The Marine Corps has always considered itself a breed apart. Since 1775, America’s smallest armed service has been suspicious of outsiders and deeply loyal to its traditions. Marines believe in nothing more strongly than the Corps’ uniqueness and superiority, and this undying faith in its own exceptionalism is what has made the Marines one of the sharpest, swiftest tools of American military power. Along with unapologetic self-promotion, a strong sense of identity has enabled the Corps to exert a powerful influence on American politics and culture. Aaron O’Connell focuses on the period from World War II to Vietnam, when the Marine Corps transformed itself from America’s least respected to its most elite armed force. He describes how the distinctive Marine culture played a role in this ascendancy. Venerating sacrifice and suffering, privileging the collective over the individual, Corps culture was saturated with romantic and religious overtones that had enormous marketing potential in a postwar America energized by new global responsibilities. Capitalizing on this, the Marines curried the favor of the nation’s best reporters, befriended publishers, courted Hollywood and Congress, and built a public relations infrastructure that would eventually brand it as the most prestigious military service in America. But the Corps’ triumphs did not come without costs, and O’Connell writes of those, too, including a culture of violence that sometimes spread beyond the battlefield. And as he considers how the Corps’ interventions in American politics have ushered in a more militarized approach to national security, O’Connell questions its sustainability.
An essential part of the Air War College curriculum consists of the study of military history and specific campaigns. Part 1 of this manuscript presents an attempt to clarify the relationship between air power and maneuver warfare since 1939, a subject that derives its importance from the fact that maneuver warfare has been the U.S. Army's official doctrine since the early eighties and remains so to the present day. Part 2 contains the collective wisdom of the military doctrine analysis of the Air University on the same subjects, as well as the way in which we have presented them.
During the early stages of helicopter development, when helicopters were able to lift just slightly more than their own weight, the military services were eagerly seeking to obtain a variety of larger, more useful helicopters. The youthful helicopter industry expressed optimism, although at times unrealistic, in its ability to meet the military requirements. The development of the helicopter program within the Marine Corps was sparked by the foresight and imagination of the officers of the period. While early helicopters provided stepping stones for an orderly progression of the program, the slowness of the technical advances and the periods of financial austerity after World War II and Korea prevented the Marine Corps from developing the vertical envelopment concept as rapidly as desired. The program gained interest and momentum, however, as a result of the success of helicopters in Korea. As Lieutenant General Gerald C. Thomas stated: "Indeed, the helicopter gave clear evidence, from its first tactical employment, that a major advance in combat was at hand." This history, which traces the development of helicopters in the Marine Corps from 1946 to 1962, offers a tribute to the creative vision and planning of a handful of Marine officers who conceived of the vertical assault concept in amphibious operations at a time when suitable aircraft to make it work did not exist. The story of the subsequent struggle to procure and develop those aircraft, to refine a doctrine for their employment, and to familiarize the Marine Corps with their use is an interesting and vital part of modern Marine Corps history. The documentary basis for this monograph was primarily the official records of the Marine Corps and Navy Department, but considerable use was made of interviews and correspondence with key individuals involved in all phases of helicopter development.
Airpower is not widely understood. Even though it has come to play an increasingly important role in both peace and war, the basic concepts that define and govern airpower remain obscure to many people, even to professional military officers. This fact is largely due to fundamental differences of opinion as to whether or not the aircraft has altered the strategies of war or merely its tactics. If the former, then one can see airpower as a revolutionary leap along the continuum of war; but if the latter, then airpower is simply another weapon that joins the arsenal along with the rifle, machine gun, tank, submarine, and radio. This book implicitly assumes that airpower has brought about a revolution in war. It has altered virtually all aspects of war: how it is fought, by whom, against whom, and with what weapons. Flowing from those factors have been changes in training, organization, administration, command and control, and doctrine. War has been fundamentally transformed by the advent of the airplane.
