Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame
Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame

Author: Audrey L. Anton

Publisher: Lexington Books

Published: 2015-12-24

Total Pages: 216

ISBN-13: 0739191764

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This book challenges a basic assumption held by many responsibility theorists: that agents must be morally responsible in the retrospective sense for anything in virtue of which they deserve praise or blame (the primacy assumption). Anton sets out to defeat this assumption by showing that accepting it as well as the much more intuitive causality assumption renders us incapable of making sense of cases whereby agents seem to deserve praise and blame. She argues that retrospective moral responsibility is a species of causal responsibility (the causality assumption). Then, she illustrates several examples in which agents are not causally responsible for any morally relevant consequences, but they seem to be deserving of praise or blame nonetheless. Anton concludes that such cases are counterexamples to the primacy assumption, and turns her attention towards discerning what grounds desert of praise and blame if not retrospective moral responsibility. Anton advances the moral attitude account, whereby agents deserve praise and blame in virtue of moral attitudes they have in response to moral reasons. These moral attitudes must be sufficiently sincere, which means they reach a threshold that distinguishes such attitudes as eligible for praise and blame. Anton adds that whether one deserves praise or blame and to what degree is sensitive to the agent’s personal moral progress as well as the status quo of her society. This addition brings with it the welcome consequence that morality may be objective, but we are still justified in judging one another charitably based on personal and societal limitations.

Sources and Reasons
Sources and Reasons

Author: Audrey Lauren Anton

Publisher:

Published: 2011

Total Pages: 241

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Abstract: This dissertation is an inquiry into the natures of moral responsibility and an agent's worthiness of praise and blame and the relation between these two phenomena. The project commences with a reflection on how contemporary views of moral responsibility and praise-and blameworthiness owe a significant heritage to a division that can be seen in Aristotle's view---that of sourcehood and reasons-responsiveness. Aristotle was one of the first to argue that an agent ought only to be praised or blamed for voluntary behavior. For Aristotle, the voluntary involves the agent's particular knowledge of her situation as well as her control over her behavior as its source. Since Aristotle's presentation of these issues, scholars tend to highlight one of these aspects over the other, indicating which is more central to establishing moral responsibility and the worthiness of praise and blame. Then, I show that contemporary views of each type hold that moral responsibility is prior to (i.e., a precondition for) an agent's worthiness of praise and blame. In my dissertation, I challenge this presumption. First, I show that moral responsibility is a type of causal responsibility. Then I argue that there are instances of agents being praise- and blameworthy that lack a causal element on the part of the agent, thus showing that one need not be morally responsible in order to be worthy of praise or blame. From here, I consider what grounds praise- and blameworthiness, offering my own account, the moral attitude account, which is in part inspired by my interpretation of how Aristotle deemed emotions to be deserving of praise and blame. Finally, I consider the possibility that moral responsibility requires agents to be praise- or blameworthy and I ultimately endorse this claim. I suggest that sourcehood accounts are applicable to moral responsibility only and that reasons-responsiveness accounts are better equipped to incorporate my conclusions into their views.

Against Moral Responsibility
Against Moral Responsibility

Author: Bruce N. Waller

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2011-10-14

Total Pages: 365

ISBN-13: 0262016591

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

A vigorous attack on moral responsibility in all its forms argues that the abolition of moral responsibility will be liberating and beneficial. In Against Moral Responsibility, Bruce Waller launches a spirited attack on a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from ancient times to the present. Waller argues that, despite the creative defenses of it by contemporary thinkers, moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientific system. The scientific understanding of human behavior and the causes that shape human character, he contends, leaves no room for moral responsibility. Waller argues that moral responsibility in all its forms—including criminal justice, distributive justice, and all claims of just deserts—is fundamentally unfair and harmful and that its abolition will be liberating and beneficial. What we really want—natural human free will, moral judgments, meaningful human relationships, creative abilities—would survive and flourish without moral responsibility. In the course of his argument, Waller examines the origins of the basic belief in moral responsibility, proposes a naturalistic understanding of free will, offers a detailed argument against moral responsibility and critiques arguments in favor of it, gives a general account of what a world without moral responsibility would look like, and examines the social and psychological aspects of abolishing moral responsibility. Waller not only mounts a vigorous, and philosophically rigorous, attack on the moral responsibility system, but also celebrates the benefits that would result from its total abolition.

Moral Responsibility Reconsidered
Moral Responsibility Reconsidered

Author: Gregg D. Caruso

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2022-12-01

Total Pages: 150

ISBN-13: 1009219766

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it is used in contemporary philosophical debates and explores the justifiability of the moral practices associated with it, including moral praise/blame, retributive punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. After identifying and discussing several different varieties of responsibility-including causal responsibility, take-charge responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of responsibility associated with attributability, answerability, and accountability-it distinguishes between basic and non-basic desert conceptions of moral responsibility and considers a number of skeptical arguments against each. It then outlines an alternative forward-looking account of moral responsibility grounded in non-desert-invoking desiderata such as protection, reconciliation, and moral formation. It concludes by addressing concerns about the practical implications of skepticism about desert-based moral responsibility and explains how optimistic skeptics can preserve most of what we care about when it comes to our interpersonal relationships, morality, and meaning in life.

