Naval Arms Control examines the context for naval arms control in the ongoing restructuring of East-West relations. Current changes in naval force postures are reviewed and a special analysis is made of military developments in Northern waters. Aims, approaches and procedures of naval arms control are presented and discussed making clear the choice between negotiated arms control and unilateral changes of naval strategy. The book also presents specific proposals making the arguments for and against clear and discussing them in relation to naval forces in general and to nuclear weapons at sea.
Since the Second World War five navies are known to have acquired nuclear weapons, and naval forces and activities around the world have become increasingly important and dangerous. However, there has been no serious consideration of naval arms control for more than forty years. SIPRI gathered together a group of experts from eight nations to consider the problems of naval forces and the possibilities for arms control. This book is a product of that conference, and it presents for the first time a broad and detailed assessment of the dangers of the naval arms race, problems with arms control, possible approaches, confidence-building measures, and verification technologies.
Arms control remains a major international issue as the twentieth century closes, but it is hardly a new concern. The effort to limit military power has enjoyed recurring support since shortly after World War I, when the United States, Britain, and Japan sought naval arms control as a means to insure stability in the Far East, contain naval expenditure, and prevent another world cataclysm. Richard Fanning examines the efforts of American, British, and Japanese leaders -- political, military, and social -- to reach agreement on naval limitation between 1922 and the mid-1930s, with focus on the years 1927-30, when political leaders, statesmen, naval officers, and various civilian pressure groups were especially active in considering naval limits. The civilian and even some military actors believed the Great War had been an aberration and that international stability would reign in the near future. But the coming of the Great Depression brought a dramatic drop in concern for disarmament. This study, based on a wide variety of unpublished sources, compares the cultural underpinnings of the disarmament movement in the three countries, especially the effects of public opinion, through examination of the many peace groups that played an important role in the disarmament process. The decision to strive for arms control, he finds, usually resulted from peace group pressure and political expediency. For anyone interested in naval history, this book illuminates the beginnings of the arms limitation effort and the growth of the peace movement.
We live in a world of change unmatched since World War II. Yesterday's impossible obstacle is today's accomplishment. Communist governments are dropping like fall leaves--with communism, as we know it, in desperate trouble, even in the Soviet Union. We are very close to reaching agreement on major strategic arms reduction and European conventional force treaties and are already witnessing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Amidst the obvious lessening of tensions and reductions in forces, the Soviet Union presses for discussions on naval arms control. At every turn the United States replies, "No!" The question is clear: Is this stance, which flies in the face of obvious trends, .justifiable and in the United States' best interest? Naval arms control, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. The United States Navy intends to maintain its preeminence. Shipbuilders fear reduction or elimination of business. Ecologists see an opportunity to eliminate nuclear weapons at sea. For budgeteers there is a chance to increase the "peace dividend," while diplomats hope to reduce world tensions and the chance of war. Although the views of each group requires consideration, our decision on naval arms control--a little, a lot, or none--should be based on the strategic interests of the United States. Just what is this "sea power" that we're considering limiting?Sea power is simply a measure of a country's ability to use the sea. It is not about the direct military effect of fighting ships, which is the realm of tactics; it is about the use of maritime lines of communication for the effective interconnection, organization, and purposeful application of the economic and war making potential of many lands.
The arms race at sea is a dangerous nuclear race which is causing growing international concern and must be brought under control. What are the hard facts about the situation? This book documents the realities of the competition - especially the nuclearization of naval forces - and dispels some of the myths surrounding the naval arms race. This incisive analysis of naval forces of the East and West concludes that, contrary to common perceptions, the US and its allies have a considerable military advantage over the Soviet Navy, a trend which is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. The authors describe in detail the widespread nuclearization of naval forces of all five nuclear navies, analyse the implications for security and arms control, and conclude with suggestions for possible arms control measures.
For most of the Cold War naval arms control was the forgotten dimension of arms control. Beginning in the late 1980s, however, it has become increasingly prominent in the East-West dialogue. But it is usually studied from the perspective of Soviet-American relations. This book examines the subject from a European perspective. What role might naval arms control play in the European context? What impact might naval arms control have on the interests and perceptions of European states? What opportunities for and obstacles to naval arms control exist in Europe? The authors address these questions, describing the naval interests and attitudes towards naval arms control of European coastal states, as well as the Soviet Union and the United States, in the Norwegian, Baltic, and Mediterranean seas.
Originally published in 1989, this book reviews the history of maritime control measures from before the First World War and provides a critical examination of both the objectives of maritime power and the concepts of disarmament, peace zones, parity, verifiability and peaceful co-existence. It argues that the objectives or maritime power are not necessarily incompatible with international security and that strategic deterrence can contribute to improved security. Limitation measures, it is argued, can in some cases be double-edged, endangering other security fields and having a destabilizing effect. The book stresses the need for non-absolute solutions in order to achieve a reasonable level of security and makes proposals for both structural and confidence-building measures along those lines
