Chasing Ghosts

Chasing Ghosts

Author: John J. Tierney

Publisher: Potomac Books, Inc.

Published: 2006-10

Total Pages: 309

ISBN-13: 1597970158

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Important military lessons for fighting today's insurgency in Iraq


Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Author: John Nagl

Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA

Published: 2002-10-30

Total Pages: 273

ISBN-13: 0313077037

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Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.


Lost Unconventional Warfare Lessons from the Yugoslav Front

Lost Unconventional Warfare Lessons from the Yugoslav Front

Author: U.s. Army Command and General Staff College

Publisher: CreateSpace

Published: 2014-07-18

Total Pages: 52

ISBN-13: 9781500568320

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During the early years of the Cold War, the United States Army developed the new doctrine of Unconventional Warfare. This work focused on U.S. soldiers working through and with indigenous guerrilla units to achieve tactical successes in support of the larger theater campaign. The early doctrine writers failed to incorporate three key lessons from the guerrilla war fought in Yugoslavia (1941-1945). The lessons were the selection and employment of the right people as advisors, the effective employment of guerrillas (who have a different agenda) and setting the conditions for effective demobilization of the guerrilla force. These overlooked lessons offered a more comprehensive approach in terms of advising, employing and then demobilizing the guerrilla units in support of U.S. military objectives. The lost lessons provided valuable planning considerations for future advisory units. Through these lessons, U.S. advisors can prepare to work with robust guerrilla organizations that are not solely dependent on U.S. logistical, moral or political support.


Chasing Ghosts

Chasing Ghosts

Author: John J. Tierney

Publisher: Potomac Books, Inc.

Published: 2011

Total Pages: 458

ISBN-13: 159797398X

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Important military lessons for fighting today's insurgency in Iraq.


Special Forces Berlin

Special Forces Berlin

Author: James Stejskal

Publisher: Casemate Publishers

Published: 2017-02-15

Total Pages: 383

ISBN-13: 1612004458

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The previously untold story of a Cold War spy unit, “one of the best examples of applied unconventional warfare in special operations history” (Small Wars Journal). It is a little-known fact that during the Cold War, two US Army Special Forces detachments were stationed far behind the Iron Curtain in West Berlin. The existence and missions of the two detachments were highly classified secrets. The massive armies of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies posed a huge threat to the nations of Western Europe. US military planners decided they needed a plan to slow the expected juggernaut, if and when a war began. This plan was Special Forces Berlin. Their mission—should hostilities commence—was to wreak havoc behind enemy lines and buy time for vastly outnumbered NATO forces to conduct a breakout from the city. In reality, it was an ambitious and extremely dangerous mission, even suicidal. Highly trained and fluent in German, each of these one hundred soldiers and their successors was allocated a specific area. They were skilled in clandestine operations, sabotage, and intelligence tradecraft, and were able to act, if necessary, as independent operators, blending into the local population and working unseen in a city awash with spies looking for information on their every move. Special Forces Berlin left a legacy of a new type of soldier, expert in unconventional warfare, that was sought after for other deployments, including the attempted rescue of American hostages from Tehran in 1979. With the US government officially acknowledging their existence in 2014, their incredible story can now be told—by one of their own.


Lost Unconventional Warfare Lessons from the Yugoslav Front - World War II, Cetniks, Guerrilla Warfare, German Anti-Guerrilla Tactics and Doctrine, OSS Involvement, Plans for Demobilization

Lost Unconventional Warfare Lessons from the Yugoslav Front - World War II, Cetniks, Guerrilla Warfare, German Anti-Guerrilla Tactics and Doctrine, OSS Involvement, Plans for Demobilization

Author: U. S. Military

Publisher:

Published: 2017-05-08

Total Pages: 113

ISBN-13: 9781521246900

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During the early years of the Cold War, the United States Army developed the new doctrine of Unconventional Warfare. This doctrine focused on U.S. soldiers working through and with indigenous guerrilla units to achieve tactical successes in support of the larger theater campaign. The early doctrine writers failed to incorporate three key lessons from the guerrilla war fought in Yugoslavia (1941-1945). The lessons were the selection and employment of the right people as advisors, the effective employment of guerrillas (who have a different agenda) and setting the conditions for effective demobilization of the guerrilla force. These overlooked lessons offered a more comprehensive approach in terms of advising, employing and then demobilizing the guerrilla units in support of U.S. military objectives. The lost lessons provided valuable planning considerations for future advisory units. Through these lessons, U.S. advisors can prepare to work with robust guerrilla organizations that are not solely dependent on U.S. logistical, moral or political support.


Unrestricted Warfare

Unrestricted Warfare

Author: Liang Qiao

Publisher: NewsMax Media, Inc.

Published: 2002

Total Pages: 228

ISBN-13: 9780971680722

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Three years before the September 11 bombing of the World Trade Center-a Chinese military manual called Unrestricted Warfare touted such an attack-suggesting it would be difficult for the U.S. military to cope with. The events of September ll were not a random act perpetrated by independent agents. The doctrine of total war outlined in Unrestricted Warfare clearly demonstrates that the People's Republic of China is preparing to confront the United States and our allies by conducting "asymmetrical" or multidimensional attack on almost every aspect of our social, economic and political life.