This paper surveys Ruth Marcus' many contributions to modal logic and its interpretation, starting with her pioneer work on quantified modal logic and ending with the controversies concerning the origin of the idea of rigid reference and other basic ideas in the so-called “New theory of reference.” Her contributions are discussed with close attention to who gave credit to whom.
Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy today, and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop new positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism, and the explantion of actions by beliefs. This state of the art collection honors one of the most rigorous and iconoclastic of philosophical pioneers.
"Ever since the beginnings of philosophical thought in Greek antiquity, philosophers have made use of modalities such as necessity and possibility. In particular, the concepts of necessity and 'what must be' played an important role in Pre-Socratic thought. For example, Anaximander maintained that things perish into that from which they came to be 'in accordance with what must be' (kata to chreôn). Heraclitus held that 'everything comes about in accordance with strife and what must be (kat' erin kai chreôn)'. In his poem, Parmenides asserts that what is (to eon) is entirely still and changeless because 'powerful Necessity (Anagkê) holds it in the bonds of a limit, which encloses it all around'. Among the atomists, Democritus identified necessity with a whirl of atoms, holding that 'everything comes about in accordance with necessity, inasmuch as the whirl - which he calls necessity - is the cause of the coming about of all things'. Finally, Plato in the Timaeus describes the creation of the cosmos as the result of the interplay between divine demiurgic Intelligence and natural Necessity. While necessity figures centrally in the cosmologies presented by Plato and the Pre-Socratics, we do not have any evidence that these thinkers provided an account of the nature of necessity in general. The first philosopher known to have provided such an account is Aristotle. In his logical and metaphysical works, Aristotle develops a systematic theory of necessity and related modalities such as possibility and impossibility"--
These papers cover important themes such as extensionality, the necessity of identity, the conception of proper names as 'tags', essentialism, substitutional quantification, and possibilia and possible worlds. What emerges from them is a robust defence of quantified modal logic in the light of a host of objections, particularly from Quine.
In one new and sixteen previously published essays, William E. Mann presents a modern interpretation of a traditional theory in philosophical theology, according to which God is a metaphysically simple, necessarily existing, personal being. Mann addresses such issues as God's independence and sovereignty, God's relationship to creation, and humans' relationship to God.
The place of religion in society has changed profoundly in the last few centuries, particularly in the West. In what will be a defining book for our time, Taylor takes up the question of what these changes mean, and what, precisely, happens when a society becomes one in which faith is only one human possibility among others.
This book aims to redress the balance in the field of Contemporary Philosophy, considered predominantly male, by highlighting the philosophical achievements of various female figures during the period 1870-1970. Contemporary Philosophy is generally presented by its historians as a field founded entirely by men, with no prominent female contributors. Historical investigation of the development of contemporary analytic philosophy, for example, usually centres around Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, with occasional ventures into Moore or the Vienna Circle. Such accounts leave out vast swathes of the historical record (from early 19th century to 20th century), in particular the women, including Christine Ladd-Franklin, Sophie Bryant, E.E.C. Jones, Susan Stebbing, Dorothy Wrinch, Alice Ambrose, Margaret MacDonald, Martha Kneale, Ruth Barcan Marcus and Ayda Ignez Arruda publishing on themes central to analytic philosophy– logic, language, realism, and relations. It is noteworthy that this pattern in historiography is not unique to one strand of philosophy or one part of the world but re-appears again and again. In the continental tradition, the development of Schopenhauer's philosophy leaves out significant contributions of women such as Olga Plümacher. The chapters in this book examine central themes from the perspective of female philosophers to provide a fuller picture of Philosophy of this period. This volume will be a great resource for academics, researchers, and advanced students of Philosophy and Women’s Studies and for everyone interested in the contribution of women philosophers. It was originally published in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
Do moral dilemmas truly exist? What counts as a moral dilemma? Can an adequate moral theory admit the possibility of genuine conflicts of moral obligations? In this book, twelve prominent moral theorists examine these and other questions from a wide variety of philosophical perspectives. Concerned throughout with the implications of moral dilemmas for moral theory, this collection of essays captures in striking fashion the full scope and vitality of the current moral dilemmas debate. Including both realist and anti-realist meta-ethical positions, and Kantian and consequentialist normative views, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory sheds new light on several standing controversies in moral philosophy while raising a fresh set of challenging issues. Contributors include Simon Blackburn, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Alan Donagan, Terrance McConnell, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Mary Mothersill, Norman Dahl, David Brink, Peter Railton, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Christopher Gowans, and H.E. Mason.
Suppose that God exists: what difference would that make to the world? The answer depends on the nature of God and the nature of the world. In this book, William E. Mann argues in one new and sixteen previously published essays for a modern interpretation of a traditional conception of God as a simple, necessarily existing, personal being. Divine simplicity entails that God has no physical composition or temporal stages; that there is in God no distinction between essence and existence; that there is no partitioning of God's mental life into beliefs, desires, and intentions. God is thus a spiritual, eternal being, dependent on nothing else, whose essence is to exist and whose mode of existence is identical with omniscience, omnipotence, and perfectly goodness. In metaphysical contrast, the world is a spatial matrix populated most conspicuously by finite physical objects whose careers proceed sequentially from past to present to future. Mann defends a view according to which the world was created out of nothing and is sustained in existence from moment to moment by God. The differences in metaphysical status between creator and creatures raise questions for which Mann suggests answers. How can God know contingent facts and necessary truths without depending on them? Why is it so easy to overlook God's presence? Why would self-sufficient God create anything? Wouldn't a perfect God create the best world possible? Can God be free? Can we be free if God's power is continuously necessary to sustain us in existence? If God does sustain us, is God an accomplice whenever we sin? Mann responds to the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing for a kind of divine command metaethical theory, whose normative content lays emphasis on love. Given the metaphysical differences between us, how can there be loving relationships between God and creatures? Mann responds by examining the notions of piety and hope.
