Alastair Norcross argues that the basic judgments of morality are essentially comparative: alternatives are judged to be better or worse than each other. Notions such as right and wrong are not part of the fundamental subject matter of moral theory, but are constructed in a context-relative fashion out of the basic comparative judgments.
In Morality by Degrees, Alastair Norcross articulates and defends a radical new approach to ethical theory. Consequentialist theories of the right connect the rightness and wrongness (and related notions) of actions with the intrinsic goodness and badness of states of affairs consequential on those actions. The most popular such theory is maximization, which is said to demand of agents that they maximize the good, that they do the best they can, at all times. Thus it may seem that consequentialist theories are overly demanding, and, relatedly, that they cannot accommodate the phenomenon of going above and beyond the demands of duty. However, a clear understanding of consequentialism leaves no room for a theory of the right, at least not at the fundamental level of the theory. A consequentialist theory, such as utilitarianism, is a theory of how to rank outcomes, and derivatively actions, which provides reasons for choosing some actions over others. It is thus a purely scalar theory, with no demands that certain actions be performed, and no fundamental classification of actions as right or wrong. However, such notions may have pragmatic benefits at the level of application, since many people find it easier to guide their conduct by simple commands, rather than to think in terms of reasons of varying strength to do one thing rather than another. A contextualist semantics for various terms, such as "right", "permissible", "harm", when combined with the scalar approach to consequentialism, allows for the expression of truth-apt propositions with sentences containing such terms.
The Handbook of Moral and Character Education offers a definitive, state-of-the-art synthesis of leading scholarship in moral and character education. A subject of international interest and the focus of numerous governmental curricular mandates, the moral development and character formation of students are increasingly recognized as an essential component of a well-rounded schooling experience. This comprehensive volume explores the philosophical, psychological, and educational issues that define the field; links robust theoretical and empirical foundations to effective classroom practice; highlights implications for civic engagement and social justice; and follows the lessons learned from moral and character education into contexts outside of schools. Fully revised and updated, this third edition features a refreshed research base, coverage of digital pedagogies, out-of-school programs, and informal learning, and discussions about the role of reason, emotion, cultural processes, and citizenship/democracy in education. Further, the book’s substantive emphasis on diversity and equity in the field results in greater racial, ethnic, and geographic representation among contributing authors, inclusion of historically marginalized school communities and student identities, and coverage of practices such as transformative social and emotional learning (SEL), restorative justice, and education for environmental sustainability.
"Most people believe there are degrees of moral status. Most prominently, they believe that animals matter morally, but human beings matter significantly more than animals. This belief explains why we put animals in cages, conduct pain-inducing experiments on them and eat them for dinner. Belief in degrees of moral status also raises the possibility that robots and genetically enhanced human beings could become significantly more important than the rest of us, in which case they might be justified in putting us in cages, experimenting on us, and eating us for dinner. The present work thus systematically assesses whether, in fact, some individuals are more important morally than others. It distinguishes between moral status conferring, moral action guiding, and moral status enhancing properties, and argues that degrees of moral status require moral status enhancing properties. It then considers whether some properties are moral status enhancing to in the sense that they increase the most status of those who possess them. This analysis reveals that there are no moral status enhancing properties, hence, no degrees of moral status. The book then considers the implications of this conclusion for seven issues: 1. The difference between a world that includes degrees of moral status and one that doesn't; 2. Our obligations to help animals; 3. Animal rights; 4. Raising animals and eating them; 5. Animal experimentation; 6. Humans who lack superior cognitive capacities; and 7. Human-animal chimeras, robots and genetically enhanced human beings"--
Dale Dorsey considers one of the most fundamental questions in philosophical ethics: to what extent do the demands of morality have normative authority over us and our lives? Must we conform to moral requirements? Most who have addressed this question have treated the normative significance of morality as simply a fact to be explained. But Dorsey argues that this traditional assumption is misguided. According to Dorsey, not only are we not required to conform to moral demands, conforming to morality's demands will not always even be normatively permissible---moral behavior can be (quite literally) wrong. This view is significant not only for understanding the content and force of the moral point of view, but also for understanding the basic elements of how one ought to live.
What should teachers and schools do about moral education? An international team of philosophers and educationalists examine some of the most fundamental questions in moral education, such as the nature of morality.
Mary Anne Warren explores a theoretical question which lies at the heart of practical ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? In other words, what are the criteria for being an entity towards which people have moral obligations? Some philosophers maintain that there is one intrinsic property—for instance, life, sentience, humanity, or moral agency. Others believe that relational properties, such as belonging to a human community, are more important. In Part I of the book, Warren argues that no single property can serve as the sole criterion for moral status; instead, life, sentience, moral agency, and social and biotic relationships are all relevant, each in a different way. She presents seven basic principles, each focusing on a property that can, in combination with others, legitimately affect an agent's moral obligations towards entities of a given type. In Part II, these principles are applied in an examination of three controversial ethical issues: voluntary euthanasia, abortion
The great French sociologist and philosopher Emile Durkheim is best known for his classic book Suicide (1897), a landmark in social psychology. Among his other major works is this study in the sociology of education, which features 18 lectures by an influential theorist who discusses his ideas on the school as the appropriate setting for moral education. The first element in developing a moral being, he maintains, is instilling a sense of discipline, followed by a willingness to behave in terms of the group's collective interest, and a sense of autonomy. Durkheim also examines discipline and the psychology of the child, discipline of the school and the use of punishment, altruism in the child, the influence of the school environment, and the teaching of science, aesthetics, and history. Perceptive and provocative, this volume abounds in valuable insights for teachers and others involved in education.
This volume, based on an interdisciplinary conference of psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, and social scientists, explores a topic of vital importance today—moral education. The book is organized around four questions: the nature and scope of moral education, the problem of ethical pluralism, psychological considerations in a program of moral education, and the social structure of the school as it relates to moral education. This volume will interest philosophers and social scientists concerned with human behaviour and values. It will be of special interest to those engaged in educational research, to curriculum planners, and teachers.