The question of market definition for monopolization cases - and thus the issue of the possession of market power by the defendant - is crucial for the outcome of these cases. However, unlike antitrust merger analysis, where the DOJ-FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines has provided a successful paradigm for market definition, monopolization cases lack a guiding market definition paradigm. This chapter addresses this issue, shows the problems that arise when a market definition paradigm is absent, and offers some partial remedies. The best remedy, though, would be the development of a suitable market definition paradigm for these cases.
In Defense of Monopoly offers an unconventional but empirically grounded argument in favor of market monopolies. Authors McKenzie and Lee claim that conventional, static models exaggerate the harm done by real-world monopolies, and they show why some degree of monopoly presence is necessary to maximize the improvement of human welfare over time. Inspired by Joseph Schumpeter's suggestion that market imperfections can drive an economy's long-term progress, In Defense of Monopoly defies conventional assumptions to show readers why an economic system's failure to efficiently allocate its resources is actually a necessary precondition for maximizing the system's long-term performance: the perfectly fluid, competitive economy idealized by most economists is decidedly inferior to one characterized by market entry and exit restrictions or costs. An economy is not a board game in which players compete for a limited number of properties, nor is it much like the kind of blackboard games that economists use to develop their monopoly models. As McKenzie and Lee demonstrate, the creation of goods and services in the real world requires not only competition but the prospect of gains beyond a normal competitive rate of return.
In this witty and modest intellectual autobiography, George J. Stigler gives us a fascinating glimpse into the little-known world of economics and the people who study it. One of the most distinguished economists of the twentieth century, Stigler was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1982 for his work on public regulation. He also helped found the Chicago School of economics, and many of his fellow Chicago luminaries appear in these pages, including Fredrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Ronald Coase, and Gary Becker. Stigler's appreciation for such colleagues and his sense of excitement about economic ideas past and present make his Memoirs both highly entertaining and highly educational.
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
The discussion in this thesis describes the challenges of delineating markets and how American judges have dealt with market definition in their courts. Reading this thesis, it should become clear that given market definition's arbitrary nature, courts have still managed to approach the subject from a dynamic perspective. This thesis also discusses the development of alternative less formalistic approaches to the assessment of horizontal mergers and today's issue of market definition in monopolization cases. This thesis offers some suggestions in response to the so-called fact based economical approach development in market delineation. It describes market definition as a complicated process, especially in light of single firm conduct. The thesis will highlight that much about the role of econometric data and how to interpret any inferences, is unclear but that it is another useful tool to try and reach satisfactory results in the assessment of antitrust cases.
