"An important contribution to contemporary jurisprudential debate and to legal thought more generally, Just Interpretations is far ahead of currently available work."--Peter Goodrich, author of Oedipus Lex "I was struck repeatedly by the clarity of expression throughout the book. Rosenfeld's description and criticism of the recent work of leading thinkers distinguishes his work within the legal theory genre. Furthermore, his own theory is quite original and provocative."--Aviam Soifer, author of Law and the Company We Keep
With today's world torn by violence and conflict, Richard B. Miller's study of the ethics of war could not be more timely. Miller brings together the opposed traditions of pacifism and just-war theory and puts them into a much-needed dialogue on the ethics of war. Beginning with the duty of nonviolence as a point of convergence between the two rival traditions, Miller provides an opportunity for pacifists and just-war theorists to refine their views in a dialectical exchange over a set of ethical and social questions. From the interface of these two long- standing and seemingly incompatible traditions emerges a surprisingly fruitful discussion over a common set of values, problems, and interests: the presumption against harm, the relation of justice and order, the ethics of civil disobedience, the problem of self-righteousness in moral discourse about war, the ethics of nuclear deterrence, and the need for practical reasoning about the morality of war. Miller pays critical attention to thinkers such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, as well as to modern thinkers like H. Richard Niebuhr, Paul Ramsey, Martin Luther King, Jr., James Douglass, the Berrigans, William O'Brien, Michael Walzer, and James Childress. He demonstrates how pacifism and just-war tenets can be joined around both theoretical and practical issues. Interpretations of Conflict is a work of massive scholarship and careful reasoning that should interest philosophers, theologians, and religious ethicists alike. It enhances our moral literacy about injury, suffering, and killing, and offers a compelling dialectical approach to ethics in a pluralistic society. Richard B. Miller is assistant professor of religious studies at Indiana University.
Just Plain Data Analysis teaches students statistical literacy skills that they can use to evaluate and construct arguments about public affairs issues grounded in numerical evidence. The book addresses skills that are often not taught in introductory social science research methods courses and that are often covered sketchily in the research methods textbooks: where to find commonly used measures of political and social conditions; how to assess the reliability and validity of specific indicators; how to present data efficiently in charts and tables; how to avoid common misinterpretations and misrepresentations of data; and how to evaluate causal arguments based on numerical data. With a new chapter on statistical fallacies and updates throughout the text, the new edition teaches students how to find, interpret, and present commonly used social indicators in an even clearer and more practical way.
The 2001 issue of the Yearbook deals with the problem of international justice. What is the meaning of "justice" in the age of globalisation? In which sense can the "right" provide for criteria that make it possible to afford conflicts in international relations? Which new interpretative standards do turn out to be introduced within domestic law by international dimension? This issue of Ars interpretandi tries to answer these questions as well as other ones, according to an interdisciplinary view, which examine their implications in law, ethics, politics, economics and religion.
The 2000 election showed that the mechanics of voting such as ballot design, can make a critical difference in the accuracy and fairness of our elections. But as Dennis F. Thompson shows, even more fundamental issues must be addressed to insure that our electoral system is just. Thompson argues that three central democratic principles—equal respect, free choice, and popular sovereignty—underlie our electoral institutions, and should inform any assessment of the justice of elections. Although we may all endorse these principles in theory, Thompson shows that in practice we disagree about their meaning and application. He shows how they create conflicts among basic values across a broad spectrum of electoral controversies, from disagreements about term limits and primaries to disputes about recounts and presidential electors. To create a fair electoral system, Thompson argues, we must deliberate together about these principles and take greater control of the procedures that govern our elections. He demonstrates how applying the principles of justice to electoral practices can help us answer questions that our electoral system poses: Should race count in redistricting? Should the media call elections before the polls close? How should we limit the power of money in elections? Accessible and wide ranging, Just Elections masterfully weaves together the philosophical, legal, and political aspects of the electoral process. Anyone who wants to understand the deeper issues at stake in American elections and the consequences that follow them will need to read it. In answering these and other questions, Thompson examines the arguments that citizens and their representatives actually use in political forums, congressional debates and hearings, state legislative proceedings, and meetings of commissions and local councils. In addition, the book draws on a broad range of literature: democratic theory, including writings by Madison, Hamilton, and Tocqueville, and contemporary philosophers, as well as recent studies in political science, and work in election law.
Photo opportunities, ten-second sound bites, talking heads and celebrity anchors: so the world is explained daily to millions of Americans. The result, according to the experts, is an ignorant public, helpless targets of a one-way flow of carefully filtered and orchestrated communication. Common Knowledge shatters this pervasive myth. Reporting on a ground-breaking study, the authors reveal that our shared knowledge and evolving political beliefs are determined largely by how we actively reinterpret the images, fragments, and signals we find in the mass media. For their study, the authors analyzed coverage of 150 television and newspaper stories on five prominent issues—drugs, AIDS, South African apartheid, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the stock market crash of October 1987. They tested audience responses of more than 1,600 people, and conducted in-depth interviews with a select sample. What emerges is a surprisingly complex picture of people actively and critically interpreting the news, making sense of even the most abstract issues in terms of their own lives, and finding political meaning in a sophisticated interplay of message, medium, and firsthand experience. At every turn, Common Knowledge refutes conventional wisdom. It shows that television is far more effective at raising the saliency of issues and promoting learning than is generally assumed; it also undermines the assumed causal connection between newspaper reading and higher levels of political knowledge. Finally, this book gives a deeply responsible and thoroughly fascinating account of how the news is conveyed to us, and how we in turn convey it to others, making meaning of at once so much and so little. For anyone who makes the news—or tries to make anything of it—Common Knowledge promises uncommon wisdom.
Legalism or legal formalism usually depicts judges as resolving cases by allegedly merely applying pre-existing legal rules. They do not seem to legislate, exercise discretion, balance or pursue policies, and they definitely do not look outside of conventional legal texts for guidance in deciding new cases. For them, the law is an autonomous domain of knowledge and technique. What they follow are the maxims of clarity, determinacy, and coherence of law. This perception of law and adjudication is sometimes designated as “an orthodox lawyering”. However, at least in certain cases, it is very difficult to say that legalism is not an inappropriate theory or a method of legal interpretation. Different theories have attested that legal interpretation is much more than just legalism, which appears to be far too naïve. In the framework of modern legal interpretation, the following questions can be raised. Is it possible to integrate legalism in a coherent theory of legal interpretation? Is legalism as a distinctive theory of legal interpretation still a feasible theory of interpretation? How can such a formalist approach withstand a critique from Dworkinian moral interpretivism or accusations of being a myth, masking political preferences from legal realists? These and many other issues about legal interpretation are discussed in this book by prominent legal philosophers and legal theorists.
