Shortlisted for the Andrew Carnegie Medal for Excellence in Nonfiction Finalist for The California Book Award in Nonfiction The San Francisco Chronicle's Best of the Year List Foreign Affairs Best Books of the Year In These Times “Best Books of the Year" Huffington Post's Ten Excellent December Books List LitHub's “Five Books Making News This Week” From the legendary whistle-blower who revealed the Pentagon Papers, an eyewitness exposé of the dangers of America's Top Secret, seventy-year-long nuclear policy that continues to this day. Here, for the first time, former high-level defense analyst Daniel Ellsberg reveals his shocking firsthand account of America's nuclear program in the 1960s. From the remotest air bases in the Pacific Command, where he discovered that the authority to initiate use of nuclear weapons was widely delegated, to the secret plans for general nuclear war under Eisenhower, which, if executed, would cause the near-extinction of humanity, Ellsberg shows that the legacy of this most dangerous arms buildup in the history of civilization--and its proposed renewal under the Trump administration--threatens our very survival. No other insider with high-level access has written so candidly of the nuclear strategy of the late Eisenhower and early Kennedy years, and nothing has fundamentally changed since that era. Framed as a memoir--a chronicle of madness in which Ellsberg acknowledges participating--this gripping exposé reads like a thriller and offers feasible steps we can take to dismantle the existing "doomsday machine" and avoid nuclear catastrophe, returning Ellsberg to his role as whistle-blower. The Doomsday Machine is thus a real-life Dr. Strangelove story and an ultimately hopeful--and powerfully important--book about not just our country, but the future of the world.
This timely book, published in advance of 2010's inter-governmental Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, makes available for the first time newly declassified government correspondence from David Owen's tenure as Foreign Secretary. Nuclear Papers gives new insight into the work of, and response to, the last major strategic nuclear study of the UK's nuclear needs, which was undertaken in 1978. The book demonstrates sustained dialogue between the Callaghan and Carter administrations on the one hand but also the internal disputes and concerns of the UK government as the Cold War and a bleak economic outlook exerted equal pressures, in much the same way as recent foreign policy and the economic downturn have challenged the current government. Owen skilfully ties the events of 30 years ago to the present, highlighting Barack Obama's determination to "show the world that America believes in its existing commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to work ultimately to eliminate all nuclear arms". As ever, David Owen is at the forefront of debate, arguing convincingly that momentum should be established towards the elimination of nuclear weapons by all five of the existing declared nuclear weapon states before the 2010 NPT Review Conference gets underway. This book, then, is an attempt to rejuvenate and expand discussions of the future of the world's nuclear weapons by exploring the classified and highly sensitive debates of the past. It will be required reading for anyone interested in UK and US nuclear policy.
This publication provides guidance and recommendations on arrangements to be made at the preparedness stage, as part of overall emergency preparedness, for the termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency and the subsequent transition from the emergency exposure situation to either a planned exposure situation or an existing exposure situation. It elaborates the prerequisites that need to be fulfilled so that responsible authorities can declare the nuclear or radiological emergency ended and it gives detailed guidance on adapting and lifting protective actions. This publication, jointly sponsored by 10 international organizations (FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, UN OCHA, WHO and WMO) is intended to assist Member States in the application of IAEA Safety Standards Series Nos GSR Part 3 and GSR Part 7.
"Nuclear weapons, since their conception, have been the subject of secrecy. In the months after the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the American scientific establishment, the American government, and the American public all wrestled with what was called the "problem of secrecy," wondering not only whether secrecy was appropriate and effective as a means of controlling this new technology but also whether it was compatible with the country's core values. Out of a messy context of propaganda, confusion, spy scares, and the grave counsel of competing groups of scientists, what historian Alex Wellerstein calls a "new regime of secrecy" was put into place. It was unlike any other previous or since. Nuclear secrets were given their own unique legal designation in American law ("restricted data"), one that operates differently than all other forms of national security classification and exists to this day. Drawing on massive amounts of declassified files, including records released by the government for the first time at the author's request, Restricted Data is a narrative account of nuclear secrecy and the tensions and uncertainty that built as the Cold War continued. In the US, both science and democracy are pitted against nuclear secrecy, and this makes its history uniquely compelling and timely"--
"An extremely important work. . . . It demonstrates the power that ethnographic analysis can have when directed at an examination of our own society's central nervous system."—Faye Ginsburg, author of Contested Lives "Essential reading for anyone trying to understand what Cold War science was in all its cultural aspects and what this same science now in transformation might yet be."—George E. Marcus, co-editor of The Traffic in Culture
Whole World on Fire focuses on a technical riddle wrapped in an organizational mystery: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S. government fail to predict nuclear fire damage as it drew up plans to fight strategic nuclear war?U.S. bombing in World War II caused massive fire damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but later war plans took account only of damage from blast; they completely ignored damage from atomic firestorms. Recently a small group of researchers has shown that for modern nuclear weapons the destructiveness and lethality of nuclear mass fire often--and predictably--greatly exceeds that of nuclear blast. This has major implications for defense policy: the U.S. government has underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons, Lynn Eden finds, and built far more warheads, and far more destructive warheads, than it needed for the Pentagon's war-planning purposes. How could this have happened? The answer lies in how organizations frame the problems they try to solve. In a narrative grounded in organization theory, science and technology studies, and primary historical sources (including declassified documents and interviews), Eden explains how the U.S. Air Force's doctrine of precision bombing led to the development of very good predictions of nuclear blast--a significant achievement--but for many years to no development of organizational knowledge about nuclear fire. Expert communities outside the military reinforced this disparity in organizational capability to predict blast damage but not fire damage. Yet some innovation occurred, and predictions of fire damage were nearly incorporated into nuclear war planning in the early 1990s. The author explains how such a dramatic change almost happened, and why it did not. Whole World on Fire shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing on what they do well and systematically excluding what they don't do well, may build a poor representation of the world--a self-reinforcing fallacy that can have serious consequences. In a sweeping conclusion, Eden shows the implications of the analysis for understanding such things as the sinking of the Titanic, the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, and the poor fireproofing in the World Trade Center.
