"A detailed account of how the US Navy modernized itself between the War of 1812 and the Civil War, through strategic approaches to its personnel, operations, technologies, and policies, among them an emerging officer corps, which sought to professionalize its own ranks, modernize the platforms on which it sailed, and define its own role within national affairs and in the broader global maritime commons"--
This major revision updates Wayne Hughes's 1986 landmark study that is credited with providing decision makers a sound foundation for battle planning and tactical thinking. The book integrates the historical evolution of tactics, analysis, and fleet operations, and today it can serve as a primer for anyone who wants to learn how navies fight and win. This second edition includes much new material on combat in the missile age and reflects the reconfiguration of many tactics for littoral operations after the fall of the Soviet Union. Hughes recreates famous battles to show how tactics have changed through the ages and the ways in which they have remained unchanged. He covers tactical interaction between land and sea, the sensory revolution of WWII, secret weapons and maritime surprise, the role in battle of leadership and morale, and the importance of surface warships in today's U.S. fleet. He suggests that naval tactics, unlike ground combat, are dominated by the offense and concludes that the great tactical maxim must be attack effectively first. A new chapter traces the evolution of missile tactics at sea and includes details of attacks on ships. Many changes emphasize joint operations and coastal combat. The already extensive appraisal of command and control and information warfare is further expanded to cover modern naval operations and the character of modern salvo warfare. In the tradition of Mahan and Clauswitz, this classic text incorporates literature, politics, and a knowledge of human nature. Indispensable reading for all those interested in naval tactics, it is also a valuable reference for wargamers
The LCS is a relatively inexpensive Navy surface combatant equipped with modular ¿plug-and-fight¿ mission packages. The basic version of the LCS, without any mission packages, is referred to as the LCS sea frame. The Navy wants to field a force of 55 LCSs. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: The LCS in General; Two Industry Teams, Each with Its Own Design; Planned Procurement Quantities; (3) Issues for Congress: New Acquisition Strategy Announced in 9/09; Unit Procurement Cost Cap; Total Program Acquisition Cost; (4) Legislative Activity for FY 2011. Appendices: Cost Growth on LCS Sea Frames; LCS Acquisition Strategy Announced in 9/09. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand publication.
A total of 20 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) have been funded through FY2014. The Navy had been planning to procure an eventual total of 52 LCSs, but on February 24, 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that "no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward" and that the Navy is to submit "alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate. I've directed the Navy to consider a completely new design, existing ship designs, and a modified LCS."
Alkire et al. provide a clear understanding of the operational, logistics, and cost trade-offs between three interdependent elements of the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program: the number of LCSs in the fleet, the number of mission packages that those LCSs would require in order to perform a range of missions, and the number and locations of LCS homeports and mission package installation sites.
China’s shipbuilding industry has grown more rapidly than any other in modern history. Commercial shipbuilding output jumped thirteen-fold from 2002–12, ensuring that Beijing has largely reached its goal of becoming the world’s leading shipbuilder. Yet progress is uneven, with military shipbuilding leading overall but with significant weakness in propulsion and electronics for military and civilian applications. It has never been more important to assess what ships China can supply its navy and other maritime forces with, today and in the future. Chinese Naval Shipbuilding answers three pressing questions: What are China’s prospects for success in key areas of naval shipbuilding? What are the likely results for China’s navy? What are the implications for the U.S. Navy? To address these critical issues, this volume assembles some of the world’s leading experts and linguistic analysts, often pairing them in research teams. These sailors, scholars, industry professionals, and government specialists have commanded ships at sea, led shipbuilding programs ashore, toured Chinese vessels and production facilities, invested in Chinese shipyards, and analyzed and presented important data to top-level decision-makers in times of crisis. In synthesizing their collective insights, this book fills a key gap in our understanding of China, its shipbuilding industry, its navy, and what it all means.
The Navy plans to spend about $28 billion to buy 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and at least 64 interchangeable mission packages to perform one of three missions ¿ mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare ¿ in waters close to shore. The Navy has been developing two different LCS seaframes and plans to select one for production in 2010. Due to the small 78-person crew size ¿ 40 core crew, 23 for aviation detachment, and typically 15 for mission packages ¿ the Navy is developing new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance. This report assessed the extent to which DoD has: (1) estimated LCS long-term operating and support costs; and (2) developed plans to operate and support LCS. Illustrations.
