This book examines statutes governing actions against the federal government, such as the Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act. The expansion of attorneys' fees recovery against the U.S. made possible by the 1980 Equal Access to Justice Act is treated in detail, as are the changes in contract dispute resolution contained in the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.
This book examines statutes governing actions against the federal government, such as the Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act. The expansion of attorneys' fees recovery against the U.S. made possible by the 1980 Equal Access to Justice Act is treated in detail, as are the changes in contract dispute resolution contained in the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.
"Any lawyer who practices regularly in the federal courts will encounter the federal government as a party and will learn, as the Supreme Court warned many decades ago, that the United States is not "just another private litigant." The federal government is a party, as plaintiff or defendant, to about one-fifth of all civil cases in the federal courts. In civil litigation, the federal government (and its employees) may be protected by sovereign or official immunities, impose specific administrative requirements, assert special defenses, and enjoy certain exceptions from liability. Federal government cases often involve issues central to the lives of many people, such as claims involving personal injury or property damage under the Federal Tort Claims Act; monetary benefits under such statutes as the Social Security Act and the Veteran Benefits Act; civilian and employee military claims under the Civil Service Reform Act and the Tucker Act; governmental expropriation of property under the Tucker Act; and contractual obligations under the Contract Disputes Act; Bivens constitutional claims against federal officers; and claims for attorney's fees under such unique statutes as the Equal Access to Justice Act."--Publisher
Of the 1.65 million lawsuits enforcing federal laws over the past decade, 3 percent were prosecuted by the federal government, while 97 percent were litigated by private parties. When and why did private plaintiff-driven litigation become a dominant model for enforcing federal regulation? The Litigation State shows how government legislation created the nation's reliance upon private litigation, and investigates why Congress would choose to mobilize, through statutory design, private lawsuits to implement federal statutes. Sean Farhang argues that Congress deliberately cultivates such private lawsuits partly as a means of enforcing its will over the resistance of opposing presidents. Farhang reveals that private lawsuits, functioning as an enforcement resource, are a profoundly important component of American state capacity. He demonstrates how the distinctive institutional structure of the American state--particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy--encourages Congress to incentivize private lawsuits. Congress thereby achieves regulatory aims through a decentralized army of private lawyers, rather than by well-staffed bureaucracies under the president's influence. The historical development of ideological polarization between Congress and the president since the late 1960s has been a powerful cause of the explosion of private lawsuits enforcing federal law over the same period. Using data from many policy areas spanning the twentieth century, and historical analysis focused on civil rights, The Litigation State investigates how American political institutions shape the strategic design of legislation to mobilize private lawsuits for policy implementation.