This handbook is a practical aid to legislative drafting that brings together, for the first time, model texts of provisions covering all aspects of nuclear law in a consolidated form. Organized along the same lines as the Handbook on Nuclear Law, published by the IAEA in 2003, and containing updated material on new legal developments, this publication represents an important companion resource for the development of new or revised nuclear legislation, as well as for instruction in the fundamentals of nuclear law. It will be particularly useful for those Member States embarking on new or expanding existing nuclear programmes.
James B. Conant (1893-1978) was one of the titans of mid-20th-century American history, attaining prominence and power in multiple fields. Usually remembered as an educational leader, he was president of Harvard University for two tumultuous decades, from the Depression to World War II to the Cold War and McCarthyism. To take that job he gave up a scientific career as one of the country’s top chemists, and he left it twenty years later to become Eisenhower’s top diplomat in postwar Germany. Hershberg’s prize-winning study, however, examines a critical aspect of Conant’s life that was long obscured by government secrecy: his pivotal role in the birth of the nuclear age. During World War II, as an advisor to Roosevelt and then Truman (on the elite “Interim Committee” that considered how to employ the bomb against Japan), Conant was intimately involved in the decisions to build and use the atomic bomb. During and after the Manhattan Project, he also led efforts to prevent a postwar nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union that, he feared, threatened the survival of civilization — an apocalyptic prospect he glimpsed in the first instant of the new age, when he witnessed the first test of the new weapon at Alamogordo on July 16, 1945. “... a vivid inquiry... a model of historiography; evocative reading...[Conant was] central to atomic policy and progress; the bomb would be as much Conant’s as it was anyone’s in Government. His inner response to that burden responsibility has long been obscured, but it is illumined here.” — Philip Morrison, The New York Times Book Review “In his splendid portrait of Conant, James Hershberg has illuminated the life of a pivotal figure in the making of U.S. nuclear, scientific, educational and foreign policy for almost a half-century. But the book is much more: It is not only an insightful narration of Conant’s life; it is also a brilliant and important account of the making of the nuclear age, a chronicle that contains much that is new... Hershberg’s superb study... is a chronicle of Conant’s moral journey and we are the wiser for his having charted Conant’s path.” — S.S. Schweber, Washington Post Book World “James G. Hershberg ably comes to grips with Conant and his hazardous times... His book is vibrantly written and compelling, and it breaches Conant’s shield of public discretion in masterly fashion, making extensive use of unpublished interviews, diaries, reports, and correspondence pried from private and governmental repositories. It is a huge, ambitious work — a history of the Cold War as Conant encountered it as well as a study of the man.” — Daniel J. Kevles, The New Yorker “... a well-written, comprehensive, nonjudgmental but sensitive biography... Conant was involved in so many and such critical events that students of almost any aspect of our public life over the past half-century will find useful the new material and helpful insights in this book... This fine biography of one of the most important and complicated of America’s twentieth-century leaders immediately establishes James Hershberg as one of America’s outstanding young historians.” — Stephen E. Ambrose,Foreign Affairs “... magnificent... Any reader interested in nuclear weapons, Cold War history or American politics from FDR to JFK will find this biography riveting.” — Priscilla McMillan, Chicago Tribune “... masterful... The prose is clear, the narrative forceful and the author’s judgments are balanced and judicious. This is simply splendid biography... The highest praise one can give for a book of this sort is that the historian has not shrunk from speaking truth to power. This book quietly but insistently does so. It should be read by the public at large as one of the definitive texts on the cold war and the nuclear age... Hershberg’s triumph is that he has prevailed over all the official lies to give us one more layer of the historical truth.” — Kai Bird, The Nation “... riveting... an impressive achievement... honest and comprehensive in its scholarship, the author has shown himself to be a historian of notable achievement and promise.” — McGeorge Bundy, Nature “Hershberg’s outstanding, balanced biography lifts the self-imposed secrecy surrounding a key architect of U.S. Cold War policy and of the nuclear age.” —Publisher’s Weekly “... [an] impressive and substantial achievement. [Hershberg] has used the life of one strategically placed individual to illuminate the most important issues surrounding America’s role and conduct in the nuclear age. His book will be invaluable to