The book provides a critical and historical inquiry into Kant's schematism chapter. It focuses on the meanings of the notion of schema before Kant, the precritical meaning of this notion, an analysis of the schematism chapter and its criticisms, and an overview of the legacy of Kant's schematism in philosophy and psychology.
La presente tesis doctoral,titulada Kant's notion of a transcendental schema: the constitution of objective knowledge between epistemology and psychology, pretende entender y evaluar histórica y críticamente la función del capítulo de Kant sobre el esquematismo transcendental. He decidido dedicar mi trabajo a la noción del esquema por varias razones. En primer lugar, aunque varios críticos niegan su importancia y sugieren que el esquematismo es un capítulo redundante e innecesario en la Crítica de la Razón Pura, yo creo que lo más conveniente estratarde descubrir si Kant atribuyeuna función a este capítulo. En segundo lugar, el problema del esquematismo, o sea la aparente imposibilidad de la aplicación de conceptos puros a las intuiciones, necesita ser clarificado. Si la filosofía de Kant, en sentido crítico, debe aclarar los problemas, el esquematismo es su parte fundamental, puesse ocupa exactamente de la cuestión de como mediar la distinción entre los aspectos intelectual y sensible en la cognición. En tercer lugar, creo que es importante examinar la historia de los términos filosóficos: a menudo los filósofos usantérminos que provienen de diferentes campos de la práctica o del saber humano y atribuyen a estos términos nuevos significadosacorde a las cuestiones que pretenden resolver, creando, así, un lenguaje técnico. Kant atribuye a 'esquema' (término usadocon anterioridadsobretodo en la retórica, la lógica y la psicología) un significado determinado,y usa esa noción para indicar (que se trata de) un método parecido a la construcción en matemática. Finalmente, si la filosofía se considera desde un punto de vista crítico, como una meta-investigación sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de las varias disciplinas, entonces el caso del esquematismo es un ejemplo interesante de las dificultades e importancia de discriminar entre los varios ámbitos del conocimiento: unas interpretaciones (interpretan/tratan) el esquematismo como un tema propio de la psicología más que de la filosofía, y Kant mismo (usa con soltura, se desenvuelve en el uso de) una terminología psicológica en el capítulo. Si es así, cual es la relación entre filosofía y psicología? El presente trabajo consta de dos partes principales. En la primera, el primer capítulo se focaliza en los significados de 'esquema' (según) los filósofos antecedentes a Kant,y el segundo, en las óperas precríticas. El tercero introduce el lector a los capítulos que preceden el esquematismo en la Crítica de la Razón Pura,o sea la "Analítica Transcendental" y la "Deducción Transcendental"; el cuarto capítulo analiza el contenido del capítulo de Kant sobre el esquematismo, mientras que el quinto considera unas de las mayores criticas dirigidas a la doctrina de Kant con el fin de determinar la función de estecapítulo tan controvertido. En la segunda parte, el primer capítulo presenta una panorámica general de la herencia filosófica del esquematismo de Kant, teniendo en particular cuenta las (percepciones/interpretaciones/obras/ideas?) de los idealistas, los post Kantianos y los mayores filósofos del tardío siglo XIX e inicios del siglo XX, como Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger y Horkheimer. El segundo capítulo se centra en la distinción de Kant entre filosofía (en la que el esquema asume un valor sistemático de gran importancia) y psicología, y además considera la interpretación de Kitcher de la doctrina de Kant como psicología transcendental. El tercero y último capítulo considera la herencia psicológica delesquematismo de Kant, presentando las teorías delesquema en Piaget, Bartlett y Barsalou.
Kant claims to have established his table of categories or "pure concepts of the understanding" according to the "guiding thread" provided by logical forms of judgment. By drawing extensively on Kant's logical writings, Béatrice Longuenesse analyzes this controversial claim, and then follows the thread through its continuation in the transcendental deduction of the categories, the transcendental schemata, and the principles of pure understanding. The result is a systematic, persuasive new interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason. Longuenesse shows that although Kant adopts his inventory of the forms of judgment from logic textbooks of his time, he is nevertheless original in selecting just those forms he holds to be indispensable to our ability to relate representations to objects. Kant gives formal representation to this relation between conceptual thought and its objects by introducing the term "x" into his analysis of logical forms to stand for the object that is "thought under" the concepts that are combined in judgment. This "x" plays no role in Kant's forms of logical inference, but instead plays a role in clarifying the relation between logical forms (forms of concept subordination) and combinations ("syntheses") of perceptual data, necessary for empirical cognition. Considering Kant's logical forms of judgment thus helps illuminate crucial aspects of the Transcendental Analytic as a whole, while revealing the systematic unity between Kant's theory of judgment in the first Critique and his analysis of "merely reflective" (aesthetic and teleological) judgments in the third Critique.
This landmark book is now reissued in a rewritten & updated edition that takes account of recent Kantian literature. It includes a new discussion of the 'Third Analogy', an expanded discussion of Kant's 'Paralogisms' & new chapters on Kant's theory of reason, theology & the 'Appendix to the Dialectic'.
For a long time, commentators viewed Sartre as one of Kant's significant twentieth-century critics. Recent research of their philosophies has discovered that Sartre's relation to Kant's work manifests an 'anxiety of influence', which masks more profound similarities. This volume of newly written comparative essays is the first edited collection on the philosophies of Kant and Sartre. The volume focuses on issues in metaphysics, metaethics and metaphilosophy, and explores the similarities and differences between the two authors, as well as the complementarity of some of their views, particularly on autonomy, happiness, self-consciousness, evil, temporality, imagination and the nature of philosophy.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously criticizes traditional metaphysics and its proofs of immortality, free will and God's existence. What is often overlooked is that Kant also explains why rational beings must ask metaphysical questions about 'unconditioned' objects such as souls, uncaused causes or God, and why answers to these questions will appear rationally compelling to them. In this book, Marcus Willaschek reconstructs and defends Kant's account of the rational sources of metaphysics. After carefully explaining Kant's conceptions of reason and metaphysics, he offers detailed interpretations of the relevant passages from the Critique of Pure Reason (in particular, the 'Transcendental Dialectic') in which Kant explains why reason seeks 'the unconditioned'. Willaschek offers a novel interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic, pointing up its 'positive' side, while at the same time it uncovers a highly original account of metaphysical thinking that will be relevant to contemporary philosophical debates.
Phenomenology, together with Marxism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy, dominated philosophy in the twentieth century—and Edmund Husserl is usually thought to have been the first to develop the concept. His views influenced a variety of important later thinkers, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who eventually turned phenomenology away from questions of knowledge. But here Tom Rockmore argues for a return to phenomenology’s origins in epistemology, and he does so by locating its roots in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant and Phenomenology traces the formulation of Kant’s phenomenological approach back to the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In response to various criticisms of the first edition, Kant more forcefully put forth a constructivist theory of knowledge. This shift in Kant’s thinking challenged the representational approach to epistemology, and it is this turn, Rockmore contends, that makes Kant the first great phenomenologist. He then follows this phenomenological line through the work of Kant’s idealist successors, Fichte and Hegel. Steeped in the sources and literature it examines, Kant and Phenomenology persuasively reshapes our conception of both of its main subjects.
