This study examines the significance of friendly fire in U.S. naval surface and submarine operations during World War II and argues that the occurrence of self-inflicted casualties is a function of the frequency and intensity of naval combat. Additionally, the causes and factors contributing to naval fratricide are identified and discussed to naval fratricide are identified and discussed using historical cases. The crucial result of this thesis is that even the most technologically advanced and highly trained force is subject to surprisingly high rates of friendly fire.
Friendly fire in naval warfare is a virtually unstudied phenomenon. In order to prepare future U.S. naval forces for the inevitable losses that will occur as a result of fratricide, we must look to the past to discover the role it has played in this century's wars at sea. This study examines the significance of friendly fire in U.S. naval surface and submarine operations during World War II and argues that the occurrence of self-inflicted casualties is a function primarily of the frequency and intensity of naval combat. Additionally, the causes of and factors contributing to naval fratricide are identified and discussed in detail using historical cases. The crucial result of this thesis is that even the most technologically advanced and highly trained force is subject to surprisingly high rates of friendly fire. Only when the vulnerability of every navy to fratricide is officially acknowledged can technology and doctrine be developed to reduce the risk of accidentally engaging one's own forces.
Scholarly studies on the Battle of Midway are prolific, yet few have examined the pivotal role American and Japanese submarines played. Fewer still have challenged the prevailing wisdom held among historians that US airstrikes on vulnerable Japanese fleet carriers marked a turning point in the war, essentially prohibiting Japan from further major naval operations. Midway Submerged presents detailed arguments regarding the tactics employed in the US strategy for the Battle of Midway and effectively argues that submarine warfare played a greater role in the battles outcome than previously thought. Through meticulous research, military historian Mark W. Allen examines the tactics, performance records, American and Japanese naval doctrine, and each participating submarines actions. He concludes that the Japanese defeat should not be blamed on ineffective submarine tactics; instead, Allen advocates a closer inspection of the overall Japanese strategic plan. Furthermore, he creates a compelling and engaging new argument that Admiral Chester W. Nimitz made an appropriate decision to use submarines defensively. Allen shows that Nimitz correctly used his available assets to defend Midway against a Japanese amphibious assault, reigniting a need for more scholarly debate on this subject. For scholars of military history, this is a worthy and much-needed addition to the body of work on the Battle of Midway.
“ . . . until now how the Navy managed to instantaneously move from the overt legal restrictions of the naval arms treaties that bound submarines to the cruiser rules of the eighteenth century to a declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor has never been explained. Lieutenant Holwitt has dissected this process and has created a compelling story of who did what, when, and to whom.”—The Submarine Review “Execute against Japan should be required reading for naval officers (especially in submarine wardrooms), as well as for anyone interested in history, policy, or international law.”—Adm. James P. Wisecup, President, US Naval War College (for Naval War College Review) “Although the policy of unrestricted air and submarine warfare proved critical to the Pacific war’s course, this splendid work is the first comprehensive account of its origins—illustrating that historians have by no means exhausted questions about this conflict.”—World War II Magazine “US Navy submarine officer Joel Ira Holwitt has performed an impressive feat with this book. . . . Holwitt is to be commended for not shying away from moral judgments . . . This is a superb book that fully explains how the United States came to adopt a strategy regarded by many as illegal and tantamount to ‘terror’.”—Military Review
