This volume offers a critical historical assessment of the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and of the origins of the nonproliferation regime. The NPT has been signed by 190 states and was indefinitely extended in 1995, rendering it the most successful arms control treaty in history. Nevertheless, little is known about the motivations and strategic calculi of the various middle and small powers in regard to their ultimate decision to join the treaty despite its discriminatory nature. While the NPT continues to be central to current nonproliferation efforts, its underlying mechanisms remain under-researched. Based on newly declassified archival sources and using previously inaccessible evidence, the contributions in this volume examine the underlying rationales of the specific positions taken by various states during the NPT negotiations. Starting from a critical appraisal of our current knowledge of the genesis of the nonproliferation regime, contributors from diverse national and disciplinary backgrounds focus on both European and non-European states in order to enrich our understanding of how the global nuclear order came into being. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, Cold War history, security studies and IR.
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is the cornerstone of non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Yet its negotiation and success were not inevitable. This book aims to address the developments that led to the negotiation of the treaty, examine its implementation, and address challenges that the NPT faces going forward.
Background -- ENDC negotiations (1964) Nonaligned developments -- First Chinese Communist test -- Disarmament Commission discussions (1965) -- Eighth session of the ENDC (1965) -- Twentieth General Assembly (1965) -- NATO and Warsaw Treaty arrangements -- Pastore resolutions -- Ninth session of the ENDC, January 27-May 10, 1966 -- Tenth session of the ENDC, June 14-August 25, 1966 -- Tenth General Conference of the IAEA, September 21-28, 1966 -- Twenty-first General Assembly (1966) -- Concerns of non-nuclear-weapon nations -- Draft nonproliferation treaty, August 24, 1967 -- Report by Secretary-General Thant, October 10, 1967 -- Twenty-second General Assembly (Part I) -- Thirteenth session of the ENDC, January 18-March 14, 1968 -- Twenty-second General Assembly (Part II) -- Security Council action on the Tripartite Assurances Proposal -- Signing of the treaty -- Documentary annex.
The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, yet its negotiation and success was not inevitable. This book aims to address the developments that led to the negotiation of the treaty, examine its implementation, and address challenges that the NPT faces going forward. It begins with an overview of precursor efforts to establish international limits on nuclear weapons and why these efforts failed. It also looks at the changes in the political environment and technical advances, which together increased the threat of proliferation and drove states to negotiate the NPT. The second chapter considers the negotiation of the treaty itself and looks at the gap between US and Soviet positions on key areas like alliance control of nuclear weapons, and how the two governments found common ground on nonproliferation language. It also explores the critical role played by the non-aligned movement to push inclusion of disarmament provisions that would become the foundation for Article VI of the treaty and the hesitancy of nuclear-armed states to support disbarment language and timelines. Chapter 3 of the book focuses on implementation of the NPT and its initial successes in heading off states with nuclear weapons research programs. It addresses how the treaty responded to challenges like the dissolution of the Soviet Union and gaps identified by the illicit nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and North Korea in the early 1990s. Chapter 3 also includes a section on the debate in 1995 over extending the treaty indefinitely, and the compromises reached to satisfy the concerns of the non-nuclear weapon states. Finally, Chapter 4 addresses some of the outstanding challenges to the NPT that remain unresolved, such as the continued failure to convene a conference on the Middle East WMD-free zone and specify the consequences of withdrawing from the NPT, and repurposing civilian nuclear technology transferred under the treaty weapons purposes. It also looks at how the ban treaty under negotiations in the United Nations will support or undermine the NPT's objectives.
Rose Gottemoeller, the US chief negotiator of the New START treaty-and the first woman to lead a major nuclear arms negotiation-delivers in this book an invaluable insider's account of the negotiations between the US and Russian delegations in Geneva in 2009 and 2010. It also examines the crucially important discussions about the treaty between President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, and it describes the tough negotiations Gottemoeller and her team went through to gain the support of the Senate for the treaty. And importantly, at a time when the US Congress stands deeply divided, it tells the story of how, in a previous time of partisan division, Republicans and Democrats came together to ratify a treaty to safeguard the future of all Americans. Rose Gottemoeller is uniquely qualified to write this book, bringing to the task not only many years of high-level experience in creating and enacting US policy on arms control and compliance but also a profound understanding of the broader politico-military context from her time as NATO Deputy Secretary General. Thanks to her years working with Russians, including as Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, she provides rare insights into the actions of the Russian delegation-and the dynamics between Medvedev and then-Prime Minister Vladmir Putin. Her encyclopedic recall of the events and astute ability to analyze objectively, while laying out her own thoughts and feelings at the time, make this both an invaluable document of record-and a fascinating story. In conveying the sense of excitement and satisfaction in delivering an innovative arms control instrument for the American people and by laying out the lessons Gottemoeller and her colleagues learned, this book will serve as an inspiration for the next generation of negotiators, as a road map for them as they learn and practice their trade, and as a blueprint to inform the shaping and ratification of future treaties. This book is in the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Dr. Geoffrey R.H. Burn) and has received much praise, including: “As advances in technology usher in a new age of weaponry, future negotiators would benefit from reading Rose Gottemoeller’s memoir of the process leading to the most significant arms control agreement of recent decades.” —Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State “Rose Gottemoeller’s book on the New START negotiations is the definitive book on this treaty or indeed, any of the nuclear treaties with the Soviet Union or Russia. These treaties played a key role in keeping the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union from breaking out into a civilization-ending war. But her story of the New START negotiation is no dry academic treatise. She tells with wit and charm the human story of the negotiators, as well as the critical issues involved. Rose’s book is an important and well-told story about the last nuclear treaty negotiated between the US and Russia.” —William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense “This book is important, but not just because it tells you about a very significant past, but also because it helps you understand the future.” — George Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State
A brief historical and analytical understanding of the difficulties encountered in negotiating and implementing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and their implications for efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Includes full text of the treaty and supplementary materials.
The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintaintenance, and in some cases further development of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations in light of the original balance of principles underlying the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.
This book chronicles the genesis of the negotiations that led to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which challenged the established nuclear order. The work provides readers with an authoritative account of the complex evolution of the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’ (HI) and the negotiation history of the TPNW. It includes a close analysis of internal strategy documents and communications in the author’s possession which trace the tactical and political decisions of a small group of state actors. By demonstrating the unacceptable humanitarian consequences and uncontrollable risks that these weapons pose to everyone’s security, the HI convinced many states to ban nuclear weapons and reject the policy of nuclear deterrence as unsustainable and illegitimate. As such, this book is a case-study of multilateral diplomacy and cooperation between state and civil society actors. It also contains a full discussion of both sides of the nuclear argument and assesses the extent to which the HI and the TPNW have moved the dial and present opportunities for transformational change. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, diplomacy, global governance, and International Relations in general.