scholars assessing the impact and legacy of the group who acquired the epithet ‘wise men’ now that the Cold War has receded.” — Carol S. Gruber, Science “... definitive... a far more textured picture than one finds in Conant’s own guarded and unrevealing autobiography... an important and rewarding book... illuminating... Conant led a remarkable and eventful life in remarkable and eventful times. James Hershberg has explored that life, and those times, in exhaustive and revealing detail.” — Paul Boyer, The New Republic “James G. Hershberg has achieved the impossible. He has written a huge biography of a Harvard president that is fascinating, informative and as valuable a piece of American history as anything I have read in years... Mr. Hershberg has brought us back vividly to an age that seems remote, so long ago, but the questions about nuclear proliferation are the same, even while the answers are still ambiguous. As we watch men struggling with unanticipated post-Cold War problems and civil wars sprouting like Jason’s men at arms, it is good to read this story about a complex man who deserves an important place in our history because he helped make that history possible.” — Arnold Beichman, The Washington Times “... engrossing... A magisterial study of an awesome and intriguing public career.” —Kirkus Reviews “... entertaining... thought-provocative.” — Dick Teresi, The Wall Street Journal “Hershberg’s book helps us more clearly understand the postwar Establishment and offers a challenging appraisal of the role of elites, of universities and of the state.” — Gar Alperovitz, In These Times “Hershberg deserves great credit for cracking a tough New England walnut, analyzing this very important public figure, demonstrating how he fit into his own time and showing us what we can learn from the man.” — Daniel R. Mortensen, The Friday Review of Defense Literature “... a compelling account... an engaging examination of one of the central figures of the nuclear age. It succeeds in showing ‘one man’s intersection with great events and issues’ and in the process illuminates those issues for us all.” — American Historical Review “... well-written... Conant’s participation in one of our country’s most dynamic periods is, thanks to Hershberg, now much better understood.” — Library Journal “A reader of the book will enter the realm of the greats, the shapers of worlds created by the atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki... Conant was no bit player in Cold War history... [the book is] very successful in weaving Conant’s subsurface persona in with his ups and downs as a prominent and committed public figure. And it leaves out little detail in describing top-level decisions involving the Cold War geopolitics of nuclear weaponry. Conant was a participant in most of these decisions—with Presidents Roosevelt and Truman themselves, their Secretaries of War and State, and, of course, all the major scientific figures of the time.” — Chemical & Engineering News “A wonderfully rich portrait that emerges from a carefully documented account of Conant’s role in the development of the atomic bomb and post-war nuclear policy... An extraordinarily well written text... Hershberg lays bare the person behind the persona — warts, dimples and all.” — Stanley Goldberg, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
The possibility of a nuclear holocaust has brought humankind into a radically new, unprecedented, and unanticipated religious situation. Gordon D. Kaufman offers a cogent and original analysis of this predicament, outlining specific proposals for reconceiving the central concerns and symbols of Christian faith. He begins with an account of a visit to Peace Park in the rebuilt city of Hiroshima. Reflecting upon this experience, Kaufman foresees that further use of nuclear weapons will result not in rebuilding but in annihilation of the human enterprise.
Concern about the threat posed by nuclear weapons has preoccupied the United States and presidents of the United States since the beginning of the nuclear era. Nuclear Security draws from papers presented at the 2013 meeting of the American Nuclear Society examining worldwide efforts to control nuclear weapons and ensure the safety of the nuclear enterprise of weapons and reactors against catastrophic accidents. The distinguished contributors, all known for their long-standing interest in getting better control of the threats posed by nuclear weapons and reactors, discuss what we can learn from past successes and failures and attempt to identify the key ingredients for a road ahead that can lead us toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The authors review historical efforts to deal with the challenge of nuclear weapons, with a focus on the momentous arms control negotiations between U.S. president Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. They offer specific recommendations for reducing risks that should be adopted by the nuclear enterprise, both military and civilian, in the United States and abroad. Since the risks posed by the nuclear enterprise are so high, they conclude, no reasonable effort should be spared to ensure safety and security.
