Although SOF may be more effective than conventional armed forces for certain missions, the unconventional operational methods of SOF create a chink in their armor not faced by the conventional armed forces. The nontraditional attire worn by SOF while operating in enemy territory, rather than traditional uniforms, arguably result in forfeiture of prisoner of war (POW) status for SOF under the law of war. Wearing a traditional uniform is not the combatant's sole means of distinguishing himself from the civilian population. SOF operating wearing nontraditional uniforms in enemy territory should not be declared spies because they wear distinctive clothing that distinguishes them from civilian populations.
Based on best-practice rules of global importance, this Handbook offers authoritative commentary and analysis of the international law of military operations, encompassing self-defence, peace operations, and other uses of force. Renowned international lawyers offer insight into the relevant principles and provisions.
The 2004 revelations of detainee maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib prison outside of Baghdad, Iraq have led to an exhaustive overhaul of Army doctrine and training with respect to this topic. The Army has identified disconnects in its individual, leader, and collective training programs, and has also identified the absence of a deliberate, focused doctrinal crosswalk between the two principal branches concerned with detainees, Military Intelligence (MI) and Military Police (MP). These problems and their consequences are real and immediate. The perceptions of just treatment held by citizens of our nation and, to a great extent the world at large, have been and are being shaped by the actions of the US Army, both in the commission of detainee maltreatment but also, and more importantly, in the way the Army addresses its institutional shortcomings. This study examines the relationship over time between doctrine in two branches of the Army Military Police (MP) and Military Intelligence (MI) and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). Specifically, it analyzes the MP detention field manual series and the MI interrogation field manual series to evaluate their GPW content. It also further examines the relationship of military police and military intelligence to each other in the enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW) and detainee operations environment, as expressed in their doctrinal manuals. Finally, the study looks at the Army's experience in detainee operations through the prism of six conflicts or contingency operations: the Korean War, Vietnam, Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983), Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989), Operation DESERT STORM (Iraq, 1991), and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1994).
Presenting a fascinating insider's view of U.S.A.F. special operations, this volume brings to life the critical contributions these forces have made to the exercise of air & space power. Focusing in particular on the period between the Korean War & the Indochina wars of 1950-1979, the accounts of numerous missions are profusely illustrated with photos & maps. Includes a discussion of AF operations in Europe during WWII, as well as profiles of Air Commandos who performed above & beyond the call of duty. Reflects on the need for financial & political support for restoration of the forces. Bibliography. Extensive photos & maps. Charts & tables.
The Department of Defense Law of War Manual belongs on the shelf of every researcher, journalist, lawyer, historian, and individual interested in foreign affairs, international law, human rights, or national security. The Manual provides a comprehensive, authoritative interpretation of the law of war for the U.S. Department of Defense.
The third edition of this work sets out a comprehensive and analytical manual of international humanitarian law, accompanied by case analysis and extensive explanatory commentary by a team of distinguished and internationally renowned experts.
In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.
Jerry Thigpen's study on the history of the Combat Talon is the first effort to tell the story of this wonderfully capable machine. This weapons system has performed virtually every imaginable tactical event in the spectrum of conflict and by any measure is the most versatile C-130 derivative ever produced. First modified and sent to Southeast Asia (SEA) in 1966 to replace theater unconventional warfare (UW) assets that were limited in both lift capability and speed the Talon I quickly adapted to theater UW tasking including infiltration and resupply and psychological warfare operations into North Vietnam. After spending four years in SEA and maturing into a highly respected UW weapons system the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) chose the Combat Talon to lead the night low-level raid on the North Vietnamese prison camp at Son Tay. Despite the outcome of the operation the Talon I cemented its reputation as the weapons system of choice for long-range clandestine operations. In the period following the Vietnam War United States Air Force (USAF) special operations gradually lost its political and financial support which was graphically demonstrated in the failed Desert One mission into Iran. Thanks to congressional supporters like Earl Hutto of Florida and Dan Daniel of Virginia funds for aircraft upgrades and military construction projects materialized to meet the ever-increasing threat to our nation. Under the leadership of such committed hard-driven officers as Brenci Uttaro Ferkes Meller and Thigpen the crew force became the most disciplined in our Air Force. It was capable of penetrating hostile airspace at night in a low-level mountainous environment covertly to execute any number of unconventional warfare missions.
"The purpose of this book is to share Army special operations soldier stories with the general American public to show them what various elements accomplished during the war to drive the Taliban from power and to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan as part of the global war on terrorism. The purpose of the book is not to resolve Army special operations doctrinal issues, to clarify or update military definitions, or to be the 'definitive' history of the continuing unconventional war in Afghanistan. The purpose is to demonstrate how the war to drive the Taliban from power, help the Afghan people, and assist the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) rebuild the country afterward was successfully accomplished by majors, captains, warrant officers, and sergeants on tactical teams and aircrews at the lowest levels ... This historical project is not intended to be the definitive study of the war in Afghanistan. It is a 'snapshot' of the war from 11 September 2001 until the middle of May 2002"--Page xv.
The story of special air warfare and the Air Commandos who served for the ambassadors in Laos from 1964 to 1975 is captured through extensive research and veteran interviews. The author has meticulously put together a comprehensive overview of the involvement of USAF Air Commandos who served in Laos as trainers, advisors, and clandestine combat forces to prevent the communist takeover of the Royal Lao Government. This book includes pictures of those operations, unveils what had been a US government secret war, and adds a substantial contribution to understanding the wider war in Southeast Asia.
