Capitalizing on the availability of physicists and chemists who had fled Hitler's Germany, U.S. and British scientists were able to repeat within a few weeks the test of nuclear fission first performed by two German chemists and strive toward cooperative development of the bomb during World War II. But the death of Roosevelt and Truman's succession in 1945, coupled with Churchill's loss of the prime ministership to Clement Attlee, marked a definite change in Anglo-American atomic policy.".
Nuclear weapons are the elusive ‘toys’ of modern warfare and are hankered after by every Middle Eastern government. Although no Middle eastern government has formally admitted that the purpose of its investment in nuclear research is to develop weapons, it is certain that two countries, Israel and Pakistan, have mastered the technology for making nuclear bombs and that others are attempting to manipulate their nuclear hardware to this end. The combination of these nuclear ambitions, the large amounts of money that can be made available for research and the area’s political instability make the region a powerful example of both the drive towards, and the dangers of, nuclear proliferation. This book, first published in 1988, examines the evolution of nuclear research and development in the region. It shows that it is the product of a complex web of internal and external factors, fuelled by considerations of international prestige and local rivalries. Whilst concluding that it is probably no longer possible to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology to the Middle East, it suggests ways in which the rate of proliferation can be slowed down.
Robert Jervis argues here that the possibility of nuclear war has created a revolution in military strategy and international relations. He examines how the potential for nuclear Armageddon has changed the meaning of war, the psychology of statesmanship, and the formulation of military policy by the superpowers.
Exploring how the United States manages its still-powerful nuclear arsenal Arms control agreements and the end of the Cold War have made the prospect of nuclear war a distant fear for the general public. But the United States and its principal rivals—China and Russia—still maintain sizable arsenals of nuclear weapons, along with the systems for managing them and using them if that terrible day ever comes. Managing U.S. Nuclear Operations in the 21st Century focuses on how theories and policies are put into practice in managing nuclear forces in the United States. It addresses such questions as: What have been the guiding priorities of U.S. nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War? What nuclear attack options would the president have during a war? How are these war plans developed and reviewed by civilian and military leaders? How would presidential orders be conveyed to the uniformed men and women who are entrusted with U.S. nuclear weapons systems? And are these communications systems and supporting capabilities vulnerable to disruption or attack? The answers to such questions depend on the process by which national strategy for nuclear deterrence, developed by civilian leaders, is converted into nuclear war plans and the entire range of procedures for implementing those plans if necessary. The chapter authors have extensive experience in government, the armed forces, and the analytic community. Drawing on their firsthand knowledge, as well as the public record, they provide unique, authoritative accounts of how the United States manages it nuclear forces today. This book will be of interest to the national security community, particularly younger experts who did not grow up in the nuclear-centric milieu of the Cold War. Any national security analyst, professional, or government staffer seeking to learn more about nuclear modernization policy and the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be interested in this book. It should also be of interest to professors and students who want a deep understanding of U.S. nuclear policy.
Groundbreaking new take on the growing rivalry between China, India and Japan-- and what it means for America, the global economy and the twenty-first century.
No country feels China's rise more deeply than Japan. Through intricate case studies of visits by Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine, conflicts over the boundaries of economic zones in the East China Sea, concerns about food safety, and strategies of island defense, Sheila A. Smith explores the policy issues testing the Japanese government as it tries to navigate its relationship with an advancing China. Smith finds that Japan's interactions with China extend far beyond the negotiations between diplomats and include a broad array of social actors intent on influencing the Sino-Japanese relationship. Some of the tensions complicating Japan's encounters with China, such as those surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine or territorial disputes, have deep roots in the postwar era, and political advocates seeking a stronger Japanese state organize themselves around these causes. Other tensions manifest themselves during the institutional and regulatory reform of maritime boundary and food safety issues. Smith scrutinizes the role of the Japanese government in coping with contention as China's influence grows and Japanese citizens demand more protection. Underlying the government's efforts is Japan's insecurity about its own capacity for change and its waning status as the leading economy in Asia. For many, China's rise means Japan's decline, and Smith suggests how Japan can maintain its regional and global clout as confidence in its postwar diplomatic and security approach diminishes.
This book investigates what is driving Iran's nuclear weapons programme in a less-hostile regional environment, using a theory of protracted conflicts to explicate proliferation. Iran’s nuclear weapons program has alarmed the international community since the 1990s, but has come to the forefront of international security concerns since 2000. This book argues that Iran’s hostility with the United States remains the major causal factor for its proliferation activities. With the US administration pursuing aggressive foreign policies towards Iran since 2000, the latter’s security threat intensified. A society that is split on many important domestic issues remained united on the issue of nuclear weapons acquisition after the US war in Iraq. Consequently, Iran became determined in its drive to acquire nuclear weapons and boldly announced its decision to enrich uranium, leaving the US in no doubt about its nuclear status. This book underscores the importance of protracted conflicts in proliferation decisions, and underpinning this is the assumption that non-proliferation may be achieved through the termination of intractable conflicts. The aims of this work are to demonstrate that a state’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons depends largely on its engagement in protracted conflicts, which shows not only that the presence of nuclear rivals intensifies the nuclear ambition, but also that non-nuclear status of rival states can promote non-proliferation incentives in conflicting states inclined to proliferate. This study will be of great interest to students of Iran, Middle Eastern politics, nuclear proliferation and international relations theory. Saira Khan is a Research Associate in the McGill-University of Montreal Joint Research Group in International Security (REGIS).
During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today’s international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.
Originally published in 1983, this book presents both the technical and political information necessary to evaluate the emerging threat to world security posed by recent advances in uranium enrichment technology. Uranium enrichment has played a relatively quiet but important role in the history of efforts by a number of nations to acquire nuclear weapons and by a number of others to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For many years the uranium enrichment industry was dominated by a single method, gaseous diffusion, which was technically complex, extremely capital-intensive, and highly inefficient in its use of energy. As long as this remained true, only the richest and most technically advanced nations could afford to pursue the enrichment route to weapon acquisition. But during the 1970s this situation changed dramatically. Several new and far more accessible enrichment techniques were developed, stimulated largely by the anticipation of a rapidly growing demand for enrichment services by the world-wide nuclear power industry. This proliferation of new techniques, coupled with the subsequent contraction of the commercial market for enriched uranium, has created a situation in which uranium enrichment technology might well become the most important contributor to further nuclear weapon proliferation. Some of the issues addressed in this book are: A technical analysis of the most important enrichment techniques in a form that is relevant to analysis of proliferation risks; A detailed projection of the world demand for uranium enrichment services; A summary and critique of present institutional non-proliferation arrangements in the world enrichment industry, and An identification of the states most likely to pursue the enrichment route to acquisition of nuclear weapons.