Building Better Beings
Building Better Beings

Author: Manuel Vargas

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2013

Total Pages: 356

ISBN-13: 019969754X

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Manuel Vargas presents a compelling and state-of-the-art defense of moral responsibility in the face of growing philosophical and scientific skepticism about free will and accountability. He shows how we can justify our responsibility practices, and provides a normatively and naturalistically adequate account of agency, blame, and desert.

Just Deserts
Just Deserts

Author: Daniel C. Dennett

Publisher: John Wiley & Sons

Published: 2021-01-14

Total Pages: 145

ISBN-13: 1509545778

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

The concept of free will is profoundly important to our self-understanding, our interpersonal relationships, and our moral and legal practices. If it turns out that no one is ever free and morally responsible, what would that mean for society, morality, meaning, and the law? Just Deserts brings together two philosophers – Daniel C. Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso – to debate their respective views on free will, moral responsibility, and legal punishment. In three extended conversations, Dennett and Caruso present their arguments for and against the existence of free will and debate their implications. Dennett argues that the kind of free will required for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism – for him, self-control is key; we are not responsible for becoming responsible, but are responsible for staying responsible, for keeping would-be puppeteers at bay. Caruso takes the opposite view, arguing that who we are and what we do is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control, and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the sense that would make us truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Just Deserts introduces the concepts central to the debate about free will and moral responsibility by way of an entertaining, rigorous, and sometimes heated philosophical dialogue between two leading thinkers.

Building Better Beings
Building Better Beings

Author: Manuel Vargas

Publisher: OUP Oxford

Published: 2013-01-17

Total Pages: 360

ISBN-13: 0191043664

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Building Better Beings presents a new theory of moral responsibility. Beginning with a discussion of ordinary convictions about responsibility and free will and their implications for a philosophical theory, Manuel Vargas argues that no theory can do justice to all the things we want from a theory of free will and moral responsibility. He goes on to show how we can nevertheless justify our responsibility practices and provide a normatively and naturalistically adequate account of of responsible agency, blame, and desert. Three ideas are central to Vargas' account: the agency cultivation model, circumstantialism about powers, and revisionism about responsibility and free will. On Vargas' account, responsibility norms and practices are justified by their effects. In particular, the agency cultivation model holds that responsibility practices help mold us into creatures that respond to moral considerations. Moreover, the abilities that matter for responsibility and free will are not metaphysically prior features of agents in isolation from social contexts. Instead, they are functions of both agents and their normatively structured contexts. This is the idea of circumstantialism about the powers required for responsibility. Third, Vargas argues that an adequate theory of responsibility will be revisionist, or at odds with important strands of ordinary convictions about free will and moral responsibility. Building Better Beings provides a compelling and state-of-the-art defense of moral responsibility in the face of growing philosophical and scientific skepticism about free will and moral responsibility.

Freedom Without Responsibility
Freedom Without Responsibility

Author: Bruce N. Waller

Publisher:

Published: 1990

Total Pages: 236

ISBN-13: 9780877227175

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

In this book, Bruce Waller attacks two prevalent philosophical beliefs. First, he argues that moral responsibility must be rejected; there is no room for such a notion within our naturalist framework. Second, he denies the common assumption that moral responsibility is inseparably linked with individual freedom. Rejection of moral responsibility does not entail the demise of individual freedom; instead, individual freedom is enhanced by the rejection of moral responsibility. According to this theory of "no-fault naturalism," no one deserves either blame or reward.In the course of arguing against moral responsibility, Waller critiques major compatibilist arguments-by Dennett, Frankfurt, Strawson, Bennett, Wolf, Hampshire, Glover, Rachels, Sher, and others. In addition, the implications of denying moral responsibility-for individual freedom, for moral judgments and moral behavior, and for social justice-are examined; the supposed dire consequences of the denial of moral responsibility are challenged; and the benefits of denying moral responsibility are described. Author note: Bruce N. Waller, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Youngstown State University, Youngstown, Ohio, is the author of Critical Thinking: Consider the Verdict.

Rejecting Retributivism
Rejecting Retributivism

Author: Gregg D. Caruso

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2021-04-29

Total Pages: 401

ISBN-13: 1108484700

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Caruso argues against retributivism and develops an alternative for addressing criminal behavior that is ethically defensible and practical.

Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society
Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society

Author: Elizabeth Shaw

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2019-08-29

Total Pages: 247

ISBN-13: 1108661262

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

'Free will skepticism' refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action - i.e. the free will - required for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Critics fear that adopting this view would have harmful consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and laws. Optimistic free will skeptics, on the other hand, respond by arguing that life without free will and so-called basic desert moral responsibility would not be harmful in these ways, and might even be beneficial. This collection addresses the practical implications of free will skepticism for law and society. It contains eleven original essays that provide alternatives to retributive punishment, explore what (if any) changes are needed for the criminal justice system, and ask whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about the real-world implications of free will skepticism.