, the paper also identifies some symmetry conditions under which nominal contracts are optimal even in the presence of relative price risk.


Optimal Nonlinear Pricing by a Dominant Firm Under Competition

Optimal Nonlinear Pricing by a Dominant Firm Under Competition

Author: Yong Chao

Publisher:

Published: 2019

Total Pages: 47

ISBN-13:

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We consider a nonlinear pricing problem faced by a dominant firm which competes with a capacity-constrained minor firm for a downstream buyer who may purchase the product from the firms under complete information. Specifically, we analyze a three-stage game in which the dominant firm offers a general tariff first and then the minor firm responds with a per-unit price, followed by the buyer choosing her purchases. By establishing an equivalence between the subgame perfect equilibrium of our asymmetric competition game and the optimal mechanism in a “virtual” principal-agent model, we characterize the dominant firm's optimal nonlinear tariff, which exhibits convexity and yet can display quantity discounts. Our analysis provides a rationale for nonlinear pricing under competition in the absence of private information: The dominant firm can use unchosen offers to constrain its rival's possible deviations and extract more surplus from the buyer. Antitrust implications are also discussed.


Pricing and Regulatory Innovations Under Increasing Competition

Pricing and Regulatory Innovations Under Increasing Competition

Author: Michael A. Crew

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 213

ISBN-13: 146156249X

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This volume focuses on incentive regulation and competition. While much of the regulatory action is taking place in telecommunications, the impact of competition and the resultant regulatory change is being felt in other traditional public utilities including electricity. The book reviews topics including price caps, incentive regulation, market structure and new regulatory technologies.


Risk Management

Risk Management

Author: Michael Frenkel

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2005-12-06

Total Pages: 842

ISBN-13: 3540269932

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Dealing with all aspects of risk management that have undergone significant innovation in recent years, this book aims at being a reference work in its field. Different to other books on the topic, it addresses the challenges and opportunities facing the different risk management types in banks, insurance companies, and the corporate sector. Due to the rising volatility in the financial markets as well as political and operational risks affecting the business sector in general, capital adequacy rules are equally important for non-financial companies. For the banking sector, the book emphasizes the modifications implied by the Basel II proposal. The volume has been written for academics as well as practitioners, in particular finance specialists. It is unique in bringing together such a wide array of experts and correspondingly offers a complete coverage of recent developments in risk management.


A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 1993

Total Pages: 746

ISBN-13: 9780262121743

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Based on their work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach to this field, focusing on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies and transportation authorities.


Social Ethics and Normative Economics

Social Ethics and Normative Economics

Author: Marc Fleurbaey

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2011-04-11

Total Pages: 358

ISBN-13: 3642178073

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This collection of thirteen essays on social ethics and normative economics honouring Serge-Christophe Kolm's seminal contributions to this field addresses the following questions: How should the public sector price its production and services? What are the normative foundations of criteria for comparing distributions of riches and advantages? How should intergenerational social immobility and inequality in circumstances be measured? What is a fair way to form partnerships? How vulnerable to manipulation is the Lindahl rule for allocating public goods? What are the properties of Kolm's ELIE tax proposal? Would the addition of EU-level income taxes enhance equity? How should we compare different scenarios for future societies with different population sizes? How can domain conditions in social choice theory be justified using Kolm's epistemic counterfactuals? How can Kolm's distributive liberal contract be implemented? What are the implications of norms of reciprocity for the organization of society? The answers to these questions give major insight into the state-of-the-art of social ethics and normative economics and are thus an indispensable source for researchers in both of these fields.


Capacity Reservation for Capital-intensive Technologies

Capacity Reservation for Capital-intensive Technologies

Author: Stefan Spinler

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 151

ISBN-13: 3642190065

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Arguably the central problem in operations research and management science (OR/MS) addressed by e-Business is better coordination of supply and de mand, including price discovery and reduction of transactions costs of buyer seller interactions. In capital-intensive industries like chemicals and steel, the out-of-pocket costs of excess capacity and the opportunity costs of underuti lized capacity have been important factors driving the growth of exchanges for improving demand and supply coordination through e-Business platforms. Stefan Spinler addresses in his dissertation one of the most interesting aspects of this evolution for OR/MS, the parallel development of long-term and short-term markets for capacity and output, accompanied by a range of exotic options and forwards as the basic mechanisms supporting transac tions. This is a fascinating research topic because it builds on the powerful framework of real options, while connecting directly to key operations deci sions (capacity planning, staffing, maintenance, and so forth) of the plants and technologies whose output is the focus of contracts. From the perspec tive of practice, the use of these contracting mechanisms, as facilitated by a new breed of B2B exchanges, represents an opportunity for further improving supply chain performance and capital asset productivity.


Capacity Options for Revenue Management

Capacity Options for Revenue Management

Author: Rolf Hellermann

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2006-10-07

Total Pages: 208

ISBN-13: 3540344209

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This book proposes capacity options as a flexible alternative air cargo contract type, and illustrates how capacity can be priced through option contracts. The analysis is accomplished by means of an analytical multivariate optimization model under price and demand uncertainty. A case study using data from a leading German carrier illustrates the financial potential. Finally, the author shows how capacity-option contracts integrate into the context of air cargo revenue management.