Northern European Overture to War offers an international perspective on the diplomatic and military factors that shaped the course of events in Northern Europe as the region became increasingly drawn into the wider great power war.
While the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 was a pivotal moment in European history and precipitated the outbreak of the Second World War western historiography has largely neglected Northern Europe. Two questions dominated the course of events, the Anglo-German contest for control of the access to the Atlantic Ocean and the Soviet-German contest for control of their former territories as a precursor to the future Total War they expected to wage against each other. This anthology of 23 essays considers both these issues collectively and provides a new international perspective on the region’s transition from the relative peace of the interwar era to the all out war following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Contributors are Azar Gat, Michael Epkenhans, Andrew Lambert, Tom Kristiansen, Rolf Hobson, Gunnar Åselius, Jörg Hillmann, Werner Rahn, Sławomir Dębski, Ole Kristian Grimnes, Česlovas Laurinavičius, Alfred Erich Senn, Lars Ericson Wolke, Karl Erik Haug, Boris Vadimovich Sokolov, Toomas Hiio, Magnus Ilmjärv, Palle Roslyng-Jensen ,Hans Christian Bjerg, Valters Ščerbinskis, Michael H. Clemmesen, and Marcus Faulkner.
A military historian and naval warfare expert delivers a revealing history of the Baltic Sea Campaigns and their significance throughout WWII. From the Battle of Westerplatte on the Polish coast in 1939 to the thousands of German refugees lost at sea in 1945, the Baltic witnessed continuous fighting throughout the Second World War. This chronicle of naval warfare in the region merges such major events as the Siege of Leningrad, the Soviet campaign against Sweden, the three wars in Finland, the Soviet liberation of the Baltic states, the German evacuation of two million people from the East, and the Soviet race westwards in 1945. Naval historian Poul Grooss explains the political and military backgrounds of the war in this theatre while also detailing the ships, radar, artillery, mines and aircraft employed there. He also offers fascinating insights into Swedish cooperation with Nazi Germany, the Germans’ use of the Baltic as a training ground for the Battle of the Atlantic, the secret weapons trials in the remote area of Peenemunde, and the Royal Air Force mining campaign that reduced the threat of German submarine technology. A major contribution to the naval history of this era, Naval War in the Baltic demonstrates the extent to which the Baltic Sea Campaigns shaped the Second World War
In 2004 the Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania - finalized their return to the West by joining NATO and the EU after definitively throwing off their 'captive nations' status by regaining independence in 1991. This has not, however, halted resurgent Russian revanchism in the region; given Russia's aggressive actions starting in Ukraine in 2014, defense of the Baltic has gained a new urgency and prominence. In The West's East, Lukas Milevski places the Baltic states in strategic and historical perspective. Through these nations' experiences, he sheds light on how independent states have been able to persist, despite being surrounded by predatory great powers. The work offers a deep overview of the region's history, from the indigenous Baltic tribes which populated it to the post-Cold War era, followed by recent political analogies of West-Russia relations. Analyses of today's strategic balance in the region indicate the various actors' geopolitical outlooks, strategic cultures, military capabilities, and non-military security vulnerabilities. As Milevski argues, the NATO-Russia relationship will play the major role in any potential conflict in the Baltic, but neutrals Finland and Sweden must also be factored into the strategic analysis. Using the logic of strategy he anticipates potential military interaction in the region step by step-from deterrence, to Russia's choice of offensive strategy, to area denial and NATO's return and break into the Baltic theater, and finally war termination-to determine the answer to the ultimate question: how much defense for the Baltic is enough? The West's East gives both experts and policymakers alike the background and framework for thinking strategically about a region that has re-emerged as a significant geopolitical concern in the Putin-Trump era.
This book is a study of Adolf Hitler in his role as military commander and strategist from the beginning of the Second World War until the end of 1942, examining in detail the campaign in southern Russia that year. The thesis challenges the post-war narrative of Hitler as a dilettante who was solely responsible for the strategic and operational errors that led to Germany’s defeat in the war. Instead, this research highlights that decisions made by Hitler with respect to such disparate themes as strategy, operations, logistics, intelligence, economics, air and naval power, and coalition warfare were generally sound if viewed from his perspective, even if they were not ultimately successful. It also gives an overview of his own ideas concerning all aspects of military affairs, such as intelligence, command, and morale. The careful analysis of Hitler’s decision-making process offers a unique contribution to Second World War scholarship and moves beyond a superficial understanding that the war’s outcome was a result of Hitler’s ineptitude as a military leader. Warlord Hitler will appeal to postgraduates and specialists in military history, as well as general readers interested in a deeper study of the Second World War.
