Oligopoly Limit-Pricing in the Lab
Oligopoly Limit-Pricing in the Lab

Author: Wieland Müller

Publisher:

Published: 2006

Total Pages: 41

ISBN-13:

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We examine the behavior of senders and receivers in the context of oligopoly limit pricing experiments in which high prices chosen by two privately informed incumbents may signal to a potential entrant that the industry-wide costs are high and that entry is unprofitable. The results provide strong support for the theoretical prediction that the incumbents can credibly deter unprofitable entry without having to distort their prices away from their full information levels. Yet, in a large number of cases, asymmetric information induces incumbents to raise prices when costs are low. The results also show that the entrants' behavior is by and large bi-polar: entrants tend to enter when the incumbents' prices are low but tend to stay out when the incumbents' prices are high.

Industrial Pricing
Industrial Pricing

Author: Frederic M. Scherer

Publisher: Chicago : Rand McNally College Publishing Company

Published: 1970

Total Pages: 186

ISBN-13:

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Oligopoly Theory
Oligopoly Theory

Author: James Friedman

Publisher: CUP Archive

Published: 1983-09-30

Total Pages: 262

ISBN-13: 9780521282444

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James Friedman provides a thorough survey of oligopoly theory using numerical examples and careful verbal explanations to make the ideas clear and accessible. While the earlier ideas of Cournot, Hotelling, and Chamberlin are presented, the larger part of the book is devoted to the modern work on oligopoly that has resulted from the application of dynamic techniques and game theory to this area of economics. The book begins with static oligopoly theory. Cournot's model and its more recent elaborations are covered in the first substantive chapter. Then the Chamberlinian analysis of product differentiation, spatial competition, and characteristics space is set out. The subsequent chapters on modern work deal with reaction functions, advertising, oligopoly with capital, entry, and oligopoly using noncooperative game theory. A large bibliography is provided.