Regulation and Markets provides the up to date, integrated analysis of regulatory policies and the administrative process that is needed in today's field of regulation economics. The book takes a modern perspective, using the tools of industrial organization and game theory. It is the only unified treatment of the field and combines theoretical models with consideration of public policy issues in the areas of antitrust, price regulation, environmental regulation, product quality, and workplace safety. The discussion considers both the welfare effects of regulation and the institutional aspects of the administrative regulatory process. Developments in the fields of law and political science have been integrated in a rigorous manner into the economic framework.Sections of the book address administrative process and market allocation, competition and pricing under increasing returns to scale, administrative regulation of markets, and antitrust enforcement. The conclusion evaluates regulatory policy and deregulation. Extensive literature citations throughout enhance the books value as a reference.
This book explores current issues regarding the regulation of various economic sectors, theoretically and empirically, discussing both neoclassical and behavioural economics approaches to regulation. Regulation has become one of the main determinants of modern economies, and virtually every sector is subject to general laws and regulations as well as specific rules and standards. A traditional argument to justify regulatory interventions is the promotion of public interests. Fixing markets that lack competition, balancing information asymmetries, internalising externalities, mitigating systemic risks, and protecting consumers from irrational behaviour are frequently invoked to complement the invisible hand of the market with the visible hand of the state.However, regulations can lead to unintended consequences, and serve the interests of powerful private interest groups rather than the public interest and social welfare. In addition, new insights from behavioural economics question the traditional regulatory approaches, most prominently in attitudes towards consumers. Furthermore, digitalisation and technological innovation in general present new challenges in terms of both the type of regulation and the regulatory process.Part I of this book discusses various theoretical approaches to the economic analysis of regulations, while Part II looks at specific applications of the law and economics of regulation.
A leading economist's exploration of what our economic arrangements might look like if we applied basic principles without ideological blinders. There is nothing wrong with economics, Dean Baker contends, but economists routinely ignore their own principles when it comes to economic policy. What would policy look like if we took basic principles of mainstream economics seriously and applied them consistently? In the debate over regulation, for example, Baker—one of the few economists who predicted the meltdown of fall 2008—points out that ideological blinders have obscured the fact there is no “free market” to protect. Modern markets are highly regulated, although intrusive regulations such as copyright and patents are rarely viewed as regulatory devices. If we admit the extent to which the economy is and will be regulated, we have many more options in designing policy and deciding who benefits from it. On health care reform, Baker complains that economists ignore another basic idea: marginal cost pricing. Unlike all other industries, medical services are priced extraordinarily high, far above the cost of production, yet that discrepancy is rarely addressed in the debate about health care reform. What if we applied marginal cost pricing—making doctors' wages competitive and charging less for prescription drugs and tests such as MRIs? Taking Economics Seriously offers an alternative Econ 101. It introduces economic principles and thinks through what we might gain if we free ourselves from ideological blinders and get back to basics in the most troubled parts of our economy.
Michael Crew and David Parker have compiled a comprehensive, up-to-date and detailed analytical work on leading research issues in the economics of regulation. With contributions from international specialists in economic regulation, the Handbook provides a comprehensive discussion of major developments in both the theory and practice of regulatory economics. This book will be an indispensable source for both students and practitioners of regulation. The Handbook begins by looking at the principles, history and methods of regulation before turning to specialist themes including: pricing and social welfare regulating service quality consumer representation performance benchmarking environmental regulation calculating the cost of capital information revelation and incentives the economics of access charging regulatory governance regulatory policy in developing countries particular issues in the regulation of the telecommunications, energy, transport and water sectors. The International Handbook on Economic Regulation is essential reading for researchers in the economics of regulation and students of regulation on final year undergraduate and postgraduate degree courses. As a major reference work, it is of value and assistance to economists in regulatory offices, regulated companies and government departments.
Optimal Regulation addresses the central issue of regulatory economics - how toregulate firms in a way that induces them to produce and price "optimally." It synthesizes the majorfindings of an extensive theoretical literature on what constitutes optimality in various situationsand which regulatory mechanisms can be used to achieve it. It is the first text to provide aunified, modern, and nontechnical treatment of the field.The book includes models for regulatingoptimal output, tariffs, and surplus subsidy schemes, and presents all of the material graphically,with clear explanations of often highly technical topics.Kenneth E. Train is Associate AdjunctProfessor in the Department of Economics and Graduate School of Public Policy at the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley. He is also Principal of the firm Cambridge Systematics.Topics include: Thecost structure of natural monopoly (economies of scale and scope). Characterization of firstandsecond-best optimality. Surplus subsidy schemes for attaining first-best optimality. Ramsey pricesand the Vogelsang-Finsinger mechanism for attaining them. Time-ofuse (TOU) prices and Riordan'smechanisms for attaining the optimal TOU prices' Multipart and self-selecting tariffs, and Sibley'smethod for using self-selecting tariffs to achieve optimality. The Averch-Johnson model of howrate-of-return regulation induces inefficiencies. Analysis of regulation based on the firm's returnon Output, costs, or sales. Price-cap regulation. Regulatory treatment of uncertainty and its impacton the firm's behavior. Methods of attaining optimality without direct regulation (contestability,auctioning the monopoly franchise.)
The past thirty years have witnessed a transformation of government economic intervention in broad segments of industry throughout the world. Many industries historically subject to economic price and entry controls have been largely deregulated, including natural gas, trucking, airlines, and commercial banking. However, recent concerns about market power in restructured electricity markets, airline industry instability amid chronic financial stress, and the challenges created by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed commercial banks to participate in investment banking, have led to calls for renewed market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a group of distinguished scholars who explore these and other issues surrounding government economic intervention. Determining the consequences of such intervention requires a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of imperfect regulation. Moreover, government interventions may take a variety of forms, from relatively nonintrusive performance-based regulations to more aggressive antitrust and competition policies and barriers to entry. This volume introduces the key issues surrounding economic regulation, provides an assessment of the economic effects of regulatory reforms over the past three decades, and examines how these insights bear on some of today’s most significant concerns in regulatory policy.
Economic regulation affects us all, shaping how we access essential services such as water, energy and transport, as well as how we communicate with one another in the digital world. Modern Economic Regulation describes the core insights of economic theory on which regulatory policies are based and connects this with evidence of how regulation is applied. It focuses on fundamental questions such as: why are certain industries regulated? What principles can inform regulation? How is regulation implemented? Which regulatory policies have been more, or less, effective in practice? All chapters in this second edition are fully updated to reflect the latest research and evidence, while five new chapters cover behavioural economics and the regulation of rail, aviation, payment systems and digital platforms. Each chapter contains discussion questions and topical case studies, and online materials include over 60 applied exercises that explore real-life regulatory problems from around the world.
New technology is revolutionizing broadcasting markets. As the cost of bandwidth processing and delivery fall, information-intensive services that once bore little economic relationship to each other are now increasingly related as substitutes or complements. Television, newspapers, telecoms and the internet compete ever more fiercely for audience attention. At the same time, digital encoding makes it possible to charge prices for content that had previously been broadcast for free. This is creating new markets where none existed before. How should public policy respond? Will competition lead to better services, higher quality and more consumer choice - or to a proliferation of low-quality channels? Will it lead to dominance of the market by a few powerful media conglomerates? Using the insights of modern microeconomics, this book provides a state-of-the-art analysis of these and other issues by investigating the power of regulation to shape and control broadcasting markets.