First published in 1971, the five essays in this book were written by young philosophers at Cambridge at that time. They focus on two major questions of ethical theory: ‘What is it to judge morally?’ and ‘What makes a reason a moral reason?’. The book explores the relation of moral judgements to attitudes, emotions and beliefs as well as the notions of expression, agency, and moral responsibility.
First published in 1971, the five essays in this book were written by young philosophers at Cambridge at that time. They focus on two major questions of ethical theory: ‘What is it to judge morally?’ and ‘What makes a reason a moral reason?’. The book explores the relation of moral judgements to attitudes, emotions and beliefs as well as the notions of expression, agency, and moral responsibility.
First published in 1981, this collection of essays was taken from Peters’ larger work, Psychology and Ethical Development (1974) in order to provide a more focused volume on moral education for students. Peters’ background in both psychology and philosophy makes the work distinctive, which is evident from the first two essays alone: ‘Freud’s theory of Moral Development in Relation to that of Piaget’ and ‘Moral Education and the Psychology of Character’. He also displays balance in his acceptance that reason and feeling are both of great importance where the subject of moral education is concerned. Although written some time ago, the book discusses issues which are still of considerable interest and importance today.
First published in 1926, this study addresses the theory of morality using four overarching approaches: analytical, psychological, theoretical, and finally, philosophical. Within these methodologies, chapters explore such areas as the character of moral enquiry, the knowledge of good and evil, freedom and self-determination and moral philosophy. This is an interesting reissue, which will be of particular value to students researching the philosophy of ethics and morality.
The late J. L. Mackie and his work were a focus for much of the best philosophical thinking in the Oxford tradition. His moral thought centres on that most fundamental issue in moral philosophy – the issue of whether our moral judgements are in some way objective. The contributors to this volume, first published in 1985, are among the most distinguished figures in moral philosophy, and their essays in tribute to John Mackie present views at the forefront of the subject. Five of the essays give a new understanding of the objectivity of moral judgements. These are by Simon Blackburn, R.M. Hare, John McDowell, Susan Hurley and Bernard Williams. The remaining contributors – Philippa Foot, Steven Lukes, Amartya Sen, David Wiggins – give their attention to problems which are equally compelling, such as the defence of a moral outlook based on a conception of a need and of what follows from it. The volume also includes the addresses given by Simon Blackburn and George Cawkwell at the memorial service for John Mackie, and a list of his publications, compiled by Joan Mackie.
First published in 1929, this book explores the crucial, ethical question of the objects and the justification of punishment. Dr. A. C. Ewing considers both the retributive theory and the deterrent theory on the subject whilst remaining commendably unprejudiced. The book examines the views which emphasize the reformation of the offender and the education of the community as objects of punishment. It also deals with a theory of reward as a compliment to a theory of punishment. Dr. Ewing’s treatment of the topics is philosophical yet he takes in to account the practical considerations that should determine the nature and the amount of the punishment to be inflicted in different types of cases. This book will be of great interest to students of philosophy, teachers and those who are interested in the concrete problems of punishment by the state. It is an original contribution to the study of a subject of great theoretical and practical importance.
First published in 1935, this book compares and examines what John Laird termed the ‘three most important notions in ethical science’: the concepts of virtue, duty and well-being. Laird poses the question of whether any one of these three concepts is capable of being the foundation of ethics and of supporting the other two. This is an interesting reissue, which will be of particular value to students researching the philosophy of ethics and morality.
The tendency to reciprocate – to return good for good and evil for evil – is a potent force in human life, and the concept of reciprocity is closely connected to fundamental notions of ‘justice’, ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’, ‘gratitude’ and ‘equality’. In Reciprocity, first published in 1986, Lawrence Becker presents a sustained argument about reciprocity, beginning with the strategy for developing a moral theory of the virtues. He considers the concept of reciprocity in detail, contending that it is a basic virtue that provides the basis for parental authority, obligations to future generations, and obedience to law. Throughout the first two parts of the book, Becker intersperses short pieces of his own narrative fiction to enrich reflection on the philosophical arguments. The final part is devoted to extensive bibliographical essays, ranging over anthropology, psychology, political theory and law, as well as the relevant ethics and political philosophy.
First published in 1978, this reissue presents a seminal philosophical work by professor Putnam, in which he puts forward a conception of knowledge which makes ethics, practical knowledge and non-mathematic parts of the social sciences just as much parts of 'knowledge' as the sciences themselves. He also rejects the idea that knowledge can be demarcated from non-knowledge by the fact that the former alone adheres to 'the scientific method'. The first part of the book consists of Professor Putnam's John Locke lectures, delivered at the University of Oxford in 1976, offering a detailed examination of a 'physicalist' theory of reference against a background of the works of Tarski, Carnap, Popper, Hempel and Kant. The analysis then extends to notions of truth, the character of linguistic enquiry and social scientific enquiry in general, interconnecting with the great metaphysical problem of realism, the nature of language and reference, and the character of ourselves.
Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, originally published in 1980, gives an account of "altruistic emotions" (compassion, sympathy, concern) and friendship that brings out their moral value. Blum argues that moral theories centered on rationality, universal principle, obligation, and impersonality cannot capture this moral importance. This was one of the first books in contemporary moral philosophy to emphasize the moral significance of emotions, to deal with friendship as a moral phenomenon, and to challenge the rationalism of standard interpretations of Kant, although Blum’s "sentimentalism" owes more to Schopenhauer than to Hume. It was a forerunner to care ethics, and feminist ethics more generally; to virtue ethics; and to subsequent influential interpretations of Kant that attempted to room for altruistic emotion and friendship, and other forms of particularism and partialism. In addition, the work has been widely influential in religious studies, political theory, bioethics, and feminist ethics.
