Since the 1990s, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. These three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging, collaboratory field.
Now in its third edition, this foremost college ethics text helps students form a basis for practical, ethical decision making in contemporary culture. Substantial updates and revisions include a new chapter on ethics and economics, online resources for instructors, current case studies, new material on bioethics and stem cell research, and more.
Winner of the Zócalo Book Prize A New York Times Book Review Editors’ Choice “Combines powerful moral arguments with superb storytelling.” —New Statesman What moral values do we hold in common? As globalization draws us together economically, are the things we value converging or diverging? These twin questions led Michael Ignatieff to embark on a three-year, eight-nation journey in search of an answer. What we share, he found, are what he calls “ordinary virtues”: tolerance, forgiveness, trust, and resilience. When conflicts break out, these virtues are easily exploited by the politics of fear and exclusion, reserved for one’s own group but denied to others. Yet these ordinary virtues are the key to healing and reconciliation on both a local and global scale. “Makes for illuminating reading.” —Simon Winchester, New York Review of Books “Engaging, articulate and richly descriptive... Ignatieff’s deft histories, vivid sketches and fascinating interviews are the soul of this important book.” —Times Literary Supplement “Deserves praise for wrestling with the devolution of our moral worlds over recent decades.” —Los Angeles Review of Books
Cary Buzzelli and Bill Johnson reinvigorate the enduring question: What is the place of morality in the classroom? Departing from notions of a morality that can only be abstract and absolute, these authors ground their investigation in analyses of actual teacher-student interactions. This approach illuminates the ways in which language, power and culture impact "the moral" in teaching. Buzzelli and Johnson's study addresses a wide range of moral issues in various classroom contexts. Its practical and diverse examples make it a valuable resource for teachers and teacher development programs.
Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint addresses in a novel format the major topics and themes of contemporary metaethics, the study of the analysis of moral thought and judgement. Metathetics is less concerned with what practices are right or wrong than with what we mean by ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’ Looking at a wide spectrum of topics including moral language, realism and anti-realism, reasons and motives, relativism, and moral progress, this book engages students and general readers in order to enhance their understanding of morality and moral discourse as cultural practices. Catherine Wilson innovatively employs a first-person narrator to report step-by-step an individual’s reflections, beginning from a position of radical scepticism, on the possibility of objective moral knowledge. The reader is invited to follow along with this reasoning, and to challenge or agree with each major point. Incrementally, the narrator is led to certain definite conclusions about ‘oughts’ and norms in connection with self-interest, prudence, social norms, and finally morality. Scepticism is overcome, and the narrator arrives at a good understanding of how moral knowledge and moral progress are possible, though frequently long in coming. Accessibly written, Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint presupposes no prior training in philosophy and is a must-read for philosophers, students and general readers interested in gaining a better understanding of morality as a personal philosophical quest.
In her landmark 1982 study In a Different Voice, Carol Gilligan argues that there is not only one, true moral voice, but two: one masculine, one feminine. Moral values and concerns associated with a feminine outlook are relational rather than autonomous; they depend upon interaction with others. Susan J. Hekman argues that the approach to morality suggested by Gilligan's work marks a radically new departure in moral thinking. In a far-reaching examination and critique of Gilligan's theory, Hekman seeks to deconstruct the major traditions of moral theory that have been dominant since the Enlightenment. She challenges the centerpiece of that tradition: the disembodied, autonomous subject of modernist philosophy. Hekman argues that the logic of Gilligan's approach entails multiple moral voices, not just one or even two, and that factors other than gender--class, race, and culture--are constitutive of moral voice. Using the work of Wittgenstein and Foucault, she outlines the parameters of a discursive morality and its implications for feminism and moral theory.
Can normative words like 'good', 'ought', and 'reason' be defined in non-normative terms? Stephen Finlay argues that they can, advancing a new theory of the meaning of this language and providing pragmatic explanations of the specially problematic features of its moral and deliberative uses which comprise the puzzles of metaethics.
Dworkin's important book is a collection of essays which discuss almost all of the great constitutional issues of the last two decades, including abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, homosexuality, pornography, and free speech. Dworkin offers a consistently liberal view of the Constitution and argues that fidelity to it and to law demands that judges make moral judgments. He proposes that we all interpret the abstract language of the Constitution by reference to moral principles about political decency and justice. His 'moral reading' therefore brings political morality into the heart of constitutional law. The various chapters of this book were first published separately; now drawn together they provide the reader with a rich, full-length treatment of Dworkin's general theory of law.
This book presents Robert S. Hartman’s formal theory of value and critically examines many other twentieth century value theorists in its light, including A.J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, William K. Frankena, R.M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, G.E. Moore, P.H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Charles Stevenson, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, and J.O. Urmson. Open Access funding for this volume has been provided by the Robert S. Hartman Institute.