As America's expeditionary force-in-readiness, the US Marine Corps operates an eclectic mix of fixed-wing, rotary-wing, tiltrotor and unmanned aircraft to support the marine rifleman on the ground. The first two decades of the 21st century have seen an almost complete transformation of the marine air wings, as Cold War-era legacy aircraft yield to digital-age replacements. In Harpia's first book dedicated to a North American air arm, Joe Copalman explains the significance of each aircraft transition in the Marine Corps over the previous 20 years - community by community - on the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and its ability to conduct amphibious and expeditionary warfare.While some of these transitions, like that of the KC-130T to KC-130J and AH-1W to AH-1Z, have been incremental, evolutionary steps up, others like the tandem-rotor CH-46 Sea Knight to the tiltrotor MV-22 Osprey and the introduction of the F-35 Lightning II to replace all three of the Marine Corps' tactical jets have revolutionised the way the service fights. In addition to introducing newer, vastly more capable and connected aircraft into its air wings, the Marine Corps has also invested heavily in keeping its remaining legacy fleets at the cutting edge of lethality and survivability throughout the final days of each type's service.Utilising a before-and-after approach, Copalman guides the reader through every transition in Modern USMC Air Power, examining what each legacy aircraft brought to the fight, and how the service's newer platforms have improved upon those capabilities, especially when aided by new constructs like precision-guided ordnance and digital interoperability.
This publication is about winning in combat. Winning requires many things: excellence in techniques, an appreciation of the enemy, exemplary leadership, battlefield judgment, and focused combat power. Yet these factors by themselves do not ensure success in battle. Many armies, both winners and losers, have possessed many or all of these attributes. When we examine closely the differences between victor and vanquished, we draw one conclusion. Success went to the armies whose leaders, senior and junior, could best focus their efforts-their skills and their resources-toward a decisive end. Their success arose not merely from excellence in techniques, procedures, and material but from their leaders' abilities to uniquely and effectively combine them. Winning in combat depends upon tactical leaders who can think creatively and act decisively.
The Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) provides the 38th Commandant's strategic direction for the Marine Corps and mirrors the function of the Secretary of Defense's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). It serves as the authoritative document for Service-level planning and provides a common direction to the Marine Corps Total Force. It also serves as a road map describing where the Marine Corps is going and why; what the Marine Corps force development priorities are and are not; and, in some instances, how and when prescribed actions will be implemented. This CPG serves as my Commandant's Intent for the next four years. As Commandant Neller observed, "The Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment." I concur with his diagnosis. Significant change is required to ensure we are aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and DPG, and further, prepared to meet the demands of the Naval Fleet in executing current and emerging operational naval concepts. Effecting that change will be my top priority as your 38th Commandant. This CPG outlines my five priority focus areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. I will use these focal areas as logical lines of effort to frame my thinking, planning, and decision-making at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), as well as to communicate to our civilian leadership. This document explains how we will translate those focus areas into action with measurable outcomes. The institutional changes that follow this CPG will be based on a long-term view and singular focus on where we want the Marine Corps to be in the next 5-15 years, well beyond the tenure of any one Commandant, Presidential administration, or Congress. We cannot afford to retain outdated policies, doctrine, organizations, or force development strategies. The coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change - just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. The Arab Spring, West African Ebola Outbreak, Scarborough Shoal standoff, Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, and weaponization of social media are but a few recent examples illustrating the point. While we must accept an environment characterized by uncertainty, we cannot ignore strong signals of change nor be complacent when it comes to designing and preparing the force for the future. What is abundantly clear is that the future operating environment will place heavy demands on our Nation's Naval Services. Context and direction is clearly articulated in the NDS and DPG as well as testimony from our uniformed and civilian leadership. No further guidance is required; we are moving forward. The Marine Corps will be trained and equipped as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations. In crisis prevention and crisis response, the Fleet Marine Force - acting as an extension of the Fleet - will be first on the scene, first to help, first to contain a brewing crisis, and first to fight if required to do so. The Marine Corps will be the "force of choice" for the President, Secretary, and Combatant Commander - "a certain force for an uncertain world" as noted by Commandant Krulak. No matter what the crisis, our civilian leaders should always have one shared thought - Send in the Marines.
For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF) oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF's mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria used for evaluating innovations.
Traces the usage of- and meaning given to- the terms "roles and missions" relating to the armed forces and particularly to the United States Air Force, from 1907 to the present.
