Trillions for Military Technology explains why the weapons purchased by the U.S. Department of Defense cost so much, why it takes decades to get them into production even as innovation in the civilian economy becomes ever more frenetic, and why some of those weapons don't work very well despite expenditures of many billions of dollars. It also explains what do about these problems. The author argues that the internal politics of the armed services make weapons acquisition almost unmanageable. Solutions require empowering civilian officials and reforms that will bring choice of weapons "into the sunshine" of public debate.
The growth of American engineering and science has affected military technology, organization, and practice from the colonial era to the present day—even as military concerns have influenced, and often funded, domestic engineering programs and scientific development. American Military Technology traces the interplay of technology and science with the armed forces of the United States in terms of what Hacker and Vining view as epochs: 1840–1865, the introduction of modern small arms, steam power, and technology, science, and medicine; 1900–1914, the naval arms race, torpedoes and submarines, and the signal corps and the airplane; and 1965–1971, McNamara's Pentagon, technology in Vietnam, guided missiles, and smart bombs. The book is an excellent springboard for understanding the complex relationship of science, technology, and war in American history.
War has at some point touched every nation. Beginning with ancient history and following through to the present, this book addresses the question of why war exists, and explains the shapes in which it occurs. It will lead young readers on a journey through time by tracing weapons from the earliest stones and clubs to modern technological military warfare. Along with the evolution of weaponry through the ages, it also goes into the development of protective gear, transportation, communication, and military strategies.
Antologi. Sikkerhedspolitiske forskere giver deres vurdering af følgerne af informationsalderens opgør med hidtidig kendt våbenteknologi og doktriner i forbindelse med den globale spredning af know-how på området.
In this book, historians of technology bring their special expertise to probing the influence of the military on technological development over a broad range of history and in a variety of cases.
Militaries with state-of-the-art information technology sometimes bog down in confusing conflicts. To understand why, it is important to understand the micro-foundations of military power in the information age, and this is exactly what Jon R. Lindsay's Information Technology and Military Power gives us. As Lindsay shows, digital systems now mediate almost every effort to gather, store, display, analyze, and communicate information in military organizations. He highlights how personnel now struggle with their own information systems as much as with the enemy. Throughout this foray into networked technology in military operations, we see how information practice—the ways in which practitioners use technology in actual operations—shapes the effectiveness of military performance. The quality of information practice depends on the interaction between strategic problems and organizational solutions. Information Technology and Military Power explores information practice through a series of detailed historical cases and ethnographic studies of military organizations at war. Lindsay explains why the US military, despite all its technological advantages, has struggled for so long in unconventional conflicts against weaker adversaries. This same perspective suggests that the US retains important advantages against advanced competitors like China that are less prepared to cope with the complexity of information systems in wartime. Lindsay argues convincingly that a better understanding of how personnel actually use technology can inform the design of command and control, improve the net assessment of military power, and promote reforms to improve military performance. Warfighting problems and technical solutions keep on changing, but information practice is always stuck in between.
Like any war before or since, the First World War formed the catalyst for a wealth of technical inventions with only one goal in mind: to inflict as much damage on the opponent as possible. No one would have dreamed that as a result of these new technologies, the death tolls on all sides would be so high, nor would the physical destruction of the opposition have seemed possible. In this new work, Wolfgang Fleischer has meticulously documented all the weaponry was used by the Central Powers and their opponents, including machine guns, artillery guns, gas, the first armored combat vehicles, aircraft and submarines.
In Buying Military Transformation, Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz analyze the United States military's ongoing effort to capitalize on information technology. New ideas about military doctrine derived from comparisons to Internet Age business practices can be implemented only if the military buys technologically innovative weapons systems. Buying Military Transformation examines how political and military leaders work with the defense industry to develop the small ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, advanced communications equipment, and systems-of-systems integration that will enable the new military format. Dombrowski and Gholz's analysis integrates the political relationship between the defense industry and Congress, the bureaucratic relationship between the firms and the military services, and the technical capabilities of different types of businesses. Many government officials and analysts believe that only entrepreneurial start-up firms or leaders in commercial information technology markets can produce the new, network-oriented military equipment. But Dombrowski and Gholz find that the existing defense industry will be best able to lead military-technology development, even for equipment modeled on the civilian Internet. The U.S. government is already spending billions of dollars each year on its "military transformation" program-money that could be easily misdirected and wasted if policymakers spend it on the wrong projects or work with the wrong firms. In addition to this practical implication, Buying Military Transformation offers key lessons for the theory of "Revolutions in Military Affairs." A series of military analysts have argued that major social and economic changes, like the shift from the Agricultural Age to the Industrial Age, inherently force related changes in the military. Buying Military Transformation undermines this technologically determinist claim: commercial innovation does not directly determine military innovation; instead, political leadership and military organizations choose the trajectory of defense investment. Militaries should invest in new technology in response to strategic threats and military leaders' professional judgments about the equipment needed to improve military effectiveness. Commercial technological progress by itself does not generate an imperative for military transformation. Clear, cogent, and engaging, Buying Military Transformation is essential reading for journalists, legislators, policymakers, and scholars.
This thorough update of a classic book includes fully revised content, new sections on the use of horses, handguns, incendiary weapons, and siege engines, and new illustrations.