Politics and Judgment in Federal District Courts

Politics and Judgment in Federal District Courts

Author: C. K. Rowland

Publisher:

Published: 1996

Total Pages: 234

ISBN-13:

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"A major empirical and theoretical work that has the potential for becoming a classic in the field". -- Sheldon Goldman, author of The Federal Courts as a Political System. "This provocative theoretical approach should be of great interest to scholars and students of the federal bench". -- Elliott E. Slotnick, editor of Judicial Politics.


The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior

The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior

Author: Lee Epstein

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2017-06-08

Total Pages: 671

ISBN-13: 0191505358

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The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior offers readers a comprehensive introduction and analysis of research regarding decision making by judges serving on federal and state courts in the U.S. Featuring contributions from leading scholars in the field, the Handbook describes and explains how the courts' political and social context, formal institutional structures, and informal norms affect judicial decision making. The Handbook also explores the impact of judges' personal attributes and preferences, as well as prevailing legal doctrine, influence, and shape case outcomes in state and federal courts. The volume also proposes avenues for future research in the various topics addressed throughout the book. Consultant Editor for The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics: George C. Edwards III.


Building the Judiciary

Building the Judiciary

Author: Justin Crowe

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2012-03-25

Total Pages: 313

ISBN-13: 1400842573

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How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? Building the Judiciary uncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution-building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, Justin Crowe moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution-building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, Crowe develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. He both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, Crowe presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution-building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what--in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy--it achieved.