Judicial systems are under increasing pressure: from rising litigation costs and decreased accessibility, from escalating accountability and performance evaluation expectations, from shifting burdens of case management and alternative dispute resolution roles, and from emerging technologies. For courts to survive and flourish in a rapidly changing society, it is vital to have a clear understanding of their contemporary role – and a willingness to defend it. This book presents a clear vision of what it is that courts do, how they do it, and how we can make sure that they perform that role well. It argues that courts remain a critical, relevant and supremely well-adjusted institution in the 21st century. The approach of this book is to weave together a range of discourses on surrounding judicial issues into a systemic and coherent whole. It begins by articulating the dual roles at the core of the judicial function: third-party merit-based dispute resolution and social (normative) governance. By expanding upon these discrete yet inter-related aspects, it develops a language and conceptual framework to understand the judicial role more fully. The subsequent chapters demonstrate the explanatory power of this function, examining the judicial decision-making method, reframing principles of judicial independence and impartiality, and re-conceiving systems of accountability and responsibility. The book argues that this function-driven conception provides a useful re-imagining of some familiar issues as part of a coherent framework of foundational, yet interwoven, principles. This approach not only adds clarity to the analysis of those concepts and the concrete mechanisms by which they are manifest, but helps make the case of why courts remain such vital social institutions. Ultimately, the book is an entreaty not to take courts for granted, nor to readily abandon the benefits they bring to society. Instead, by understanding the importance and legitimacy of the judicial role, and its multifaceted social benefits, this books challenge us to refresh our courts in a manner that best advances this underlying function.
Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of “The Federalist Papers”, a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton. Following the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the governing doctrines and policies of the States lacked cohesion. “The Federalist”, as it was previously known, was constructed by American statesman Alexander Hamilton, and was intended to catalyse the ratification of the United States Constitution. Hamilton recruited fellow statesmen James Madison Jr., and John Jay to write papers for the compendium, and the three are known as some of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755–1804) was an American lawyer, journalist and highly influential government official. He also served as a Senior Officer in the Army between 1799-1800 and founded the Federalist Party, the system that governed the nation’s finances. His contributions to the Constitution and leadership made a significant and lasting impact on the early development of the nation of the United States.
“Hamburger argues persuasively that America has overlaid its constitutional system with a form of governance that is both alien and dangerous.” —Law and Politics Book Review While the federal government traditionally could constrain liberty only through acts of Congress and the courts, the executive branch has increasingly come to control Americans through its own administrative rules and adjudication, thus raising disturbing questions about the effect of this sort of state power on American government and society. With Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, Philip Hamburger answers this question in the affirmative, offering a revisionist account of administrative law. Rather than accepting it as a novel power necessitated by modern society, he locates its origins in the medieval and early modern English tradition of royal prerogative. Then he traces resistance to administrative law from the Middle Ages to the present. Medieval parliaments periodically tried to confine the Crown to governing through regular law, but the most effective response was the seventeenth-century development of English constitutional law, which concluded that the government could rule only through the law of the land and the courts, not through administrative edicts. Although the US Constitution pursued this conclusion even more vigorously, administrative power reemerged in the Progressive and New Deal Eras. Since then, Hamburger argues, administrative law has returned American government and society to precisely the sort of consolidated or absolute power that the US Constitution—and constitutions in general—were designed to prevent. With a clear yet many-layered argument that draws on history, law, and legal thought, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? reveals administrative law to be not a benign, natural outgrowth of contemporary government but a pernicious—and profoundly unlawful—return to dangerous pre-constitutional absolutism.
This book is a comparative study of judge-managed court systems across Australia, Europe and North America. This book makes an original contribution to the literature of court administration by providing a framework for examining court-service models of judicial councils, the policymaking bodies of courts and tribunals. This book promises to assist court administration scholars, judicial leaders, and policymakers in devising more effective organizational solutions to the contemporary challenges of judicial self-governance. The author Dr. Tim Bunjevac offers a nuanced elaboration of judicial accountability in court administration and a model institutional framework of court governance, comparing key Australian and international models of court administration, including the Australian Federal and two state court systems, Irish, English, Canadian and Dutch models. With a close case study, the author puts his sharpest focus on the Victoria, Australia, which introduced a judicial council in 2014. This book does an innovative job of proposing a new elaboration of judicial accountability in court administration. This book proposes that the likely success of any court system reform ultimately depends on the quality of the interaction between the courts, government, and other justice system stakeholders, which must be rooted in the concepts of organizational transparency and administrative accountability.
This study discusses the many different aspects of judicial independence in Israel. It begins with an historical analysis of the concept of judicial independence in a comparative perspective, emphasizing the conceptual roots of the judiciary in Jewish law. Recent decades have witnessed a marked increase in the role played by the judiciary in society. This general trend is apparent in Israel, where the highly significant social role played by the judiciary has been on the increase for some years. The constitutional role of the judiciary in society is more pronounced in countries where the courts are empowered to review the constitutionality of legislative acts. In Israel the power of judicial review, in decisions of the Supreme Court, has been applied in a number of cases in which legislation of the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, has been set aside. The increasingly prominent role of the judiciary in Israel is further manifested by the frequent recourse to judicial commissions of inquiry, chaired by judges who are often called upon to examine some of the major public controversies.
A distinguished and experienced appellate court judge, Richard A. Posner offers in this new book a unique and, to orthodox legal thinkers, a startling perspective on how judges and justices decide cases. When conventional legal materials enable judges to ascertain the true facts of a case and apply clear pre-existing legal rules to them, Posner argues, they do so straightforwardly; that is the domain of legalist reasoning. However, in non-routine cases, the conventional materials run out and judges are on their own, navigating uncharted seas with equipment consisting of experience, emotions, and often unconscious beliefs. In doing so, they take on a legislative role, though one that is confined by internal and external constraints, such as professional ethics, opinions of respected colleagues, and limitations imposed by other branches of government on freewheeling judicial discretion. Occasional legislators, judges are motivated by political considerations in a broad and sometimes a narrow sense of that term. In that open area, most American judges are legal pragmatists. Legal pragmatism is forward-looking and policy-based. It focuses on the consequences of a decision in both the short and the long term, rather than on its antecedent logic. Legal pragmatism so understood is really just a form of ordinary practical reasoning, rather than some special kind of legal reasoning. Supreme Court justices are uniquely free from the constraints on ordinary judges and uniquely tempted to engage in legislative forms of adjudication. More than any other court, the Supreme Court is best understood as a political court.