The Navy wants to develop and procure three new types of unmanned vehicles (UVs) in FY2020 and beyond-Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs), Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs), and Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs). The Navy is requesting $628.8 million in FY2020 research and development funding for these three UV programs and their enabling technologies. The Navy wants to acquire these three types of UVs (which this report refers to collectively as large UVs) as part of an effort to shift the Navy to a new fleet architecture (i.e., a new combination of ships and other platforms) that is more widely distributed than the Navy's current architecture. Compared to the current fleet architecture, this more-distributed architecture is to include proportionately fewer large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers), proportionately more small surface combatants (i.e., frigates and Littoral Combat Ships), and the addition of significant numbers of large UVs. The Navy wants to employ accelerated acquisition strategies for procuring these large UVs, so as to get them into service more quickly. The emphasis that the Navy placed on UV programs in its FY2020 budget submission and the Navy's desire to employ accelerated acquisition strategies in acquiring these large UVs together can be viewed as an expression of the urgency that the Navy attaches to fielding large UVs for meeting future military challenges from countries such as China. The LUSV program is a proposed new start project for FY2020. The Navy wants to procure two LUSVs per year in FY2020FY2024. The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships based on commercial ship designs, with ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads-particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, meaning principally anti-ship and land-attack missiles. The Navy reportedly envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having a full load displacement of about 2,000 tons. The MUSV program began in FY2019. The Navy plans to award a contract for the first MUSV in FY2019 and wants to award a contract for the second MUSV in FY2023. The Navy wants MUSVs, like LUSVs, to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships that can accommodate various payloads. Initial payloads for MUSVs are to be intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Navy defines MUSVs as having a length of between 12 meters (about 39 feet) and 50 meters (about 164 feet). The Navy wants to pursue the MUSV program as a rapid prototyping effort under what is known as Section 804 acquisition authority. The XLUUV program, also known as Orca, was established to address a Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON). The Navy wants to procure nine XLUUVs in FY2020-FY2024. The Navy announced on February 13, 2019, that it had selected Boeing to fabricate, test, and deliver the first four Orca XLUUVs and associated support elements. On March 27, 2019, the Navy announced that the award to Boeing had been expanded to include the fifth Orca. The Navy's large UV programs pose a number of oversight issues for Congress, including issues relating to the analytical basis for the more-distributed fleet architecture; the Navy's accelerated acquisition strategies and funding method for these programs; technical, schedule, and cost risk in the programs; the proposed annual procurement rates for the programs; the industrial base implications of the programs; the personnel implications of the programs; and whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do in FY2020 on the programs.
The legendary New York Times bestselling tale of top-down change for anyone trying to navigate today's uncertain business seas. When Captain Abrashoff took over as commander of USS Benfold, it was like a business that had all the latest technology but only some of the productivity. Knowing that responsibility for improving performance rested with him, he realized he had to improve his own leadership skills before he could improve his ship. Within months, he created a crew of confident and inspired problem-solvers eager to take the initiative and responsibility for their actions. The slogan on board became "It's your ship," and Benfold was soon recognized far and wide as a model of naval efficiency. How did Abrashoff do it? Against the backdrop of today's United States Navy, Abrashoff shares his secrets of successful management including: See the ship through the eyes of the crew: By soliciting a sailor's suggestions, Abrashoff drastically reduced tedious chores that provided little additional value. Communicate, communicate, communicate: The more Abrashoff communicated the plan, the better the crew's performance. His crew eventually started calling him "Megaphone Mike," since they heard from him so often. Create discipline by focusing on purpose: Discipline skyrocketed when Abrashoff's crew believed that what they were doing was important. Listen aggressively: After learning that many sailors wanted to use the GI Bill, Abrashoff brought a test official aboard the ship-and held the SATs forty miles off the Iraqi coast. From achieving amazing cost savings to winning the highest gunnery score in the Pacific Fleet, Captain Abrashoff's extraordinary campaign sent shock waves through the U.S. Navy. It can help you change the course of your ship, no matter where your business battles are fought.
From a brilliant Brookings Institution expert, an “important” (The Wall Street Journal) and “penetrating historical and political study” (Nature) of the critical role that oceans play in the daily struggle for global power, in the bestselling tradition of Robert Kaplan’s The Revenge of Geography. For centuries, oceans were the chessboard on which empires battled for supremacy. But in the nuclear age, air power and missile systems dominated our worries about security, and for the United States, the economy was largely driven by domestic production, with trucking and railways that crisscrossed the continent serving as the primary modes of commercial transit. All that has changed, as nine-tenths of global commerce and the bulk of energy trade is today linked to sea-based flows. A brightly painted forty-foot steel shipping container loaded in Asia with twenty tons of goods may arrive literally anywhere else in the world; how that really happens and who actually profits from it show that the struggle for power on the seas is a critical issue today. Now, in vivid, closely observed prose, Bruce Jones conducts us on a fascinating voyage through the great modern ports and naval bases—from the vast container ports of Hong Kong and Shanghai to the vital naval base of the American Seventh Fleet in Hawaii to the sophisticated security arrangements in the Port of New York. Along the way, the book illustrates how global commerce works, that we are amidst a global naval arms race, and why the oceans are so crucial to America’s standing going forward. As Jones reveals, the three great geopolitical struggles of our time—for military power, for economic dominance, and over our changing climate—are playing out atop, within, and below the world’s oceans. The essential question, he shows, is this: who will rule the waves and set the terms of the world to come?