The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest campaign of the Second World War. This volume highlights the scale and complexity of this bitterly contested campaign, one that encompassed far more than just attacks by German U-boats on Allied shipping. The team of leading scholars assembled in this study situates the German assault on seaborne trade within the wider Allied war effort and provides a new understanding of its place within the Second World War. Individual chapters offer original perspectives on a range of neglected or previously overlooked subjects: how Allied grand strategy shaped the war at sea; the choices facing Churchill and other Allied leaders and the tensions over the allocation of scarce resources between theaters; how the battle spread beyond the Atlantic Ocean in both military and economic terms; the management of Britain's merchant shipping repair yards; the defense of British coastal waters against German surface raiders; the contribution of air power to trade defense; antisubmarine escort training; the role of special intelligence; and the war against the U-boats in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans.
Unknown Conflicts of the Second World War: Forgotten Fronts is a collection of chapters dealing with various overlooked aspects of the Second World War. The aim is to give greater depth and context to the war by introducing new stories about regions of the world and elements of the war rarely considered. These chapters represent new discussions on previously undeveloped narratives that help to expand our understanding of the interconnectedness of the war. It also provides an expanded view of the war as a mosaic of overlapping conflicts rather than a two-sided affair between massive alliance structures. The Second World War saw revolutions, civil wars, social upheaval, subversion, and major geopolitical policy shifts that do not fit neatly into the Allied vs. Axis 1939–1945 paradigm. This aim is to connect the unseen dots from around the globe that influenced the big turning points we think we know well but have really only a superficial understanding of and in so doing shed new light on the scope and influence of the war.
A dramatic and timely account of Stalin’s failed invasion of Finland in 1939, and the decade of wars and fraught relations that followed In November 1939, Stalin directed his military leaders to launch an invasion of Finland. In what became known as the Winter War, the full might of the Soviet army was pitted against this small Nordic republic. Yet despite their vastly superior military strength, the Soviets suffered heavy losses and failed to mount Stalin’s intended full-scale invasion. How did Finland evade Stalin’s crosshairs—not once, but three times more? In this groundbreaking account, Kimmo Rentola traces the epochal shifts in Soviet-Finnish relations. From the Winter War to Finland’s exit from World War II in 1944, a possible Soviet-backed coup in 1948, and Moscow’s designation of Finland as an enemy state in 1950, Finland was forced to navigate Stalin’s outsize political and territorial demands. Rentola presents a dramatic reconstruction of Finland’s unlikely survival at a time when the nation’s very existence was at stake.
The German invasion of Norway was a pivotal moment in modern warfare, the first joint campaign that featured air power as an equal element of all operations. It was, in fact, the superior use of their air force that gave the Germans the decisive margin of victory and ensured the failure of the Allied counter-offensive in central Norway in April and May 1940. All aspects of air power were employed in Norway, from long-range bombing and reconnaissance to air transport, with the Luftwaffe's ability to transport large numbers of troops and supply ground forces over great distances being particularly important. Norway was the first campaign in history in which key targets were seized by airborne forces, and the first in which air superiority was able to overcome the overwhelming naval superiority of an enemy. Researched from primary sources, this engaging history by air power expert Dr James Corum skilfully draws out where and why air power made the difference in Norway, and analyses the campaign's influence on the coming months and years of World War II.
The British campaign in Norway in 1940 was an ignominious and abject failure. It is perhaps best known as the fiasco which directly led to the fall of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his replacement by Winston Churchill. But what were the reasons for failure? Why did the decision makers, including Churchill, make such poor decisions and exercise such bad judgement? What other factors played a part? John Kiszely draws on his own experience of working at all levels in the military to assess the campaign as a whole, its context and evolution from strategic failures, intelligence blunders and German air superiority to the performance of the troops and the serious errors of judgement by those responsible for the higher direction of the war. The result helps us to understand not only the outcome of the Norwegian campaign but also why more recent military campaigns have found success so elusive.