Berenika Drazewska’s book offers a comprehensive scholarly analysis of the current meaning of military necessity in the international legal framework for the protection of cultural heritage during armed conflicts.
There has been considerable debate in the international community as to the legality of the forceful actions in Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003 under the United Nations Charter. There has been consensus, however, that the use of force in all these situations had to be both proportional and necessary. Against the background of these recent armed conflicts, this 2004 book offers the first comprehensive assessment of the twin requirements of proportionality and necessity as legal restraints on the forceful actions of States. It also provides a much-needed examination of the relationship between proportionality in the law on the use of force and international humanitarian law.
In A Scrap of Paper, Isabel V. Hull compares wartime decision making in Germany, Great Britain, and France, weighing the impact of legal considerations in each. She demonstrates how differences in state structures and legal traditions shaped the way the three belligerents fought the war. Hull focuses on seven cases: Belgian neutrality, the land war in the west, the occupation of enemy territory, the blockade, unrestricted submarine warfare, the introduction of new weaponry, and reprisals. A Scrap of Paper reconstructs the debates over military decision-making and clarifies the role law played—where it constrained action, where it was manipulated, where it was ignored, and how it developed in combat—in each case. A Scrap of Paper is a passionate defense of the role that the law must play to govern interstate relations in both peace and war.
What does it mean to say that international humanitarian law (IHL) strikes a realistic and meaningful balance between military necessity and humanity, and that the law therefore 'accounts for' military necessity? To what consequences does the law 'accounting for' military necessity give rise? Through real-life examples and careful analysis, this book challenges received wisdom on the subject by devising a new theory that not only reaffirms Kriegsräson's fallacy but also explains why IHL has no reason to restrict or prohibit militarily unnecessary conduct on that ground alone. Additionally, the theory hypothesises greater normative significance for humanitarian and chivalrous imperatives when they conflict with IHL rules. By combining international law, jurisprudence, military history, strategic studies, and moral philosophy, this book reveals how rational fighting relates to ethical fighting, how IHL incorporates contrasting values that shape its rules, and how law and theory adapt themselves to war's evolutions.
Revitalizing the concept of military necessity -- Lawful war of self-defense : when not to be a sitting duck -- Military strategy : the blind spot of international humanitarian law -- Defensive deterrence : legalizing the stepchild of international law.
"Necessity and proportionality occupy a firm place in the international law governing the use of force by states. Perhaps most importantly for practical purposes, the exercise of the right of self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, is subject to the requirements of necessity and proportionality, as the International Court of Justice determined in the Nicaragua case. Necessity and proportionality are also firmly anchored in the international law governing armed conflicts. In its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice even referred to one articulation of the idea of necessity, that directed against the causing of unnecessary suffering, as one of two "cardinal principles" of this body of law. However, beyond statement in such general terms, the realms of uncertainty and controversy soon begin. It is far from clear, for example, how to distinguish with precision between necessity and proportionality in the international law on self-defense and, in immediate connection herewith, what it means precisely to say that forcible action taken in the exercise of self-defense must be proportionate. It is all the less clear what legal significance, if any, necessity and proportionality possess in other contexts of the international law governing the use of force"--