The classic problem of when to depend on lessons learned from previous conflicts and when to employ new tactics and technology always confronts military leaders. At the beginning of World War II, for example, Allied naval strategists were prepared to do battle using traditional tactics against surface vessels, but - this study contends - not against submarines; because the strategists failed to appreciate either the damage done by submarines in World War I or the tactics that had worked successfully against them. Consequently, from the beginning of World War II to mid-1943, German U-boats were able to mount a devastating campaign against Allied shipping. In Slide Rules and Submarines, Montgomery Meigs describes how the allies learned to counter the U-boat threat. Using new technology - and new tactics derived from scientific methods - they devised countermeasures to defeat the German submarine menace. Then, continuing to apply those successful measures, they went on to negate the Japanese submarine threat in the Pacific. The author cites the crucial role of civilian scientists - the "outsiders" - who worked with military staffs and operational commanders of the campaign at sea. Their open minds and objective methods were essential for the application of such tactical advances as sonar and radar, acoustic torpedoes, depth finders, and code breaking to the battle. As this study illustrates, the importance of such timely and innovative cooperation among scientists, the research and development community, and military commanders in bringing technological knowledge to bear for operational and strategic advantage cannot be overstated. Meigs study of how such cooperation succeeded in the crucible of wartime crisis is itself an example of how the lessons of the past can serve us well today. J. A. Baldwin Vice Admiral, United States Navy President, National Defense University
The fate of the USS Flier is one of the most astonishing stories of the Second World War. On August 13, 1944, the submarine struck a mine and sank to the bottom of the Sulu Sea in less than one minute, leaving only fourteen of its crew of eighty-six hands alive. After enduring eighteen hours in the water, eight remaining survivors swam to a remote island controlled by the Japanese. Deep behind enemy lines and without food or drinking water, the crewmen realized that their struggle for survival had just begun. On its first war patrol, the unlucky Flier made it from Pearl Harbor to Midway where it ran aground on a reef. After extensive repairs and a formal military inquiry, the Flier set out once again, this time completing a distinguished patrol from Pearl Harbor to Fremantle, Western Australia. Though the Flier's next mission would be its final one, that mission is important for several reasons: the story of the Flier's sinking illuminates the nature of World War II underwater warfare and naval protocol and demonstrates the high degree of cooperation that existed among submariners, coast watchers, and guerrillas in the Philippines. The eight sailors who survived the disaster became the first Americans of the Pacific war to escape from a sunken submarine and return safely to the United States. Their story of persistence and survival has all the elements of a classic World War II tale: sudden disaster, physical deprivation, a ruthless enemy, and a dramatic escape from behind enemy lines. In The USS Flier: Death and Survival on a World War II Submarine, noted historian Michael Sturma vividly recounts a harrowing story of brave men who lived to return to the service of their country.
At last count, more than 80 U.S. submarines recorded some type of actual "friendly fire" incident in which they were involved during their WWII war patrols. From being attacked by Allied bombers, depth-charged by U.S. ships or fired upon by armed Allied merchant ships, submariners quickly came to understand the bitter truth of the maxim: 'The submarine has no friends.' While the majority of submarines and their crew escaped with little more than bruised egos or minor injuries, three submarines and their crews were lost to friendly fire. For the first time in book format, a serious and most comprehensive research effort has gone into capturing all such "friendly fire" incidents involving U.S. submarines during World War II. Compiled through relentless research by the co-authors, their stories of loss and survival by "other than the enemy" is presented within these pages.
Submarines were responsible for about 55 percent of the tonnage of the Japanese fleets sunk during World War II. The 22 percent casualty rate of U.S. submariners was the highest of the military services. This volume traces the career of the submarine the USS Puffer from the laying of her keel and her commissioning on April 27, 1943, until her departure for the scrap yard in late 1960. Compiled from interviews with former crew members, including the author's father, Donald B. McDonald, as well as other contemporary sources, it follows the crew of the Puffer through nine war patrols. Events recollected include the First War Patrol, which resulted in a record-setting 38 hour submergence because of enemy fire; the dangerous transfer of torpedoes while surfaced in enemy waters; and the wild bombardment of Japanese shore installations with the 5-inch deck gun. There are numerous wartime photographs and appendices providing a list of awards earned by the crew and a summary of claimed successful attacks. Brief biographies of the seven commissioned officers are also included.
Details the American victory in the Coral Sea and the US Navy's stunning defeat of a far superior Japanese force at Midway, as well as the events leading up to the six months' struggle at Guadalcanal.
